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Tackling	  Overindebtedness	  




By:	  Sarah	  Lynn	  Flecke	  
	  
Thesis	  Advisor:	  Professor	  María	  Amparo	  Cruz-­Saco,	  Ph.D.	  	  	  AN	  HONORS	  THESIS	  PRESENTED	  TO	  THE	  ECONOMICS	  DEPARTMENT	  IN	  PARTIAL	  FULFILLMENT	  OF	  THE	  REQUIREMENTS	  FOR	  HONORS	  IN	  THE	  MAJOR	  FIELD	  	  	  	  	   Abstract	  	  This	   thesis	   examines	   the	   growth	   and	   development	   of	   the	   financial	   sector	   in	   Ecuador,	  focusing	   in	   particular	   on	   the	   products	   and	   services	   offered	   to	   low-­‐income	   individuals,	  including,	   but	   not	   limited	   to	   microfinance.	   I	   examine	   the	   current	   problem	   of	   over-­‐indebtedness,	   and	   evaluate	   both	   the	   supply	   /	   institutional	   side	   as	  well	   as	   the	   demand	   /	  client	  side.	  	  I	  conclude	  that	  while	  the	  market	  for	  microfinance	  institutions	  and	  low-­‐income	  products	  and	  services	  is	  highly	  saturated	  and	  very	  developed,	  governmental	  interventions,	  structural	   problems	   and	   lack	   of	   accompanying	   financial	   capabilities	   have	   limited	   the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  industry,	  and	  perpetuated	  indebtedness.	  	  I	  propose	  mandatory	  financial	  education	  programs	  provided	  by	  all	  financial	  institutions	  that	  target	  low-­‐income	  clients	  in	  particular.	   This	   policy	   recommendation	  will	   improve	   the	   current	  microfinance	  model	   by	  increasing	   client	   financial	   knowledge,	   hence	   mitigating	   the	   harmful	   consequences	   of	  governmental	  intervention	  in	  the	  financial	  system.	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Introduction	  
	  	   Microfinance,	   and	   the	   market	   for	   products	   and	   services	   targeting	   low-­‐income	  individuals	   have	  been	   increasingly	  discussed	  over	   the	  past	   20	   years	   in	   particular.	   	  Many	  changes	   throughout	   the	  world	  have	  been	  witnessed,	   as	  microfinance	  has	  become	  a	  well-­‐established	  industry	  in	  nearly	  every	  continent.	  	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  this	  growth	  and	  promise	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  help	  eradicate	  poverty,	  many	  have	  questioned	  the	  actual	  effects	  of	  this	  development	  strategy.	  	  Indeed,	  microfinance	  has	  not	  quite	  lived	  up	  to	  its	  original	  promise.	  	  Yet,	  as	  many	  scholars	   have	   shown	   through	   the	   use	   of	   impact	   evaluations,	   surveys	   and	   comprehensive	  studies,	   there	   is	   great	  potential.	   	   The	  model	   is	  not	  perfect,	   but	   it	   can	  be	   a	   critical	   tool	   to	  providing	   the	   financially	   excluded	   population	   with	   products	   and	   services	   to	   help	   them	  improve	  their	  economic	  situations.	  	  In	  order	  for	  this	  to	  happen,	  some	  reform	  is	  needed.	  In	  particular,	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  microfinance	  model	  in	  each	  regional	  context	  must	  be	  taken,	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  issues	  most	  critical	  to	  the	  local	  institutions	  and	  populations.	  	  	  	   The	  purpose	  of	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	   take	   a	   closer	   look	  at	   the	  microfinance	  model	   as	   it	  currently	  exists	  in	  Ecuador.	  	  I	  will	  show	  the	  changes	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  recent	  years	  in	  the	   industry	   as	   a	   whole	   and	   how	   clients	   have	   been	   affected.	   	   The	   Ecuadorian	   context	  provides	   an	   interesting	   case	   study	   because	   it	   has	   one	   of	   the	  most	   saturated	  markets	   in	  Latin	   America	   and	   reflects	   the	   struggles	   many	   other	   countries	   are	   going	   through	   with	  regards	   to	   its	   microfinance	   market	   and	   clients.	   	   In	   particular,	   the	   problem	   of	  overindebtedness	  has	  been	  cited	  as	  the	  greatest	  threat	  to	  the	  microfinance	  industry	  in	  the	  world	  and	  is	  one	  problem	  the	  Ecuadorian	  economy	  has	  been	  grappling	  with	  more	  recently.	  	  As	  a	  number	  of	  institutional	  changes	  are	  taking	  place	  in	  Ecuador,	  the	  recent	  emergence	  of	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financial	   education	   has	   sparked	   a	   new	   discourse	   about	  what	   the	   country	   and	   its	   clients	  need.	  	  	  Thus,	   using	   Ecuador	   as	   a	   case	   study,	   the	   paper	   will	   examine	   the	   issues	   faced	   by	  microfinance	  institutions	  (MFIs)	  and	  clients	  more	  carefully.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  will	  provide	  an	  examination	   of	   the	   indebtedness	   challenge	   and	   evaluate	   to	   what	   extent	   it	   can	   truly	   be	  classified	  as	   an	   ‘overindebtedness	   crisis’	   as	   the	  national	   rhetoric	  has	   suggested.	  Lastly,	   it	  will	  analyze	  the	  potential	  for	  financial	  education	  and	  give	  a	  policy	  recommendation	  for	  its	  most	  effective	  use	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  faced	  in	  Ecuador.	  	  	  The	   research	   in	   this	   paper	   contributes	   to	   a	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   the	  microfinance	   industry	   in	   Ecuador.	   	   It	   also	   provides	   a	   solution	   for	   how	   to	   improve	   the	  existing	  model	   and	  makes	   a	   case	   for	   the	   greater	   use	   of	   financial	   education	   as	   a	   way	   of	  achieving	  greater	   financial	   inclusion	  of	   low-­‐income	  populations,	  a	  critical	   issue	   facing	  the	  microfinance	  industry	  worldwide.	  Chapter	   1	   presents	   a	   brief	   history	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	  microfinance,	   as	  well	   as	   a	  discussion	  of	  the	  various	  kinds	  of	  microfinance	  structures.	  	  It	  gives	  a	  global	  context	  of	  MFIs	  and	  their	  services	  and	  the	  most	  significant	  changes	  that	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  industry	  over	  the	  past	  40	  years.	  	  Chapter	  2	  discusses	  the	  challenges	  and	  achievements	  of	  the	  industry,	  and	  focuses	  on	  particular	   findings	   from	   randomized	   control	   trials.	   	   The	   chapter	   presents	   the	   main	  criticisms	   that	   have	   been	   voiced	   about	   microfinance	   as	   a	   development	   strategy	   and	  evaluates	  their	  validity.	  	  It	  also	  analyzes	  the	  major	  contributions	  of	  the	  field	  and	  highlights	  the	  most	  successful	  aspects	  of	  the	  model	  globally.	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Chapter	   3	   focuses	   on	   Ecuador’s	   regulatory	   framework,	   in	   particular	   how	   it	   has	  shaped	   and	   affected	   the	   financial	   and	  microfinance	   sector.	   	   The	   chapter	   provides	   a	   brief	  history	   of	   Ecuador’s	   economic	   changes	   and	   contextualizes	   the	   presence	   of	  microfinance.	  	  The	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  policies	  most	  recently	  put	  in	  place	  by	  the	  New	  Left	  government	  of	  Rafael	  Correa	  and	  the	  changes	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  economic	  structure	  that	  have	  disrupted	  the	  operations	  of	  financial	  institutions	  within	  it.	  	   Chapter	   4	   provides	   an	   overview	  of	  MFIs	   in	  Ecuador,	   highlighting	   two	  of	   the	  most	  important	  institutions	  in	  the	  market:	  Banco	  Solidario	  and	  Banco	  Pichincha’s	  Credi	  Fé.	  	  This	  includes	   an	   outline	   of	   a	   brief	   history	   of	   these	   institutions	   and	   contextualizing	   their	  approach	   and	   client	   base.	   	   Furthermore,	   the	   chapter	   offers	   a	   financial	   analysis	   of	   both	  institutions,	  shedding	  light	  on	  the	  overall	  financial	  health	  and	  stability	  of	  the	  key	  players	  in	  the	  market.	  	  	   Chapter	   5	   discusses	   problem	   of	   Ecuadorian	   overindebtedness	   in	   more	   depth.	   	   It	  gives	  a	  deeper	  insight	  into	  the	  financial	  trends	  and	  behaviors	  of	  clients,	  using	  a	  number	  of	  different	  indicators	  of	  indebtedness	  to	  do	  so.	  	  The	  section	  examines	  the	  increase	  in	  clients	  in	  the	  market,	  particularly	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  microenterprise	  portfolio,	  the	  rise	  in	  access	  to	  and	   circulation	   of	   credit	   cards,	   and	   the	   debates	   around	   the	   elimination	   of	   private	   credit	  bureaus.	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  overindebtedness	  can	  truly	  be	  considered	  a	  crisis	  in	  Ecuador.	  	   Chapter	  6	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	   financial	  education	  and	  discusses	  the	   literature	  review	   on	   the	   subject.	   Studies	   show	   its	   effectiveness	   in	   inducing	   positive	   behavioral	  changes	  and	   financial	  behaviors	   in	  different	   contexts.	  The	  chapter	  also	  explains	   the	  need	  for	  more	  financial	  education	  globally	  to	  accompany	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  products	  and	  services	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available	   to	   clients.	   	  Moreover,	   it	   outlines	   the	   current	   governmental	   reforms	  pushing	   for	  mandatory	  education	  programs	  offered	  by	  all	  MFIs	  in	  Ecuador.	  Chapter	  7	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  financial	  education	  in	  addressing	  some	  of	  the	  shortcomings	   of	   the	   current	   microfinance	   model	   as	   it	   exists	   in	   Ecuador.	   	   It	   focuses	   in	  particular	   on	   how	   the	   problems	   leading	   to	   overindebtendess	   can	   be	  mitigated	   and	   how	  financial	   behavior	   can	   be	   positively	   affected	   through	   the	   model.	   It	   serves	   as	   a	  recommendation	  to	  policymakers	  for	  how	  to	  best	  implement	  financial	  education.	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Chapter	  1:	  Global	  Context	  of	  Microfinance	  and	  Financial	  Inclusion	  	   Over	   the	   past	   two	   decades,	   we	   have	   seen	   a	   significant	   increase	   in	   financial	  institutions,	   products	   and	   services	   being	   made	   available	   to	   low-­‐income	   and	   poor	  individuals	   throughout	   the	   world.	   	   Why	   is	   this	   significant?	   	   One	   of	   the	   Millennium	  Development	  Goals,	  as	  stated	  by	  the	  United	  Nations,	  is	  to	  reduce	  poverty	  by	  half	  by	  the	  year	  2015.	   	   This	   requires	   a	   sustainable,	   long-­‐term	   strategy	   that	   will	   allow	   for	   an	   enhanced	  financial	   solvency	   in	   the	  world.	   	   Providing	   formal	   financial	   products	   and	   services	   to	   the	  world’s	  poor	  is	  considered	  one	  way	  to	  promote	  greater	  financial	  independence,	  and	  move	  a	  step	   closer	   towards	   long-­‐term	   poverty	   reduction.	   	  Moreover,	  microfinance	   –	   a	   collective	  term	   referring	   to	   financial	   services,	   including	   loans,	   made	   available	   primarily	   for	   the	  purposes	   of	   expanding	   small	   businesses,	   or	   microenterprises	   –	   has	   been	   seen	   as	   one	  method	  to	  increase	  financial	  inclusion	  and	  reduce	  poverty.	  	  	  Within	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  development	  challenge	  then,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  one	  key	  aspect	   is	   providing	   products	   and	   services	   to	   the	   population	   who	   is	   not	   included	   in	   the	  commercial	  formal	  financial	  banking	  system.	  	  There	  can	  be	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons	  why	  certain	  populations	   are	   excluded	   from	   the	   financial	   system,	   such	   as	   lack	   of	   collateral,	   illiteracy,	  poor	  credit	  score,	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  	  In	  the	  past,	  this	  population	  was	  considered	  “unbankable,”	  or	  a	  liability	  for	  most	  financial	  institutions	  who	  would	  not	  take	  on	  these	  clients.	  	  However,	  more	  and	  more	  low-­‐income	  individuals	  are	  becoming	  a	  part	  of	  the	  formal	  financial	  system,	  thanks	  in	  large	  part	  to	  the	  rise	  in	  microfinance	  over	  the	  past	  3	  decades.	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  global	  developments	  and	  spread	  of	  microfinance,	  as	  well	  as	  present	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  Latin	  American	  trends.	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A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Microfinance	  	   The	  1970s	  and	  80s	  were	   times	  of	   global	   economic	   recessions,	   and	   it	   is	   in	   this	  era	  that	  we	  first	  begin	  to	  see	  the	  development	  of	  microfinance	  organizations	  as	  we	  know	  them	  today.	  However,	  attempts	   to	  broaden	   financial	   inclusion	  occurred	  much	  earlier	   than	  that,	  but	   in	   different	   forms.	   	   Credit	   cooperatives	   and	   credit	   unions	   are	   cited	   as	   early	  microfinance	   organizational	   forms	  which	   date	   back	   to	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   20th	   century	  (Jurik,	  2005).	  	  Credit	   cooperatives	   included	  programs	   that	  granted	   loans	   to	   farmers	  and	   traders,	  often	  by	  rural	  development	  banks.	  	  Between	  the	  1950’s	  and	  1980’s,	  these	  kinds	  of	  lending	  programs	  tended	  to	  be	  government	  subsidized	  and	  high	  default	  rates	  were	  common.	  	  This	  was	   explained	   in	   part	   by	   inefficiency	   and	   bad	   business	   practices	   often	   fostered	   through	  subsidies.	   In	   addition,	   the	   agricultural	   industry	   was	   very	   vulnerable	   to	   seasonal	   and	  weather	   changes,	   making	   this	   kind	   of	   lending	   rather	   risky.	   	   Credit	   unions	   began	   in	   the	  Global	   South	   and	   are	   cooperative	   financial	   institutions	   which	   have	   no	   external	  shareholders,	  providing	  credits	  and	  savings	  to	  members.	  	  Overall,	  these	  forms	  of	  increasing	  financial	  inclusion	  have	  been	  said	  to	  benefit	  those	  poor	  who	  are	  better	  off	  than	  the	  indigent	  population	  including	  farmers	  without	  land.	  	  Furthermore,	  their	  structure	  only	  allows	  for	  a	  limited	  range	  of	  financial	  products	  and	  services	  such	  as	  working	  capital	   loans,	  short-­‐term	  loans,	  and	  loans	  for	  restricted	  periods	  of	  time	  (Berger,	  Goldmark	  &	  Sanabria,	  2006).	  In	  the	  1970s,	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  development	  discourse	  emerged	  and	  challenged	  the	  prior	  beliefs	  that	  state-­‐led	  interventions	  and	  large,	  centralized	  development	  projects	  were	  key	   to	  solving	   the	  development	  question.	   	  Thus,	   smaller-­‐scale,	  private,	  and	  informal	   enterprises	   were	   seen	   as	   a	   more	   efficient	   strategy	   to	   tackle	   economic	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development.	  	  NGOs	  began	  to	  mushroom	  around	  the	  world,	  leading	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  what	  is	  known	  as	  the	  non-­‐profit	  or	  third	  sector	  (Bédécarrats,	  Bastiaensen	  &	  Doligez,	  2001).	  	  This	  also	   fit	  well	  with	   the	  neoliberal	  policies	  of	   the	  structural	  adjustment	  period,	  which	  called	  for	  privatization,	  market-­‐driven	  production	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  and	  trade	  liberalization	  .	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  the	  first	  MFIs	  that	  we	  know	  today	  began	  to	  emerge.	  	  	  Perhaps	  the	  best-­‐known	  example	  of	  such	  an	  MFI	  is	  the	  Grameen	  Bank.	  	  The	  story	  of	  the	   Bangladeshi	   “village	   bank”	   has	   been	   the	   model	   for	   many	   subsequent	   MFIs	   and	   the	  inspiration	   for	   several	   books	   and	   documentaries.	   Muhammed	   Yunus,	   a	   Bangladeshi	  professor	   of	   Economics	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Chittagong,	   is	   the	   founder	   of	   Grameen.	  Concerned	  with	  the	  level	  of	  poverty	  prevalent	  in	  Bangladesh,	  particularly	  in	  rural	  areas,	  the	  bank	  initially	  began	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  field	  study	  in	  1976	  (Yunus,	  2008).	  	  	  Only	   a	   few	   years	   after	   the	   Bangladeshi	   independence	   from	   Pakistan	   in	   1971,	   the	  country	  was	  still	  in	  a	  political	  and	  economic	  phase	  of	  transition.	  	  Many	  individuals	  lived	  in	  dire	   poverty,	   and	   particularly	   the	   rural	   areas	   of	   Bangladesh	   were	   affected	   by	   economic	  struggles.	   Together	   with	   his	   students,	   Yunus	   visited	   such	   poor	   rural	   areas	   and	   began	  talking	   to	   individuals	   about	   their	   financial	   situations.	   	   They	   soon	   discovered	   that	   small-­‐business	   owners	   (such	   as	   street	   vendors	   and	   weavers)	   relied	   on	   local	   loan	   sharks	   who	  charged	   exorbitant	   interest	   rates.	   	   The	   rates	  were	   so	   high,	   recipients	  would	   realistically	  never	  be	  able	  to	  repay	  them,	  causing	  small	  business-­‐owners	  to	  pay	  back	  all	  their	  profits	  to	  the	  lenders,	  thereby	  remaining	  in	  a	  debt	  trap.	  	  Yunus	  realized	  that	  it	  wouldn’t	  take	  much	  to	  set	   the	   borrowers	   free	   from	   the	   cycle	   of	   predatory	   loans	   and	   began	   a	   project	   with	   his	  students	  to	  give	  small	   loans	  (average	  of	  $160)	  to	  these	  individuals	  for	  their	  businesses	  at	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interest	   rates	   of	   approximately	   20%;	   significantly	   lower	   than	   those	   of	   the	   loan	   sharks	  (Yunus,	  2008).	  	  
The	  Grameen	  Model	  	   Yunus	   applied	   a	   number	   of	   strategies	   to	   his	   small	   lending	   organization,	   which	  helped	  to	  make	  it	  successful.	  	  He	  primarily	  targeted	  women,	  who	  are	  the	  greatest	  victims	  of	  poverty.	   	  According	  to	  the	  Global	  Poverty	  Project,	  more	  than	  70%	  of	  the	  world’s	  poor	  are	  women. Furthermore,	   in	   the	   Bangladeshi	   context,	   many	   women	   were	   denied	   access	   to	  formal	  sector	  employment,	   forcing	  them	  to	  rely	  on	   loan	  sharks.	   	  Yunus	  also	  believed	  that	  women	   were	   more	   likely	   to	   invest	   their	   capital	   into	   child	   education	   and	   social	  infrastructures,	  beneficial	  to	  the	  community,	  while	  men	  were	  more	  selfish	  spenders	  (Jurik,	  2005).	  	  The	   second	   important	   strategy	   is	   the	   village-­‐banking	   model,	   which	   gives	   the	  Grameen	  Bank	  its	  name.	   	  This	  village	   lending	  model	   involves	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  bank	  branch	   in	   an	   area,	   with	   a	   field	   officer	   and	   staff	   members	   who	   cover	   an	   area	   of	   several	  villages.	   	   The	   ground	   staff	   recruits	   suitable	   clients	   in	   these	   villages.	   	   Groups	   of	   clients	   /	  borrowers	   are	   formed	  and	   for	   a	   test	  phase	  2	   selected	  borrowers	   are	   granted	   loans	   for	   a	  period	   of	   5	   weeks.	   	   If	   during	   this	   period,	   the	   clients	   repay	   on	   time,	   the	   other	   group	  members	   may	   also	   receive	   their	   loans.	   The	   date	   their	   payments	   are	   due,	   clients	   come	  together	  again	  as	  a	  group.	  If	  one	  member	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  repaying,	  the	  other	  women	  must	  step	  in	  and	  cover	  their	  costs.	  This	  lending	  technology	  is	  called	  “joint-­‐liability”	  and	  attempts	  to	  minimize	  default	  rates.	  	  The	  charged	  interest	  rate	  covers	  operating	  costs	  and	  includes	  a	  small	  group	  fund	  and	  an	  emergency	  fund	  for	  clients.	   	  Thus,	  a	  portion	  of	  every	  repayment	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goes	  into	  a	  small	  savings	  account	  /	  emergency	  fund	  and	  another	  portion	  goes	  into	  a	  group	  fund,	  which	  the	  group	  members	  can	  spend	  as	  they	  wish.	   	  The	  group	  also	  meets	  weekly	  in	  the	   village	   to	   discuss	   business	   strategies,	   progress	   and	   give	   one	   another	   moral	   support	  (Grameen	  Bank).	  	  This	  small-­‐scale,	  experimental	  operation	  quickly	  grew	  into	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  MFIs	  in	  the	  world.	  	  It	  has	  become	  a	  for-­‐profit	  institution,	  attainted	  formal	  bank	  status,	  and	  is	  part	  of	  a	  group	  of	  institutions	  which	  include	  both	  for-­‐	  and	  non-­‐profit	  segments.	  	  By	  2010,	  Grameen	  had	  6.61	  million	  active	  borrowers	  and	  a	  loan	  portfolio	  of	  nearly	  14	  billion	  USD.	  	  Grameen	  has	   set	  up	  branches	   in	  36	  different	   countries,	   in	  Asia,	   Latin	  America,	  North	  America,	   the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  Africa	   (Gramen	  Foundation).	  Seen	  as	  an	   innovative	  and	  successful	   long-­‐term	  development	  strategy,	  Grameen’s	  microfinance	  model	  has	  since	  then	  spread	  rapidly	  to	  other	  countries.	  	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  Grameen	  Fund	  has	  also	  allowed	  for	  funding	  of	  MFIs	  throughout	   the	   world.	   By	   2008	   there	   were	   an	   estimated	   2,420	   MFIs	   and	   99	   million	  borrowers	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  (Gonzalez,	  2008).	  	  
Departing	  from	  Grameen:	  Other	  Global	  Developments	  in	  Microfinance	  	   While	  Grameen	   is	  considered	  one	  of	   the	  earliest	  and	  most	   influential	   formal	  MFIs,	  there	  are	  other	  significant	  examples	  of	  different	  models,	  organizations	  and	  institutions	  that	  have	  impacted	  the	  field	  of	  economic	  development	  and	  financial	  inclusion.	  In	  Latin	  America,	  the	   concept	  of	   granting	   small	   loans	   to	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs	  was	  being	  developed	  around	  the	   same	   time	   that	   Yunus	   and	  his	   students	  were	   first	   experimenting	  with	   small	   loans	   in	  Bangladesh.	   	   In	   1972,	   a	   Brazilian	   organization	   based	   in	  Recife	   called	   Projeto	  Uno,	   began	  offering	  small	  working	  capital	   loans	  to	  small	  business	  owners.	  An	  important	  contribution	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by	  Projeto	  Uno	  to	  the	  field	  of	  microfinance	  was	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  role	  of	  a	  proactive	  loan	  officer,	  who	  formed	  a	  personal	  connection	  with	  clients.	  	  The	  loan	  officer	  has	  become	  a	  critical	  agent	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  microfinance	  around	  the	  world,	  and	  is	  present	  at	  all	  stages	  of	   the	   loan	   cycle.	   	   The	   officer	   recruits	   and	   evaluates	   potential	   clients,	   grants	   the	   loan,	  follows	  up	  on	   the	  client’s	  progress,	   and	   is	   responsible	   for	   collecting	   the	   loan	  repayments	  from	  the	  client	  (Berger,	  Goldmark	  &	  Sanabria,	  2006).	  1975	  marked	  the	  International	  Year	  for	  Women,	  which	  heightened	  discourse	  about	  ways	   to	   increase	  economic	   inclusion	  of	  women.	   	  During	   this	   time,	  many	   felt	   that	   greater	  access	   to	   credit	   would	   lead	   women	   to	   greater	   independence	   and	   allow	   them	   to	   spend	  money	   where	   they	   deemed	   it	   relevant,	   covering	   their	   needs.	   	   Thus,	   women’s	   access	   to	  credit	  was	  viewed	  as	  the	  more	  pressing	  concern,	  above	  other	  issues	  such	  as	  health	  care	  or	  education.	   	   In	   response	   to	   these	   sentiments,	   a	   group	   of	   10	  women	   came	   together	   at	   the	  United	  Nations	  Women’s	  Conference	  in	  Mexico	  City	  that	  year	  to	  establish	  the	  MFI	  network,	  Women’s	  World	  Banking.	  This	  was	  a	  further	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  rapid	  growth	  and	  spread	  of	   development	   strategies	   geared	   towards	   greater	   financial	   access	   and	   inclusion	   of	  previously	  unbanked	  populations	  of	  the	  world	  (Berger,	  Goldmark	  &	  Sanabria,	  2006).	  	  A	  further	  pioneering	  MFI	  which	  affected	  the	  development	  of	  the	  industry	  emerged	  in	  Latin	  America:	  ACCION.	   	  ACCION	  was	  originally	  founded	  in	  Caracas,	  Venezuela	  in	  1961	  by	  a	  group	  of	  U.S.	  volunteers	  with	  a	  mission	  to	  improve	  neighborhoods	  near	  local	  corporate	  branches	  of	  U.S.-­‐based	  multi-­‐national	  corporations.	  However,	  by	  1973	   its	   focus	  shifted	  to	  providing	  loans	  to	  poor	  microentrepreneurs	  (Jurik,	  2005).	  	  It	  has	  since	  grown	  into	  a	  large	  network	  of	  MFIs,	  operating	   in	  Latin	  America,	   the	  Caribbean,	   the	  United	  States	  and	  Africa.	  	  ACCION	  has	  relied	  on	  funding	  from	  private	  and	  public	  sources,	  but	  began	  to	  realize	  early	  on	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the	   importance	   of	   financial	   self-­‐sufficiency.	   	   Thus,	   it	   began	   transforming	   a	   number	   of	   its	  branches	   to	   commercial	   regulated	   institutions.	   ACCION’s	   model	   affected	   the	   way	   Latin	  American	  MFIs	   have	  moved	   towards	   commercialization	   and	   played	   a	   critical	   part	   in	   the	  establishment	  of	  some	  of	  the	  region’s	  first	  commercial	  bank	  MFIs,	  BancoSol	  and	  Finamerica	  of	  Bolivia	  and	  Colombia	  respectively	  (Berger,	  Goldmark	  &	  Sanabria,	  2006).	  	  
Upgrading	  and	  Downscaling	  of	  MFIs	  	   The	  process	  of	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  transforming	  into	  formal	  financial	  banking	  institutions	  regulated	  by	  a	  central	  bank	  or	  regulatory	  framework	  is	  known	  as	  “upgrading.”	  This	  process	  allows	  for	  financial	  sustainability	  and	  regulation	  of	  the	  MFI,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	   maintains	   loan	   sizes	   that	   are	   much	   smaller	   than	   commercial	   bank	   loans,	   thereby	  staying	   true	   to	   the	   original	  mission	   of	  microfinance.	   	   The	   realization	   that	   small	   business	  owners	  valued	  the	  availability	  of	  –	  and	  quick	  access	  to	  –	  financial	  services	  more	  than	  very	  low	   interest	   rates	   allowed	   for	   coverage	   of	   the	   high	   overhead	   costs	   of	  MFIs.	   	   It	   also	   gave	  institutions	   access	   to	   capital	   markets	   and	   interbank	   lending.	   This	   upgrading	   process	  enabled	   the	   provision	   of	   funding,	   considered	   one	   of	   the	   greatest	   bottlenecks	   of	   the	  industry.	   Furthermore,	   the	   process	   of	   upgrading	   broadened	   the	   institutional	   operational	  scale	  and	  reach	  at	  a	  national	  and	  international	  level,	  and	  gave	  them	  more	  credibility.	  	  It	  also	  provided	  clients	  with	  new	  financial	  products	  and	  services,	   including	  savings	  accounts,	  an	  important	   step	   towards	   truly	   increasing	   financial	   access,	   inclusion	   and	   sustainability	   of	  clients.	  In	  response	  to	  these	  changes	  in	  the	  financial	  system	  and	  microfinance	  industry	  as	  a	  whole,	   the	  Latin	  American	   regulatory	  environment	  began	   to	   change	   too.	   	  Regulations	   for	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non-­‐bank	  financial	  institutions	  tightened	  and	  the	  respective	  national	  financial	  supervisory	  institutions	   imposed	   capital	   and	   collateral	   requirements	   on	   them.	   	   Thus,	   the	   upgrading	  process	  of	   the	   industry	   led	  to	  changes	  of	   the	  regulatory	  environment,	  but	  upgraded	  MFIs	  also	  benefited	  from	  these	  changes	  (Berger,	  Goldmark	  &	  Sanabria,	  2006).	  With	   the	   upgrading	   process,	   MFIs	   were	   also	   able	   to	   broaden	   and	   diversify	   their	  client	  base.	   	  In	  many	  instances,	  in	  order	  to	  access	  more	  savings,	  commercial	  MFIs	  opened	  branches	  in	  wealthier	  neighborhoods.	  	  When	  upgraded	  MFIs	  increasingly	  began	  to	  develop	  deposits,	  other	  services	  like	  ATMs,	  debit	  and	  credit	  cards	  started	  to	  be	  added	  to	  the	  range	  of	   products	   and	   services	   offered.	   	   This	  meant	   increasing	   the	   size	   of	   banking	   operations	  through	   a	   larger	   number	   of	   branches,	   hiring	   more	   staff	   and	   adopting	   more	   advanced	  technologies	   which	   led	   to	   higher	   operational	   costs	   for	   the	   MFIs.	   	   In	   order	   to	   remain	  profitable	  and	   to	  keep	   interest	   rates	   low,	   financial	   institutions	  had	   to	   increase	  efficiency,	  thereby	  achieving	  lower	  marginal	  costs.	  	  This	  benefited	  not	  only	  the	  institution,	  but	  clients	  too,	   since	   reaching	  out	   to	  a	  wider	  client	  base	  allowed	   for	  expanded	  access	   to	   capital	  and	  also	   kept	   interest	   rates	   low	   as	   a	   result	   of	   higher	   efficiency.	   The	   upgrading	   and	  commercialization	  of	  microfinance	  also	  attracted	  national	  and	  international	  investors	  and	  changed	   the	  way	   the	   industry	   is	   viewed	  with	   regards	   to	   profitability.	   	   For	   the	   first	   time,	  MFIs	  are	  not	  just	  non-­‐profit	  organizations,	  but	  also	  operate	  for-­‐profits	  	  which	  has	  	  made	  the	  reverse	   effect,	   or	   the	   adoption	   of	  microfinance	   by	   a	   commercial	   bank,	   a	  more	   attractive	  prospect.	  	  This	  trend	  has	  been	  observed	  in	  recent	  years	  in	  the	  Latin	  American	  context,	  and	  is	  known	  as	  “downscaling.”	  	  
	   16	  
Microfinance	  Mission	  Drift?	  	  Both	  developments	  of	  upgrading	  and	  downscaling	  have	  caused	  people	   to	  question	  the	  original	  mission	  of	  microfinance	  and	  to	  criticize	  MFIs	  for	  being	  guilty	  of	  a	  mission	  drift.	  	  Many	   have	   argued	   that	   obtaining	   a	   profit	   through	   lending	   to	   the	   poor	   is	   not	   morally	  justifiable	  and	  constitutes	  a	  digression	  away	  from	  the	  original	  purpose	  of	  microfinance.	  If	  a	  profit	  is	  being	  made,	  the	  poor	  are	  being	  overcharged,	  so	  the	  argument	  goes.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Mexican	  commercial	  MFI	  Compartamos	  charges	  women	  90%	  interest	  rates,	  and	  earns	  a	  yearly	  profit	  of	  USD	  80	  million	  (Roy,	  2010).	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Grameen	  Bank	  is	  also	  a	  for-­‐profit	  institution,	  making	  more	  than	  USD	  11	  million	  in	  profits	  a	  year,	  but	  charges	  women	  an	  interest	  rate	  of	  less	  than	  20%.	  	  Thus,	  in	  certain	  cases	  interest	  rates	  have	  been	  unjustifiably	  too	  high,	  leading	  in	  some	  cases	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  nation-­‐wide	  interest	  rate	  cap.	  	  	  However,	   policymakers	   and	   scholars	   have	   also	   argued	   that	   profitable	   MFIs	   are	  better	   at	   operating	   efficiently,	   thereby	   driving	   the	   price/interest	   rates	   down	   overall.	  	  Higher	  profitability	  rates	  and	  solvency	  reduce	  the	  leverage	  cost	  of	  funding	  for	  the	  financial	  institution.	   Thus,	   it	   is	   in	   their	   own	   interest	   to	   push	   efficiency	   up	   and	   lower	   average	  operation	   costs.	   Another	   effect	   of	   productivity	   gains	   is	   that	   it	   leads	   to	   more	  competitiveness,	  since	  institutions	  can	  fund	  themselves	  with	  lower	  rates	  and	  pass	  on	  those	  gains	  by	  offering	  lower	  interest	  rates	  for	  clients.	  This	  positively	  affects	  clients,	  as	  it	  raises	  their	   overall	   consumer	   surplus.	   It	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   when	   upgrading	   truly	   becomes	  effective	   at	   reaching	   people,	   it	   comes	   closer	   to	   achieving	   the	   Millennium	   Development	  Goals.	  	  The	  question	  regarding	   the	   justifiability	  of	  a	  new	  client	  base	  of	  MFIs	  also	  has	   two	  perspectives.	   	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  MFIs	  are	  no	   longer	   focusing	  solely	  on	   the	   truly	  poor,	  but	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spending	  time	  and	  money	  on	  expanding	  products	  and	  services	  to	  others,	  which	   is	   indeed	  no	   longer	   in	   line	  with	   the	  goal	   to	  eradicate	  poverty.	   	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	   this	   too	   is	   a	  way	  of	   expanding	   financial	   products	   and	   services	   to	   those	  who	  did	  not	  previously	   access	   them	   from	   formal	   banks,	   like	   the	   lower-­‐middle	   income	   individuals	   or	  better-­‐off	  poor.	  	  Furthermore,	  by	  providing	  services	  to	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  people	  and	  income	  levels,	   institutions	   have	   a	   more	   diverse	   portfolio,	   and	   are	   better	   capable	   to	   withstand	  economic	   shocks.	   	   Similarly,	   by	  pooling	   risks	   through	  an	   increased	  market	   size,	   financial	  institutions	  hedge	  themselves	  from	  concentrating	  risk	  exposure	  on	  one	  type	  of	  client.	  	  This	  allows	   for	   greater	   access	   to	   capital	   and	   cash	   flow,	  which	   can	  help	  offer	   a	  wider	   range	  of	  products	  and	  services	  to	  the	  poor.	  	  
Moving	  South	  to	  North	  	   A	   further	   interesting	   development	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   microfinance	   has	   been	   the	  spillover	  from	  the	  Global	  South	  to	  the	  Global	  North.	  	  As	  outlined,	  microfinance	  was	  initially	  about	  the	  income-­‐generating	  development	  strategy	  for	  the	  context	  of	  the	  developing	  world	  and	  poverty	  reduction.	  However,	  with	  the	  power	  of	  being	  replicated,	  different	  microfinance	  models	   have	   been	   implemented	   in	   various	   contexts	   throughout	   the	   world	   and	   allowed	  populations	   to	   access	   credits	   who	   were	   unable	   to	   before.	   	   In	   this	   sense,	   success	   has	  occurred	  in	  varying	  regional	  contexts,	  making	  it	  clear	  that	  microfinance	  could	  be	  applied	  as	  a	  way	   to	  provide	   financial	   access	   to	   all	   segments	  of	   a	  population	   that	   are	   excluded	   from	  formal	  banking	  systems,	  whether	  actually	  living	  in	  poverty	  or	  not.	  	  	  Beginning	  in	  the	  1980s,	  microfinance	  was	  introduced	  in	  the	  United	  States.	   	  For	  the	  U.S.	  context,	   this	  meant	  providing	   financial	  services	   to	  encourage	  entrepreneurs	   in	   target	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populations	   including	  minorities,	   immigrants,	   refugees,	   disabled	   and	   other	  marginalized	  groups.	   	   The	   structures	   had	   to	   be	   adapted	   to	   fit	   local	   demands,	   and	   thus	   diverged	  somewhat	  from	  the	  models	  described	  in	  the	  Asian	  and	  Latin	  American	  contexts;	  however,	  the	  basic	  premise	  remained	  true	  to	  the	  microfinance	  mission.	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Chapter	  2:	  Challenges	  and	  Achievements	  
	   Though	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  microfinance	  sounds	  very	  promising,	  and	  has	  gained	  huge	  global	  acclaim,	  there	  a	  number	  of	  challenges	  that	  the	  industry	  still	  faces.	  	  These	  must	  be	   addressed	   in	  order	   to	  better	  understand	   the	  bigger	  picture	  of	  microfinance,	   but	  also	  to	  improve	  it	  in	  order	  to	  better	  help	  more	  of	  the	  world’s	  poor.	  	  
Assessing	  the	  Impacts	  of	  Microfinance	  Products	  and	  Services	  	   True	   impact	   assessments	   and	   microfinance	   outreach	   have	   not	   been	   measured	  extensively	  since	  the	  development	  of	  MFIs.	  	  Many	  individual	  cases	  of	  clients	  recalling	  heart-­‐warming	   stories	   of	   how	   an	   MFI	   changed	   their	   life	   have	   been	   recorded	   and	   promoted.	  However,	  until	  recently	  ‘scientific’	  studies	  that	  aim	  to	  measure	  real	  impact	  of	  products	  and	  services,	   using	   control	   groups	   and	   standardized	   methodologies	   have	   been	   scarce.	   This	  resulted	   in	   many	   people	   and	   institutions	   questioning	   how	   much	   positive	   change	   can	  actually	  be	  attributed	  to	  microfinance.	  In	  many	  instances,	  MFIs	  attempted	  impact	  assessments	  by	  surveying	  clients	  before	  they	   received	   loans	   or	   other	   services,	   about	   various	   indicators	   that	   were	   supposed	   to	  improve	   over	   time	   (such	   as	   their	   standard	   of	   life,	   purchasing	   power,	   various	   financial	  indicators	   related	   to	   their	   businesses,	   child	   education	   and	   health	   care,	   etc.).	   	   Then,	   they	  asked	  the	  same	  questions	  after	  the	  microloans	  had	  been	  repaid	  to	  see	  what	  had	  changed.	  	  Any	   positive	   changes	   were	   attributed	   to	   the	   products	   and	   services	   the	   MFI	   provided.	  However,	  this	  kind	  of	  assumption	  is	  a	  dangerous	  and	  faulty	  one.	  	  These	  observed	  changes	  can	  by	  no	  means	  be	   attributed	  only	   to	   the	  workings	  of	  microfinance.	   	   Perhaps	   the	   client	  would	   have	   improved	   these	   factors	   on	   her/his	   own	   regardless,	   or	   by	   other	   poverty	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reduction	  programs	  that	  are	  either	  public	  or	  led	  by	  non-­‐profit	  organizations.	  	  What	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  MFI	  was	  the	  cause?	  Also,	  what	  about	  clients	  whose	  situations	  did	  not	  improve?	  	  Is	  that	   also	   the	   fault	   of	   the	  MFI?	   Does	   that	  mean	  microfinance	   is	   ineffective?	   No,	   it	   simply	  means	  that	  an	  accurate	  way	  to	  measure	  its	  effects	  is	  needed.	  	  
The	  Power	  of	  Randomized	  Control	  Trials	  	   In	   response	   to	   this	   lack	   of	   standardized	   procedures	   and	   reliable	   impact	  assessments,	  some	  organizations	  dedicated	  to	  this	  cause	  have	  since	  made	  a	  very	  valuable	  contribution	  to	  the	  field.	  Organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Abdul	  Latif	   Jameel	  Poverty	  Action	  Lab	  (J-­‐PAL),	  as	  well	  as	  Innovations	  for	  Poverty	  Action	  (IPA)	  and	  the	  Financial	  Access	  Initiative	  (FAI)	  have	  begun	  to	  use	  replicable,	  scientific	  methods	  to	  conduct	  field	  studies,	  and	  evaluate	  impact.	  	  This	  has	  been	  achieved	  through	  the	  use	  of	  randomized	  control	  trials	  (RCTs).	  	  The	  methodology	  is	  explained	  by	  Innovations	  for	  Poverty	  Action:	  	  	  “In	  the	  simplest	  kind	  of	  study,	  the	  group	  we	  are	  looking	  at	  is	  divided	  randomly	  in	  two.	  One	  group	   receives	   the	  benefits	   of	   a	  program	  or	   intervention,	   and	   the	  other	  does	  not.	  We	  are	  basically	  flipping	  a	  coin	  for	  each	  person	  to	  decide	  whether	  they	  receive	  a	  program	  or	  not.	  	  With	  random	  assignment,	  each	  person	  in	  the	  study	  has	  the	  same	  chance	  of	  being	  assigned	  to	  a	  group	  as	  another	  person.	  This	  ensures	   that	  as	   long	  as	   the	   two	  groups	  are	   large	  enough,	  they	  will	  on	  average	  be	  statistically	  identical.	  Any	  change	  which	  we	  then	  observe	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  can	  be	  attributed	  entirely	  to	  the	  program	  or	  intervention	  itself,	  rather	  than	  other	  external	  or	  unobserved	  factors.”1	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  www.poverty-­‐action.org	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Findings	  from	  RCTs	  Around	  the	  World	  	  	   A	  paper	  by	  FAI	  summarizes	  the	  most	  important	  recent	  findings	  from	  20	  randomized	  control	   trials	   conducted	   in	   India,	   Malawi,	   Morocco,	   Kenya,	   Ghana,	   the	   Philippines,	   Sri	  Lanka,	  South	  Africa,	  Peru,	  Bolivia	  and	  the	  Dominican	  Republic	  (Bauchet,	  Marschall,	  Starita,	  Thomas	  &	  Yalouris,	  2011).	  	  It	  addresses	  a	  number	  of	  other	  criticisms	  regarding	  the	  effect	  of	  microfinance,	   including	   the	   question	   of	   true	   upward	   mobility	   of	   clients	   thanks	   to	  microfinance,	   as	  well	   as	  women’s	   empowerment.	   	   These	   studies	   show	   that	  microfinance	  has	  not	   created	   the	  huge	   level	  of	   success	  many	  believed	   it	  would	  have,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  clients	  did	  not	  suddenly	  escape	  poverty	  after	  taking	  out	  microloans	  to	  invest	  in	  their	  small	  businesses.	   	   However,	   the	   studies	   also	   demonstrated	   that	   owing	   debts	   by	   taking	   a	  microloan	   does	   not	   have	   negative	   impacts	   on	   the	   poor,	   as	   a	   number	   of	   critics	   had	  hypothesized	  (Dichter	  &	  Harper,	  2007).	  Positive	  impacts	  have	  been	  observed,	  but	  were	  not	  as	  abundant	  or	  drastic	  as	  early	  proponents	  of	  microfinance	  believed.	  	  	  
Changes	  in	  Client’s	  Financial	  Behaviors	  	   More	   specifically,	   the	   single	   largest	   impact	   of	   microloans	   discovered	   is	   improved	  spending	  habits	  of	   clients.	   	   Clients	   that	  used	   the	   loan	   to	   start	  up	  a	  business	  or	   expand	   it	  changed	  their	  household	  spending	   in	  a	  positive	  way.	   	  They	  moved	  away	  from	  temptation	  goods,	   such	  as	  alcohol,	   tobacco,	   gambling	  and	  purchase	  of	   food	  at	   restaurants	  or	  outside	  the	   home	   and	   purchased	  more	   durable	   goods	   instead	   (Banerjee,	   Duflo,	   Glennerster,	   and	  Kinnan	  2010).	   It	  was	   also	  discovered	   that	   in	  many	   cases	   clients	  did	  not	  use	   the	   loans	   to	  invest	   in	   their	   businesses	   at	   all,	   but	   used	   them	   for	   their	   households	   (Karlan	  &	   Zinmann,	  2011).	   	   This	   casts	   light	   on	   the	   larger	   problem	   that	  microfinance,	   based	   on	   the	   idea	   that	  
	   22	  
loans	  should	  be	  used	  for	  expansion	  of	  or	  investment	  in	  a	  business	  is	  perhaps	  a	  misguided	  concept.	   	   Rather,	   the	  majority	   of	   poor	   people	   need	  money	   to	   spend	   on	   daily	   necessities,	  such	  as	   food,	   school	   fees	  and	  supplies,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   cope	  with	  a	   family	  medical,	  or	  other	  emergencies	  (Dichter	  &	  Harper,	  2007).	  	  	  To	  confirm	  this	  point,	  a	  randomized	  control	   trial	  conducted	   in	  South	  Africa,	  which	  assessed	   the	   impact	  of	   consumer	   credit	  demonstrated	   that	   individuals	  who	   took	  out	   this	  kind	  of	  loan	  greatly	  benefited	  from	  it.	  	  6-­‐12	  months	  after	  taking	  out	  the	  loan,	  individuals	  in	  the	  treatment	  group	  had	  higher	  overall	  income	  levels,	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  kept	  their	  job,	   had	   perceived	   higher	   decision-­‐making	   power	  within	   the	   household	   and	   community,	  and	  had	  on	  average	  improved	  food	  consumption	  (Karlan	  &	  Zinnman,	  2010).	  	  Savings	   products	   have	   also	   generally	   been	   coupled	   with	   microcredit.	   This	   has	  overall	   demonstrated	   very	   positive	   behavioral	   changes	   in	   clients.	   One	   of	   the	  aforementioned	  randomized	  control	  trials	  showed	  that	  providing	  formal	  savings	  accounts	  to	  women	  will	  greatly	  increase	  the	  amounts	  they	  save	  a	  month.	  	  Furthermore,	  these	  clients	  will	   on	   average	   invest	   more	   into	   their	   business	   than	   women	   without	   access	   to	   formal	  savings	   accounts.	   	  Daily	  private	   expenditures,	   as	  well	   as	   food	  expenditures	   increased	   for	  the	  treatment	  group,	  suggesting	  an	   increase	   in	   income	  as	  well.	   	   It	  was	  also	  observed	  that	  women	  without	  access	  to	  formal	  savings	  were	  forced	  to	  use	  capital	  from	  their	  business	  to	  respond	  to	  health	  shocks.	  The	  treatment	  group	  was	  able	  to	  use	  the	  savings	  and	  therefore	  did	   not	   have	   to	   access	   business	   capital	  when	   an	   illness	   in	   the	   family	   occurred	   (Dupas	  &	  Robinson,	  2011).	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Women’s	  Empowerment	  	   The	   effect	   that	   microfinance	   has	   on	   women’s	   empowerment	   is	   also	   disputed.	   	   In	  various	   randomized	   control	   trials	   discussed	   in	   the	   FAI	   summary,	   women	   tended	   to	   not	  invest	  significant	  amounts	  of	  their	  loans	  into	  their	  businesses,	  thereby	  not	  generating	  more	  profits	   for	   themselves,	   whereas	   men	   did.	   	   Studies	   also	   showed	   that	   women	   were	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  invest	  this	  money	  into	  their	  households	  and	  cover	  other	  expenses.	  	  However,	  when	  in-­‐kind	  gifts	  of	  equipment	  or	  inventory	  useful	  to	  the	  business	  were	  given	  to	  women,	  profitability	  of	  the	  businesses	  did	  increase,	  particularly	  for	  already	  more	  established,	  larger	  microenterprises	   (Fafchamps,	  McKenzie,	   Quinn,	   and	  Woodruff,	   2011).	   Thus,	   we	   see	   that	  women’s	   empowerment	   via	   larger	   profitability	   of	   their	   businesses,	   and	   thus	   greater	  economic	   power,	   cannot	   be	   so	   simply	   achieved	   by	   granting	   them	   loans.	   	   However,	  providing	   other	   kinds	   of	   products,	   like	   equipment	   or	   inventory	   for	   the	   business,	   may	  promote	  more	  profitability	  and	  economic	  independence	  for	  female	  microentrepreneurs.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  very	  important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  design	  of	  products	  and	  services	  offered	  by	  MFIs	  and	  other	  lending	  institutions.	  	  	  While	  microfinance	  has	   thus	  not	  been	  as	   effective	   in	   the	  overall	   empowerment	  of	  women,	   in	   financial	   terms,	   there	   are	   still	   other	   factors	   to	   take	   into	   account,	   such	   as	   the	  power	   to	   make	   household	   financial	   decisions,	   and	   decisions	   about	   family	   planning.	   As	  stated	  in	  What	  is	  Wrong	  With	  Microfinance?	  with	  regards	  to	  a	  female-­‐led	  self-­‐help	  lending	  group	   in	   India	   (SHG),	   “Although	   the	   examples	   of	   SHG	   action	   that	  we	   found	  were	   not	   as	  numerous	  or	   as	   effective	   as	   hoped	   for,	   the	   fact	   that	   such	   initiatives	  happen	   at	   all	   can	  be	  seen	   as	   a	   good	   start	   in	   a	   traditional,	   patriarchal	   society	   that	   has	   usually	   marginalized	  women’s	  roles	  and	  agencies.”	  (Dichter	  &	  Harper,	  2007).	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Lacking	  Training	  to	  Accompany	  Products	  and	  Services	  	  A	   further	   criticism	   of	  microfinance	   is	   that	  while	   access	   has	   been	   growing	   rapidly	  over	   the	   past	   decade,	   financial	   education	   to	   accompany	   this	   increased	   access	   has	   lagged	  behind.	   	   To	   put	   this	   into	   perspective,	   according	   to	   a	   comprehensive	   study	   by	   the	   Citi	  Foundation,	   between	   500	   and	   800	   million	   of	   the	   world’s	   poor	   have	   access	   to	   finance,	  whereas	   only	   110-­‐130	  million	   of	   them	   received	   any	   form	   of	   financial	   training	   (Deb	   and	  Kubzansky,	   2012).	   This	   means	   that	   roughly	   75%	   of	   low-­‐income	   individuals	   must	   make	  financial	  decisions	  independently,	  without	  guidance	  or	  formal	  instructions.	  	  	  Most	   higher	   income	   individuals	   will	   have	   received	   instructions	   before	   opening	   a	  savings	  or	  checking	  account,	  or	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  improve	  one’s	  credit	  score	  to	  receive	  a	  credit	  card,	  or	   take	  out	  a	   loan	  or	  mortgage,	   to	  give	  a	   few	  examples.	   	  Though	  we	  still	   find	  that	   the	  wealthy	  have	  made	  many	  poor	   financial	  decisions	  despite	  greater	  guidance,	  help	  from	   accountants	   and	   advisors,	   education	   and	   other	   services,	   at	   least	   they	   are	   given	   a	  greater	  chance	  to	  make	  smart	  economic	  decisions	  for	  themselves	  and	  their	  families.	  	  What	  they	  chose	  to	  make	  of	  these	  tools	  to	  aid	  them	  is	  another	  question.	  	  However,	  in	  many	  cases,	  these	  initial	  forms	  of	  financial	  education	  and	  guidance	  are	  not	  available	  to	  the	  poor,	  despite	  the	   fact	   that	   they	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  would	  most	  benefit	   from	  such	  services.	   	  According	  to	  the	  CGAP	  2010	  Annual	  Report,	  	  “poorer	  households	  in	  the	  informal	  economies	  of	  the	  developing	  world	  need	  financial	  services	  as	  much	  as	  wealthier	   families—actually	  more	  so,	   for	   two	  reasons.	  First,	   their	   income	  streams	  and	  bigger	  outlays	   tend	   to	  be	   irregular	  and	  unpredictable,	   and	   their	   income	  and	  expenses	  do	  not	  sync	  up	  as	  neatly	  as	  wealthier	  peoples’	  monthly	  paychecks	  and	  mortgage	  payments.	  Second,	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poor	  people	  obviously	  have	  less	  of	  a	  cushion	  to	  absorb	  economic	  shocks	  to	  begin	  with.”	  (Access	  to	  Finance	  to	  the	  Poor:	  Annual	  Report	  2010)	  For	  these	  reasons,	   it	   is	  essential	  to	  not	  only	  provide	  them	  with	  services,	  but	  also	  to	  grant	  them	  the	  necessary	  tools	  to	  use	  them	  well.	  For	  true	  financial	  inclusion	  to	  occur,	  access	  and	  the	  skills	  to	  make	  best	  use	  of	  that	  access	  are	  required.	  	  
Summary	  and	  Conclusions	  	  	   It	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  the	  industry	  as	  a	  whole	  has	  made	  significant	  progress,	  and	  that	  there	  is	  great	  potential	  to	  develop	  effective	  models	  that	  stay	  true	  to	  the	  mission	  of	  microfinance.	  	  It	  may	  be	  true	  that	  microfinance	  has	  not	  lived	  up	  to	  the	  expected	  role	  as	  a	  “miracle	  solution”	  to	  poverty.	  	  However,	  with	  some	  reform,	  and	  combined	  with	  the	  right	  products	  and	  services,	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  it	  can	  be	  very	  beneficial	  to	  low-­‐income	  populations.	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Chapter	  3:	  Ecuador’s	  Regulatory	  Framework	  and	  its	  Impact	  on	  the	  
Financial	  Sector	  	  	   Though	   the	   focus	  of	   the	  paper	   so	   far	  has	  been	  on	   the	  general	  global	   state	  of	  MFIs	  around	   the	   world,	   and	   recent	   changes	   in	   the	   industry,	   this	   section	   will	   focus	   more	  specifically	   on	   the	   context	   of	   one	   country:	   Ecuador.	   	   Ecuador	  will	   serve	   as	   a	   case	   study	  example	   of	   the	   developments	   in	   microfinance,	   in	   particular	   with	   regards	   to	   a	   globally	  prevalent	  problem	  of	  overindebtedness	  of	  low-­‐income	  families.	  	  Giving	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  factors	  that	  could	  contribute	  to	  these	  trends	  is	  crucial,	  but	  providing	  this	  for	   a	   range	   of	   regions	   and	   countries	   does	   not	   fall	   under	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   paper.	   	   Thus,	  Ecuador	  will	  serve	  as	  the	  primary	  example	  that	  will	  be	  analyzed	  in	  greater	  detail.	  	  The	  first	  aspect	  more	  closely	  examined	  will	  be	  its	  regulatory	  framework,	  and	  how	  this	  has	  affected	  MFI	  growth	  and	  development.	  	  
Historical	  Context	  	  	   Ecuador’s	  economy	  is	  largely	  centered	  around	  a	  few	  export	  commodities,	  including	  oil,	  bananas	  and	  shrimp	  (Seelke,	  2008).	  	  The	  country’s	  dependence	  on	  oil	  in	  particular	  since	  the	  discovery	  of	   large	  oil	   fields	   in	   the	  Amazon	  region	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  has	  allowed	   it	   to	  become	   very	   vulnerable	   to	   various	   economic	   shocks.	   In	   1998	   the	   El	   Niño	   weather	  phenomenon	   caused	   torrential	   rains	   detrimental	   to	   crop	   yields,	   resulting	   in	   $2.6	   billion	  worth	  of	  crop	  damages.	  	  Furthermore,	  a	  disease	  affected	  the	  shrimp	  industry,	  and	  a	  global	  plunge	   in	   oil	   prices	   left	   Ecuador	   in	   a	   detrimental	   financial	   crisis	   from	   1999	   to	   2000	  (Beckerman	   &	   Solimano,	   2002).	   	   The	   president	   at	   the	   time	   Jamil	   Mahuad,	   attempted	   to	  tame	  inflation	  and	  stabilized	  the	  economy	  by	  replacing	  the	  domestic	  currency	  for	  the	  US-­‐
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Dollar	  in	  1999.	  	  Instead	  of	  implementing	  necessary	  structural	  reforms,	  and	  diversifying	  the	  economy,	   the	   proceeding	   Gutiérrez	   government	   took	   a	   different	   approach.	   	   Under	   this	  president,	  in	  2003	  taxes	  were	  increased,	  private	  investment	  –	  especially	  in	  the	  oil	  sector	  –	  was	   encouraged,	   and	   subsidies	   were	   removed.	   	   Not	   surprisingly,	   the	   majority	   of	   the	  population	  (40%	  of	  which	  lived	  in	  poverty,	  and	  13%	  of	  which	  lived	  in	  extreme	  poverty)was	  unhappy	   with	   these	   economic	   changes.	   	   In	   part	   because	   of	   public	   discontent	   with	   the	  previous	  administration,	  and	  in	  part	  because	  of	  his	  left-­‐leaning	  populist	  platform	  appealing	  to	   the	  “pueblo”	  (ordinary	  people),	   former	  economics	  professor	  Rafael	  Correa	  was	  elected	  president	  in	  2007	  (ECLAC	  Social	  Panorama,	  2007).	  	  
Rafael	  Correa	  and	  the	  New	  Left	  	  	   The	  new	  administration	  allowed	  for	  a	  number	  of	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  political	  direction	   of	   Ecuador.	   	   In	   September	   2008,	   Correa	   implemented	   a	   new	   Constitution,	  changing	  the	  entire	  institutional	  framework	  of	  the	  country.	   	  This	  allowed	  for	  a	  number	  of	  shifts	  in	  economic	  policy,	  including	  greater	  control	  of	  oil,	  and	  an	  emphasis	  on	  development	  through	  internal	  resources	  (Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank,	  2007).	  	  Correa	  scrutinized	  multilateral	  organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank,	  and	  focused	  attention	  on	  a	  solidarity-­‐based	  economy.	  	  This	  meant	  structuring	  the	  economy	  around	  three	  main	  sectors:	  public,	   private	   entrepreneurial,	   and	   popular.	   	   This	   structure	   has	   a	   significant	   effect	   on	  individual	  entrepreneurs	  and	  businesses,	  which	  now	  operate	  in	  an	  “economic	  sphere	  that	  is	   a	   hybrid	   between	   capitalism,	   mutualism	   and	   the	   state.”	   (Bédécarrats,	   Bastiaensen	   &	  Deligez,	  2011).	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   On	  May	  11,	  2011,	  a	  new	  bill	  was	  enacted	  to	  highlight	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘popular	  finance’	  in	  the	  financial	  sector.	   	  Particularly,	   this	  affects	  MFIs,	   for	   it	  prioritizes	  this	  so-­‐called	  popular	  finance	   (based	  on	   collective	  ownership)	   over	  other	   forms	  of	  microfinance.	   	   For	   example,	  the	  law	  does	  not	  recognize	  the	  status	  of	  microfinance	  NGOs,	  because	  these	  do	  not	  fall	  under	  the	  scope	  of	   the	  Central	  Bank	  and	  Superintendent	  of	  Banks.	   	  As	  of	  now,	   this	   law	  remains	  vaguely	  specified,	  and	  has	  not	  really	  been	  put	  into	  action,	  but	  the	  foundations	  are	  there	  for	  the	   microfinance	   sector	   to	   be	   severely	   harmed	   through	   subsidized	   competition	   like	   the	  ‘popular	  finance’	  (Bédécarrats,	  Bastiaensen	  &	  Deligez,	  2011).	  	  	   The	   term	   “new	   left”	   has	   been	   coined	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   number	   of	   political	  leaders	  in	  Latin	  America	  who	  oppose	  neo-­‐liberalism,	  and	  “willfully	  challenge	  assumptions	  of	   state	   inefficiency	   and	   the	   predominance	   of	   private	   initiative	   and	  markets	   as	   the	  most	  effective	   modes	   of	   organizing	   society	   and	   the	   economy.”	   (Bédécarrats,	   Bastiaensen	   &	  Deligez,	  2011).	  Such	  governments	  not	  only	   include	  Correa’s	  Ecuador,	  but	  also	  Venezuela,	  Brazil,	  Argentina,	  Uruguay,	  Honduras,	  Bolivia,	  Nicaragua,	  Paraguay	  and	  El	  Salvador.	  	  These	  socialist	   governments	   have	   criticized	   the	   actions	   of	   multi-­‐lateral	   organizations,	   private	  companies,	   NGOs,	   and	   other	   institutions	   and	   structures	   developed	   after	   the	   structural	  adjustment	  period.	   	  Microfinance,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  was	  implemented	  during	  the	  same	   time,	   and	   has	   presented	   an	   alternative	   to	   state-­‐led	   intervention	   and	   development	  strategies.	  	   In	  this	  sense,	  although	  the	  goals	  of	  microfinance	  to	  help	  the	  poor	  and	  reduce	  poverty	  are	   very	   much	   aligned	   with	   socialist	   objectives,	   the	   structural	   nature	   of	   MFIs	   directly	  opposes	   them.	   	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   ties	   of	  microfinance	   to	   neo-­‐liberal	   organizations	   and	  institutions	  make	   them	   a	   target	   of	   criticism	   and	   opposition	   by	   Latin	   America’s	   new	   left	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governments.	  	  At	  the	  center	  of	  these	  criticisms	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  interest	  rates,	  which	  are	  said	  to	  exploit	  the	  poor	  to	  benefit	  NGOs	  and	  private	  financial	  institutions.	  	  
Recent	  Regulatory	  Changes	  	  	   Ecuador’s	  policy	   regarding	  microfinance	  has	   includes	   an	   incremental	   interest	   rate	  reduction	  of	  all	  MFIs.	  	  The	  national	  average	  portfolio	  yield	  (serving	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  interest	  rates)	   in	   2007	   was	   21.1%	   interest	   annually.	   This	   is	   five	   percent	   less	   than	   the	   regional	  average	   of	   26.2%	   for	   the	   same	   year.	   	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   the	   interest	   rate	   limitation	  imposed	   by	   the	   government.	   	   This	   set	   of	   laws	  was	   intended	   to	   help	   the	   poor	   to	   not	   be	  exploited	  by	  MFIs	  who	  charge	  profitable	  interest	  rates.	  	  The	  Central	  Bank	  has	  been	  allowed	  to	   eliminate	   commissions,	   as	  well	   as	   limit	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   institutions	   regulated	   by	   it	  (Campion,	  Ekka	  &	  Wenner,	  2010).	  Although	   in	   theory	   such	   interest	   rate	   caps	   seem	   like	   a	   positive	   development	   for	  Ecuador’s	  poor,	  they	  do	  not	  truly	  help	  the	  way	  Correa	  intended.	  	  In	  fact,	  such	  interest	  rate	  caps	   actually	   harm	   clients	  more	   than	   they	  benefit	   them.	   	  As	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	  1,	   in	   a	  competitive	   market,	   MFIs	   will	   have	   to	   operate	   more	   efficiently	   in	   order	   to	   remain	  profitable.	  Thus,	  operating	  costs	  are	  positively	  correlated	  with	   interest	   rates,	  or	  portfolio	  yield,	  meaning	  that	  as	  operating	  costs	  increase,	  portfolio	  yield	  will	  also	  rise.	  In	  other	  words,	  countries	  where	  MFI	   operative	   costs	   are	   lower,	   or	  more	   efficient,	   have	   a	   lower	  portfolio	  yield	  too.	   	  This	  benefits	  the	  clients	  overall,	  because	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  lower	  interest	  rates,	  and	  be	  served	  by	  more	  efficiently	  operated	  MFIs.	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Consequences	  of	  the	  Interventions	  	  	   In	  Ecuador,	  the	  operating	  efficiency	  is	  on	  average	  lower	  than	  many	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  region.	  	  This	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  interest	  rates	  have	  been	  artificially	  imposed	  by	   the	   government,	   and	  have	  not	   adjusted	  naturally	   in	   the	   economy.	   	  A	   further	  issue	  with	  the	  interest	  rate	  cap	  is	  that	  Ecuadorian	  MFIs	  are	  forced	  to	  extend	  larger	  average	  loans	  in	  order	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  low	  interest	  rates.	  	  Thus,	  although	  the	  client’s	  average	  income	   is	   not	   higher	   than	   that	   of	   most	   Latin	   American	   countries,	   Ecuador’s	   average	  microfinance	  loan	  size	  is	  comparatively	  high.	  	  In	  2007,	  the	  average	  loan	  size	  in	  Ecuador	  was	  1,629	  USD,	  while	   similar	   economies,	   such	   as	   Peru	   and	  Bolivia	   had	   1,184	   and	   1,502	  USD	  average	   loan	   sizes	   respectively.	   The	   problem	   with	   this	   is	   that	   many	   poor	   families	   are	  therefore	  excluded	  from	  taking	  out	  loans,	  and	  these	  interest	  rate	  restrict	  them	  further.	  	  Another	  implication	  is	  that	  fewer	  women	  will	  be	  served	  in	  the	  microfinance	  market	  (Campion,	   Ekka	   &	  Wenner,	   2010).	   In	   fact,	   it	   can	   be	   seen	   that	   the	   percentage	   of	   female	  borrowers	  has	  declined	  in	  Ecuador	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years.	  	  In	  2008,	  56%	  of	  clients	  were	  women	  while	   in	   2011	   only	   49%	  were	   (MIX	  Market,	   2013).	   A	   regression	   analysis	   by	   the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank	  (IDB)	  has	  shown	  that	  MFIs	  with	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  female	  clients	  also	  have	  higher	  interest	  rates.	   	  According	  to	  the	  same	  study,	  “Interest	  rate	  caps	  reduce	  outreach	  to	  women	  and	  to	  poor	  and	  rural	  clients”	  (Campion,	  Ekka	  &	  Wenner,	  2010).	   Clearly,	   this	   is	   not	   aligned	  with	   the	  mission	   of	  microfinance,	   as	   it	   does	   not	   serve	  those	   who	   most	   need	   its	   services.	   The	   purpose	   of	   protecting	   the	   common	   people	   by	  imposing	  this	  law	  is	  therefore	  defeated.	  	  	   Another	  issue	  faced	  by	  Ecuador	  is	  that	  Correa	  has	  replaced	  a	  number	  of	  technocrats	  within	  the	  main	  governing	  bodies	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  with	  political	  appointees.	  	  This	  has	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meant	   the	   presence	   of	   fewer	   subject	   specialists,	   and	   more	   left-­‐leaning	   bureaucrats	   in	  critical	   regulatory	   institutions,	   resulting	   in	   a	   reduction	   in	   expertise	   in	   the	   policy-­‐making	  positions	   (Bédécarrats,	  Bastiaensen	  &	  Deligez,	   2011).	  A	  2010	  article	   by	  Elisabeth	  Rhyne,	  Managing	   Director	   of	   the	   Center	   for	   Financial	   Inclusion,	   discusses	   the	   implications	   of	  government	  intervention	  in	  the	  MFI	  sector.	  	  According	  to	  the	  article,	  “One	  estimate	  is	  that	  the	  reduction	  in	  [interest]	  rates	  will	  squeeze	  nearly	  $300	  million	  in	  annual	  revenue	  out	  of	  the	   microfinance	   market,	   and	   this	   means	   that	   new	   investment	   in	   microfinance	   delivery	  capacity	  is	  likely	  to	  dry	  up”.	  Furthermore,	  these	  changes	  will	  have	  “heavy	  costs	  in	  terms	  of	  growth	  of	  services,	  especially	  for	  lower	  income	  clients”	  (Rhyne,	  2010).	  	  
Outreach	  and	  Market	  Saturation	  	  	   One	  positive	  development	   in	  the	  MFI	  sector	  of	  Ecuador	   is	   its	   large	  outreach	  to	  the	  population.	  	  According	  to	  one	  IDB	  estimate,	  in	  2008,	  41%	  of	  the	  potential	  market	  was	  being	  served	   by	   microfinance.	   This	   translates	   to	   899,744	   people,	   from	   a	   population	   of	   13.3	  million.	   	  The	  estimation	  assumes	  that	  70%	  of	   the	  poor	  of	   the	  population	  could	  be	  served	  (just	   over	   2	  million).	   	   This	   overall	   level	   of	  market	   saturation	   is	   significantly	   higher	   than	  other	  countries	  of	   the	  region.	   	  Mexico,	  Peru	  and	  Bolivia	  have	  only	  13%,	  24%	  and	  26%	  of	  market	  saturation	  respectively	  (Campion,	  Ekka	  &	  Wenner,	  2010).	  	  Despite	   high	   levels	   of	   outreach,	   Ecuador	   is	   not	   considered	   the	   most	   competitive	  market.	   	   Peru	   and	   Bolivia	   fared	   better	   in	   this	   category,	   resulting	   in	   the	   lowest,	   most	  competitive	  interest	  rates	  (Campion,	  Ekka	  &	  Wenner,	  2010).	  In	  2011,	  Ecuador	  had	  45	  MFIs	  regulated	   under	   the	   Central	   Bank,	   with	   a	   gross	   loan	   portfolio	   of	   2.2	   billion	   USD.	   	   With	  regards	  to	  both	  values,	  Ecuador	   is	   in	  the	  upper	  end	  of	   the	  region.	   	   In	  Latin	  America,	  only	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Mexico	  and	  Peru	  had	  more	  MFIs.	  	  Similarly,	  only	  Bolivia,	  Colombia	  and	  Peru	  (in	  ascending	  order)	  had	  a	  higher	  gross	  loan	  portfolio	  (MIX	  Market,	  2013).	  	  
Summary	  and	  Conclusions	  	   Based	   on	   the	   data	   provided,	   it	   can	   be	   seen	   that	   Ecuador’s	   MFI	   market	   is	   very	  sophisticated	  and	  expansive.	  	  However,	  due	  to	  government	  intervention,	  it	  may	  be	  limited	  from	   growing	   to	   its	   full	   potential.	   Particularly	   interest	   rate	   caps	   hinder	   MFIs	   from	  operating	  as	  efficiently	  as	  they	  could,	  and	  have	  harmed	  the	  populations	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  serve.	  	  Higher	  average	  loans	  mean	  many	  of	  the	  country’s	  poorest,	  as	  well	  as	  many	  women	  are	   excluded	   from	   the	  microfinance	  market,	   contradicting	   its	   original	  purpose.	   	   The	  new	  left	  government	  of	  President	  Correa	  has	  made	   life	  difficult	   for	  MFIs,	  but	  has	  also	  harmed	  the	   poor	   populations	   these	   laws	   were	   supposed	   to	   help.	   	   This	   forces	   the	   underserved	  population	   to	  seek	   for	   loans	  elsewhere,	   including	   turning	   to	  predatory	   lending	  and	  other	  such	  harmful	  practices.	  	  The	  IDB	  study	  cited	  previously	  summarizes	  this	  sentiment	  well	  by	  saying,	  “Although	  it	  can	  be	  politically	  tempting	  to	  intervene	  in	  ways	  that	  seem	  likely	  to	  help	  the	   poor,	   government	   officials	   need	   to	   carefully	   consider	   the	   short-­‐	   and	   long-­‐term	  implications	  of	  such	  initiatives”.	  	  Authors	  further	  suggest,	  “Avoid	  intervening	  in	  a	  way	  that	  distorts	  microfinance	  markets”.	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Chapter	  4:	  MFIs	  in	  Ecuador	  
	   When	  examining	  the	  Ecuadorian	  microfinance	  sector,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  although	  there	   are	   a	   range	   of	   58	   MFIs2,	   the	   majority	   of	   clients	   borrow	   from	   only	   a	   few	   large	  banks.The	   five	   MFIs	   with	   the	   most	   borrowers	   have	   over	   51%	   of	   all	   active	   borrowers.	  Moreover,	   the	   top	   two,	  Banco	  Solidario	  and	  Credi	  Fé,	   serve	  a	  16%	  and	  14%	  share	  of	   the	  country’s	   MFI	   clients	   respectively.	   	   In	   numbers	   that	   equals	   more	   than	   245,000	   clients	  combined	  (MIX	  Market,	  2013).	  	  Interestingly,	  while	  they	  are	  both	  banks,	  the	  nature	  of	  how	  they	   introduced	  microfinance	   into	   their	   portfolios	   is	   very	   different.	   I	  will	   outline	   a	   brief	  history	  of	  the	  two	  below,	  and	  provide	  more	  detailed	  information	  about	  their	  financials.	  	  	  
Banco	  Solidario	  	   Banco	   Solidario	   provides	   a	   highly	   successful	   case	   study	   of	   the	   integration	   of	  microfinance	   into	   the	   formal	   structure	   of	   a	   bank.	   It	  was	   originally	   founded	   in	   1995	   as	   a	  finance	  company	  with	  a	   social	  mission	   to	  serve	  small-­‐medium	  enterprises	   (SME).	   	   It	  was	  promoted	   by	   Fundación	   Alternativa,	   a	   social	   organization	   also	   involved	   in	  microfinance.	  	  One	  year	  after	  its	  foundation,	  it	  formally	  became	  Banco	  Solidario	  in	  1996	  and	  thus	  became	  the	  first	  private	  financial	  institution	  to	  serve	  the	  microenterprise	  sector	  in	  Ecuador	  (Harper	  &	  Arora,	  2005).	  	  	  In	  its	  early	  stages,	  the	  bank’s	  microenterprise	  portfolio	  was	  less	  than	  20%	  of	  its	  total	  loan	  portfolio,	  and	  the	  majority	  focused	  on	  SME.	  Realizing	  the	  demand	  and	  success	  in	  the	  market,	  the	  microfinance	  loan	  portfolio	  grew.	  	  By	  2005,	  the	  proportions	  had	  reversed,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Figure	  includes	  banks,	  cooperatives/credit	  unions,	  NGOs	  and	  non-­‐bank	  financial	  institutions	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the	  microfinance	   portfolio	   increased	   to	   62%	   (Berger,	   Goldmark	   &	   Snabria,	   2006).	   Since	  then,	  Banco	  Solidario	  has	  expanded	  to	  provide	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  products	  and	  services	  to	  its	  clients.	  	  One	  of	  the	  key	  strategies	  boosting	  the	  bank’s	  growth	  has	  been	  its	  array	  of	  lending	  products	   and	   loan	   sizes	  which	   allows	  microentrepreneurs	   of	   all	   different	   stages	   in	   their	  business’s	   growth	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   financial	   services.	   Aside	   from	   its	   microloans	   for	  small	  business	  owners,	  Banco	  Solidario	  also	  offers	   loans	   in	  change	   for	  gold	  or	   jewelry	  as	  collateral.	   This	   “Olla	   de	   Oro”	   program	   is	   available	   to	   non-­‐microentrepreneurs	   too.	   Also,	  open	   to	   all	   individuals	   is	   the	   option	   to	   open	   savings	   and	   checking	   accounts,	   as	   well	   as	  insurance	  (Banco	  Solidario).	  While	  boasting	   the	   largest	  number	  of	   active	  borrowers	   amongst	  MFIs	   in	  Ecuador,	  totaling	  135,587	  for	  the	  2011	  fiscal	  year,	   it	  ranks	  3rd	  in	  terms	  of	  gross	  loan	  portfolio	  size,	  which	   totaled	   324	  million	   USD	   in	   2011.	   It	   has	   an	   average	   loan	   balance	   per	   borrower	   of	  2,394	  USD.	   	   Its	  yield	  on	  gross	  portfolio	   in	  real	  terms	  was	  17%	  and	  it	  also	  has	  a	  relatively	  high	   profit	  margin	   of	   17%.	   	   Banco	   Solidario	   has	   37	   offices	   throughout	   Ecuador	   and	   has	  reached	   out	   to	   a	   considerably	   large	   population,	   including	   many	   women.	   This	   is	   critical,	  particularly	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   original	  mission	   of	  microfinance,	  which	   sought	   to	   target	  female	  clients	  in	  order	  to	  empower	  women	  and	  improve	  education	  and	  health	  of	  the	  next	  generations.	  	  61%	  of	  Banco	  Solidario’s	  clients	  are	  female,	  which	  is	  comparably	  higher	  than	  most	  of	  the	  other	  largest	  MFIs	  in	  Ecuador	  (MIX	  Market,	  2013).	  	  	  
Credi	  Fé	  	   Credi	   Fé	   provides	   a	   further	   interesting	   MFI	   case-­‐study,	   because	   it	   too	   has	  experienced	   a	   lot	   of	   growth	   in	   recent	   years,	   but	   shows	   a	   different	   approach	   to	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incorporating	  microfinance	  into	  a	  bank’s	  loan	  portfolio.	  Unlike	  Banco	  Solidario	  which	  was	  founded	   with	   a	   social	   mission	   and	   the	   intention	   of	   targeting	   the	  microfinance	   and	   SME	  sector,	   Credi	   Fé	   is	   a	   subsidiary	   of	   the	   commercial	   bank	   Banco	   Pichincha.	   	   Currently	  Ecuador’s	   largest	  private	  commercial	  bank,	  Banco	  Pichincha	  has	  more	  than	  200	  branches	  in	  the	  country,	  as	  well	  as	  others	  in	  Peru,	  Colombia,	  Panama,	  Spain	  and	  the	  US.	   	  In	  2007	  it	  had	   over	   1.5	  million	   clients	   and	   a	   loan	   portfolio	   of	   more	   than	   1.5	   billion	   USD	   (Business	  
Standard,	   2007).	   Realizing	   the	   potential	   of	   the	   microfinance	   market,	   it	   established	   a	  subsidiary	  called	  Credi	  Fé	  in	  1999	  to	  administer	  services	  to	  the	  microenterprise	  sector	  and	  diversify	  the	  bank’s	  portfolio	  (Berger,	  Goldmark	  &	  Snabria,	  2006).	  	  Credi	  Fé	  experienced	  rapid	  growth	  and	  within	  two	  years	  of	  its	  foundation	  had	  over	  9,000	  clients	  and	  a	  3.5	  million	  USD	  loan	  portfolio.	  	  By	  2005	  the	  number	  of	  active	  clients	  had	  grown	  to	  38,000	  and	  the	  portfolio	  to	  53	  million	  USD	  (Berger,	  Goldmark	  &	  Snabria,	  2006).	  In	  2011	  the	  gross	  loan	  portfolio	  reached	  more	  than	  453	  million	  USD.	  This	  is	  the	  highest	  of	  any	  MFI	  portfolios	  in	  Ecuador.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  active	  borrowers	  it	  ranks	  second	  in	  the	  country	  with	  118,477	  borrowers	  (just	  following	  Banco	  Solidario),	  which	  equals	  16%	  of	  MFI	  clients	  (MIX	  Market,	  2013).	  Its	  products	  and	  services	  include	  microloans	  for	  entrepreneurs,	  which	  can	   take	   the	   form	   of	   housing	   loans,	   cash	   loans,	   “development”	   credit	   for	   inventory,	   raw	  material	  and	  supplies	  purchases,	  “investing”	  credit	  for	  purchasing	  machinery	  and	  vehicles,	  and	  an	  “agriculture”	  credit	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  livestock,	  fertilizers	  and	  seeds.	  It	  also	  offers	  insurance,	   savings	   accounts	   and	   credit/debit	   cards	   (Credi	   Fé).	   Like	   Banco	   Solidario,	   its	  various	  kinds	  of	  microloans	  are	  available	  only	  to	  small	  business	  owners.	  Interestingly,	  Credi	  Fé’s	  average	  loan	  balance	  per	  borrower	  was	  3,828	  USD	  for	  the	  2011	   fiscal	   year,	  which	   is	   significantly	   larger	   than	   that	   of	   Banco	   Solidario.	   This	   helps	   to	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explain	  its	  large	  gross	  portfolio.	  Credi	  Fé	  has	  a	  profit	  margin	  of	  16%,	  like	  Banco	  Solidario,	  but	  a	  much	  lower	  real	  yield	  on	  gross	  portfolio	  of	   just	  over	  1%.	   	  It	   is	  also	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  borrowers	  are	  in	  fact	  men.	  	  Only	  44%	  of	  its	  borrowers	  are	  female.	  	  This	  may	  also	  be	  due	  to	  its	  higher	  average	  loan	  size.	  Another	  important	  fact	  is	  that	  824	  clients	  had	   outstanding	   loans	   of	   one	   year	   or	  more	   in	   2011,	  which	   essentially	  means	   that	   these	  individuals	   will	   be	   defaulting	   and	   the	   bank	   cannot	   recuperate	   these	   payments.	   	   This	  number	  is	  also	  much	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  Banco	  Solidario,	  where	  the	  delinquency	  number	  is	  only	  335	  (MIX	  Market,	  2013).	  	  
Financial	  Analysis	  
	  	   In	   Chapter	   1	   some	   of	   the	   pros	   and	   cons	   of	   the	   MFI	   upscaling	   and	   downscaling	  process	  were	  discussed.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  conduct	  a	  more	  detailed	  financial	  analysis	  of	  the	   two	   leading	  MFI’s	   in	   the	  market,	   Banco	   Solidario	   and	   Credi	   Fé,	   in	   order	   to	   examine	  more	  closely	  their	  financial	  viability	  and	  outreach.	  Both	  these	  aspects	  are	  important	  for	  the	  sustainable	  growth	  and	  survival	  of	  an	  MFI,	   and	   for	   the	  benefit	  of	   reaching	  a	   larger	  client	  base	   and	   achieving	  microfinance’s	   mission	   of	   serving	   the	   poor	   populations.	   	   The	   values	  discussed	  for	  each	  indicator	  are	  displayed	  in	  Tables	  1	  and	  2	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  chapter.	  	  
Productivity	  	  Productivity	   is	   an	   important	  measure	   of	   institutional	   health,	   as	   it	   allows	   us	   to	   see	  most	  basically	  what	  output	  is	  obtained	  per	  unit	  of	  input.	  	  If	  an	  institution	  is	  productive,	  it	  makes	  most	  efficient	  use	  of	  its	  resources	  to	  maximize	  profits.	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• Portfolio	  Yield:	  This	   is	   a	   critical	   indicator	  which	   shows	  how	  much	   income	  an	  MFI	  has	  actually	  generated	  from	  its	  lending	  activities.	  	  A	  very	  good	  portfolio	  yield	  is	  similar	  to	  its	  effective	  interest	  rate	  charged	  to	  clients.	  	  In	  reality,	  the	  yield	  is	  usually	  somewhat	  lower	  due	   to	   other	   factors	   such	   as	   loan	   defaults.	  However,	  when	   the	   values	   are	   not	   too	   far	  apart,	   it	   can	   be	   assumed	   the	   portfolio	   is	   very	   productive	   (Brandt,	   Epifanova	   &	  Kamornikov).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Banco	  Solidario,	  the	  portfolio	  yield	  has	  been	  steadily	  increasing	  over	  the	  past	  5	  years,	   from	  16%	  to	  19%.	   	   In	  2012	   it	   is	  nearly	  exactly	   the	   same	  as	   its	   effective	  interest	   rate	   of	   20%	   annually	   charged	   to	   clients,	   demonstrating	   it	   has	   a	   highly	  productive	  portfolio.	  For	  Credi	  Fé	  this	  value	  has	  been	  rather	  small	  over	  the	  past	  5	  years,	  and	   in	   2008	   was	   even	   a	   negative	   value.	   It	   has	   increased	   each	   year	   since	   then	   and,	  though	  there	  is	  no	  data	  for	  2012,	  it	  reached	  2.42	  in	  2011.	  	  Comparatively,	  this	  is	  a	  very	  low	  figure	  and	  suggests	  the	  portfolio	  is	  not	  as	  productive	  as	  Solidario’s.	  	  
• Operational	  Self-­Sufficiency:	  this	  measure	  indicates	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  financial	  institution	  has	  generated	  enough	  revenue	  to	  cover	  its	  total	  costs	  (comprised	  of	  financial	  costs,	  loan	  provisions/net	  impairment	  loss	  and	  operational	  expenses).	   	  A	  percentage	  of	  100%	  (or	  more)	  shows	  an	   institution	   is	   completely	  self-­‐sufficient.	   If	   an	  MFI	   is	  not	  operationally	  self-­‐sufficient,	   it	  will	   eventually	  use	  up	   its	   equity,	   leaving	   less	   to	   loan	  borrowers,	   and	  risk	  incurring	  insolvency.	  Aside	  from	  2009	  when	  Banco	  Solidario’s	  self-­‐sufficiency	  dropped	  to	  99.11%,	  it	  has	  been	  self-­‐sufficient	  for	  the	  past	  5	  years.	  	  In	  2012	  the	  ratio	  was	  the	  highest,	  at	  122.06%.	  	  Credi	  Fé	  shows	  similar	  figures,	  though	  it	  has	  been	  self-­‐sufficient	  every	  year	  since	  2008.	  	  The	  latest	  figure	  for	  2011	  shows	  a	  self	  sufficiency	  of	  119.53%.	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• Returns	  on	  Assets	  (ROA):	  This	  ratio	  expressed	  as	  a	  percentage	  measures	  the	  net	  income	  earned	  on	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  MFI.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  an	  indicator	  of	  how	  well	  the	  institution	  utilizes	  its	  total	  assets	  (including	  fixed	  assets	  such	  as	  real	  estate).	  	  It	  is	  a	  measurement	  of	   both	   profitability	   and	   efficiency,	   and	   is	   used	   often	  within	   an	  MFI	   to	   compare	   and	  evaluate	   individual	   managers	   across	   multiple	   branches	   of	   the	   institution.	   	   Most	  commercial	  MFIs	  in	  developing	  countries	  earn	  asset	  ratios	  of	  less	  than	  2%,	  and	  highly	  successful	  MFIs,	  as	  shown	  in	  a	  study	  by	  the	  US	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development,	  ranged	  between	  -­‐18.5%	  and	  7.4%	  (Ledgerwood,	  1998).	  Banco	  Solidario’s	  assets	  ratio	  ranged	  from	  -­‐0.66%	  to	  3.08%	  over	  the	  past	  5	  years,	  with	  its	   most	   recent	   ratio	   being	   2.68%	   in	   2012.	   By	   comparison,	   this	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   fairly	  healthy	   ratio.	   Credi	   Fé’s	   ROA	   ratio	   has	   remained	   more	   constant	   since	   2008	   and	  fluctuated	  between	  0.41%	  and	  0.67%.	  
• Returns	  on	  equity	  (ROE):	  This	  ratio	  measures	  how	  much	  net	  income	  was	  returned	  on	  the	  equity	  of	  the	  MFI.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  reflects	  how	  much	  the	  institution	  has	  earned	  on	  the	  funds	  that	  have	  been	  invested	  by	  the	  shareholders.	  	  This	  is	  different	  from	  the	  ROA	  ratio	  which	   includes	   both	   liabilities	   and	   equity,	   while	   ROE	   includes	   only	   equity.	   	  Whereas	  ROA	   ratio	   was	   important	   internally	   for	   institutional	   branch	   managers,	   ROE	   ratio	   is	  particularly	   critical	   for	   for-­‐profit	  MFIs	   and	   commercial	   banks	   because	   this	   signals	   to	  investors	   and	   donors	   how	   the	   institution	   compares	   against	   other	   investment	  alternatives.	  	  Depending	  on	  the	  funding	  structure	  of	  an	  MFI,	  its	  ROE	  and	  ROA	  ratios	  will	  vary.	   	  Those	  that	  fund	  their	  assets	  largely	  with	  liabilities	  will	  show	  a	  higher	  return	  on	  equity	  than	  MFIs	  that	  fund	  their	  assets	  largely	  with	  equity.	  It	  is	  typical	  for	  commercial	  financial	  institutions	  to	  aim	  for	  a	  ROE	  ratio	  of	  15%	  to	  20%	  (Ledgerwood,	  1998).	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In	   the	   case	  of	  Banco	  Solidario	   the	  ROE	  ratio	  has	  varied	  greatly	  over	   the	  past	  5	  years.	  2009	  was	  an	  overall	  bad	  year	   for	  a	  number	  of	   indicators,	   including	  returns	  on	  equity	  with	  a	  ratio	  of	  -­‐1.85%.	  	  However,	  all	  other	  years	  showed	  positive	  returns	  and	  the	  past	  two	  have	  shown	  ROE	  ratios	  of	  over	  20%,	  with	  24.32%	  and	  20.14%	  in	  2011	  and	  2012,	  respectively.	  	  Credi	  Fé	  has	  reported	  ROE	  ratios	  of	  more	  than	  29%	  each	  year	  since	  2008,	  and	  a	  ratio	  as	  high	  as	  64.90%	  in	  2011.	  
Operating	  Expenses	  	  Indicators	  within	   this	   category	   demonstrate	  whether	   or	   not	   an	   institution	   is	   being	   cost-­‐effective,	  which	  is	  a	  critical	  component	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  financial	  success.	  	  
• Operating	   expense	   to	   loan	   portfolio:	   This	   is	   a	   measurement	   of	   overall	   institutional	  efficiency	   and	   shows	   the	   institutional	   cost	   of	   providing	   loan	   services.	   The	   lower	   the	  operating	  expense	  ratio,	  the	  higher	  the	  efficiency.	  For	  Banco	  Solidario,	   the	  ratio	  has	  been	   increasing	  each	  year	   for	   the	  past	  5	  years.	  The	  bank’s	   operating	   expenses	   have	   been	   increasing	   significantly	   each	   year,	   while	   the	  portfolio	   has	   been	   increasing	   in	   smaller	   increments,	   making	   the	   expense	   ratio	   grow	  overall.	   	   It	  can	  be	  said	  that	  the	  2012	  value	  of	  59.4%	  is	  quite	  high	  –	  a	  bank	  should	  aim	  towards	  15-­‐25%.	  	  	  
• Cost	   per	   borrower:	   This	   measures	   how	   much	   monetary	   input	   is	   required	   to	   gain	   a	  certain	   level	  of	  output,	  or	   in	   this	  case,	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  borrowers.	  The	  higher	   the	  number,	  the	  higher	  the	  costs	  required	  to	  obtain	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  borrowers.	  	  
• Average	  staff	  salary	  to	  GNI	  per	  capita:	  This	  is	  the	  average	  salary	  ratio	  which	  measures	  the	  salary	  burden	  on	  the	  MFI	  per	  staff	  member.	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Outreach	  &	  Efficiency	  	  Particularly	  in	  the	  MFI	  context	  these	  indicators	  are	  important	  to	  show	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  target	  population	  of	  clients	  is	  actually	  being	  reached	  by	  the	  financial	  products	  and	  services.	  	  In	  order	  to	  remain	  true	  to	  the	  mission	  of	  microfinance,	  this	  category	  cannot	  be	  overlooked.	  	  
• Number	  of	  total	  active	  borrowers	  to	  total	  personnel:	  	  This	  indicator	  measures	  how	  many	  borrowers	  can	  be	  “produced”	  per	  personnel	  member.	   	  The	  higher	  the	  ratio,	   the	   fewer	  personnel	  is	  needed	  to	  obtain	  a	  given	  number	  of	  active	  borrowers.	   	  The	  literature	  has	  shown	  that	  this	  ratio	  is	  positively	  correlated	  with	  financial	  self-­‐sufficiency.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Banco	  Solidario,	  there	  were	  141	  borrowers	  per	  staff	  member	  in	  2011.	  	  	  
• Number	   of	   total	   active	   borrowers	   to	   loan	   officers:	   This	   measure	   is	   similar	   to	   the	  borrower	  to	  personnel	  ratio,	  in	  that	  it	  measures	  how	  many	  borrowers	  are	  produced	  per	  loan	  officer.	   	  Again,	  a	  higher	  number	  means	  that	  fewer	  loan	  officers	  are	  required	  for	  a	  given	  number	  of	  borrowers,	  showing	  increased	  productivity	  and	  self-­‐sufficiency.	  	  
• Loan	  Income	  Ratio:	  Derived	  by	  dividing	  the	  average	  loan	  size	  by	  the	  GDP	  per	  capita	  of	  Ecuador,	  this	  ratio	  helps	  to	  identify	  what	  sector	  of	  the	  population	  is	  truly	  being	  served	  by	  the	  access	  to	  credit	  from	  the	  respective	  financial	  institution.	  	  According	  to	  Kiva,	  only	  if	  the	  ratio	  is	  below	  20%,	  are	  the	  poorest	  of	  the	  poor	  being	  served.	  Between	  20%	  and	  149%	  the	  middle	  poor	  are	  reached.	  In	  2011,	  the	  average	  loan	  size	  of	  Banco	  Solidario	  was	  $2,394.	  	  Stated	  alone	  this	  already	  seems	   like	   a	   fairly	   high	   value,	   but	   without	   context	   it	   is	   not	   a	   particularly	   useful	  indicator.	  	  The	  GDP	  per	  capita	  for	  the	  same	  year	  is	  $4,496,	  slightly	  less	  than	  double	  the	  average	  loan	  size.	  	  Presented	  as	  a	  loan	  income	  ratio,	  this	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  28.13%.	  	  This	  is	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an	  increase	  of	  more	  than	  7%	  since	  2008.	  	  We	  see	  a	  steady	  increase	  in	  this	  ratio	  which	  has	  grown	  by	  roughly	  2%	  each	  year	  since	   then.	   	  This	   is	  an	   indicator	   that	  clients	  with	  slightly	  higher	  incomes	  are	  being	  targeted	  and	  reached	  by	  the	  bank	  each	  year.	  This	  may	  be	   an	   indication	   of	   the	   changing	   regulatory	   environment	   in	  which	   the	  MFI	   operates,	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  serve	  the	  truly	  poor	  while	  remaining	  profitable.	  	  This	  aspect	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  depth	  later.	  	  Interestingly,	  Credi	  Fé’s	  loan	  income	  ratio	  is	  even	  higher	  than	   Banco	   Solidario’s.	   	   While	   in	   2008	   it	   was	   already	   at	   76.78%,	   by	   2011	   it	   was	   at	  85.15%	   -­‐	   an	   increase	   of	  more	   than	   8%.	   	   The	   average	   loan	   size	   was	   $3,828	   in	   2011,	  approximately	  $1,500	  higher	  than	  Solidario’s.	  	  Thus,	  Credi	  Fé	  reaches	  even	  fewer	  poor	  and	  has	  been	  shifting	  into	  higher	  income	  populations	  over	  the	  past	  years.	  	  This	  may	  also	  explain	  why	  only	  44.51%	  of	  their	  client	  base	  is	  female,	  whereas	  the	  majority	  (61.04%)	  of	  Solidario’s	  clients	  continue	  to	  be	  male.	  	  
Financial	  Structure	  	  These	  measures	  are	  of	  particular	  importance	  to	  investors	  who	  want	  to	  see	  the	  success	  and	  stability	   of	   the	   bank’s	   portfolio.	   	   This	   is	   crucial	   to	   attracting	  more	   capital	   and	   investors,	  which	   ultimately	   serves	   the	   institution	   and	   its	   clients,	   as	   it	   can	   expand	   and	   increase	   its	  outreach.	  	  
• Capital/Asset	   Ratio:	   This	   is	   a	   ratio	   of	   a	   bank’s	   total	   capital	   and	   reserves	   to	   its	   total	  assets.	   	  The	  ratio	  helps	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  institution	  has	  enough	  capital	  and	   is	   expressed	   as	   a	   percentage	   of	   its	   risk	   weighted	   exposures	   to	   credit	   (it	   is	   also	  known	  as	  Capital	  to	  Risk	  Weighted	  Assets	  Ratio).	  	  A	  minimum	  ratio	  is	  usually	  set	  by	  the	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government	  or	  the	  institution	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  depositors	  and	  also	  promote	  the	  sense	  of	  stability	  and	  confidence	  in	  the	  financial	  system.	  Banco	  Solidario’s	  capital	  to	  asset	  ratio	  has	  remained	  above	  10%	  for	  the	  past	  5	  years	  and	  fluctuated	  between	  10%	  and	  13%.	  	  This	  is	  a	  fairly	  normal	  and	  adequate	  ratio	  for	  a	  bank.	  Credi	  Fé	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  demonstrated	  a	  far	  lower	  ratio,	  which	  has	  fallen	  roughly	  around	   1%	   since	   2008,	   with	   2011	   being	   its	   lowest	   year	   at	   1.08%.	   	   As	   Credi	   Fé	   is	   a	  subsidiary	  of	  the	  larger	  bank	  Banco	  Pichincha,	  it	  might	  be	  the	  case	  that	  it	  does	  not	  have	  significant	  amounts	  of	   independently	  earned	  capital	  but	  doesn’t	  need	  to,	  as	   it	  can	  rely	  on	  Pichincha	  for	  funding	  in	  a	  crisis	  situation.	  	  
• Debt	  to	  Equity	  Ratio:	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  measures	  of	  capital	  adequacy	  of	  a	   financial	   institution	  and	  essentially	  shows	  the	  overall	   leverage	   it	  has.	   	  Specifically,	   it	  indicates	   the	   relationship	  between	   capital	   contributed	  by	   creditors	   and	  by	   owners	   in	  order	  to	  show	  how	  much	  protection	  is	  given	  to	  the	  creditors	  by	  the	  owners.	  	  The	  higher	  the	   ratio,	   the	   greater	   the	   risk	   that	   creditors	   are	   taking.	   	   The	   ratio	   is	   also	   critical	   for	  lenders	  because	  it	  tells	  them	  how	  much	  equity	  as	  a	  safety	  cushion	  the	  institution	  has	  in	  order	   to	  absorb	   losses.	   	  Essentially,	   it	   shows	  us	  how	  much	  debt	  per	  unit	  of	  equity	   (in	  U.S.	  dollars)	  an	  institution	  has.	  Banco	  Solidario	  has	  shown	  a	  debt	  to	  equity	  ratio	  that	  fluctuates	  between	  just	  over	  8	  to	  just	  over	  6,	  with	  2012	  being	  its	  best	  year	  demonstrating	  a	  ratio	  of	  6.35.	  	  By	  comparison,	  Credi	  Fé	  has	  a	  very	  high	  ratio,	  indicating	  it	  has	  little	  equity.	  Its	  ratio	  has	  increased	  since	  2008	  from	  69.45	  to	  89.32	  in	  2011.	  	  This	  is	  a	  further	  indication	  that	  Credi	  Fé	  itself	  must	  rely	  on	  Banco	  Pichincha	  for	  capital	  and	  equity.	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• Portfolio	   at	   Risk:	   This	   very	   useful	  measurement	   indicates	   the	   proportion	   of	   the	   total	  outstanding	   loan	   portfolio	   that	   it	   at	   risk	   of	   default.	   	   There	   are	   two	   different	   factors	  measured	   which	   are	   included	   here:	   portfolio	   at	   risk	   >30	   days,	   and	   >90	   days.	   The	  distinction	  is	  important	  because	  in	  some	  cases	  the	  30	  days	  outstanding	  balance	  will	  still	  be	   repaid	   by	   borrowers.	   	   However,	   the	   90	   day	   portfolio	   at	   risk	   is	   not	   likely	   to	   be	  recovered.	  Typically	  the	  >90	  day	  value	  is	  smaller	  for	  that	  reason.	  For	  Banco	   Solidario	   both	   risk	   values	   have	   fluctuated	   over	   the	   past	   5	   years,	   but	  were	  highest	  in	  2012.	  	  The	  2012	  values	  of	  over	  6%	  and	  over	  5%	  respectively	  are	  quite	  high.	  Typically	  a	  desirable	  risk	  would	  lie	  at	  around	  2%.	  	  For	  Credi	  Fé	  this	  value	  has	  been	  very	  good	  over	  the	  past	  five	  years,	  ranging	  from	  1.71%	  to	  2.14%	  for	  the	  >30	  days,	  and	  as	  low	  as	  0.98%	  to	  1.01%	  for	  >90.	  	  Overall	  this	  is	  a	  very	  positive	  trend	  and	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  clients	  are	  paying	  back	  on	  time.	  	  
Summary	  and	  Conclusions	  	   Overall,	  the	  financial	  indicators	  and	  ratios	  of	  both	  Banco	  Solidario	  and	  Credi	  Fé	  are	  quite	  positive	  and	  promising,	  but	  with	  some	  exceptions.	   	  The	  most	  positive	  developments	  are	   in	   productivity,	   for	  we	   see	   an	   increase	   in	   portfolio	   yield,	   operational	   self-­‐sufficiency,	  ROA,	   ROE	   and	   profit	   margin	   in	   both	   banks.	   	   Furthermore,	   financial	   structure	   of	   Banco	  Solidario	   is	   solid,	   as	   demonstrated	  by	   its	   capital-­‐asset	   ratio	   and	  debt-­‐to-­‐equity	   ratio.	   For	  Credi	   Fé	   these	   values	   are	   skewed	   due	   to	   its	   nature	   as	   a	   Banco	   Pichincha	   subsidiary.	  	  However,	   there	   are	   increasing	   problems	   primarily	   in	   outreach	   and	   efficiency,	   as	  well	   as	  with	  operating	  expenses.	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First	  of	  all,	  we	  see	  an	  upward	  trend	  in	  both	  institutions’	  overall	  operating	  expenses.	  	  While	  this	  alone	  is	  not	  bad,	  since	  the	  number	  of	  borrowers	  and	  therefore	  outreach	  is	  also	  increasing	  (which	  is	  very	  positive),	  we	  simultaneously	  find	  a	  steady	  increase	  in	  the	  cost	  per	  borrower	   over	   the	  past	   5	   years.	   	   This	  means	   that	   it	   is	   becoming	  more	   expensive	   for	   the	  respective	  MFIs	  to	  accept	  each	  additional	  client.	  	  A	  further	  reflection	  of	  decreased	  efficiency	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  fewer	  borrowers	  per	  staff	  member,	  indicating	  it	  has	  become	  more	  labor	   intensive	   to	   take	   on	  more	   clients.	   	   Another	  major	   problem	   is	   the	   increase	   in	   loan	  income	   ratio,	   demonstrating	   that	   fewer	   of	   the	   poorest/poorer	   individuals	   are	   actually	  being	  served	  by	  the	  MFIs.	  	  Lastly,	  risk	  ratios	  for	  Banco	  Solidario	  are	  higher	  than	  they	  should	  be,	  and	  though	  Credi	  Fé’s	  portfolio	  is	  at	  less	  risk,	  the	  values	  for	  both	  >30	  and	  >90	  days	  have	  been	  steadily	   increasing	  over	  the	  past	   five	  years.	   	  These	  trends	  have	  serious	   implications	  not	  only	  for	  the	  MFIs,	  but	  for	  the	  borrowers	  who	  are	  not	  being	  served	  as	  well	  as	  they	  could.	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Table	  1:	  Financial	  Indicators	  and	  Ratios	  for	  Banco	  Solidario	  (2008-­‐2012)	  	  
Indicator	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	  
Productivity	  
Yield	  on	  Gross	  Portfolio	  (real)	  
(Credit	  Program	  Income/Ave.	  Outstanding	  Portfolio	  
16.12%	   19.02%	   16.55%	   17.36%	   19.07%	  
Profit	  Margin	  
(Net	  Operating	  Income/Financial	  Revenue)	  
3.63%	   -­‐0.90%	   8.35%	   16.67%	   18.08%	  
Operational	  Self-­‐sufficiency	  
(Financial	  Revenue/[Financial	  Expense	  +Net	  
Impairment	  Loss+	  Operating	  Expense])	  
103.76%	   99.11%	   109.12%	   120.01%	   122.06%	  
Return	  on	  Assets	  
([Net	  Operating	  Income	  -­‐Taxes]/Ave.	  Total	  Assets)	  
0.69%	   -­‐0.22%	   1.52%	   3.08%	   2.68%	  
Return	  on	  Equity	  
([Net	  Operating	  Income	  -­‐Taxes]/Ave.	  Total	  Equity)	  
5.84%	   -­‐1.85%	   12.58%	   24.32%	   20.14%	  
Operating	  Expenses	  
Operating	  Expense	   31,201,945	   31,125,495	   35,141,660	   39,796,140	   -­‐	  
Operating	  Expense/Loan	  Portfolio	   13.56%	   13.75%	   14.50%	   49.8%	   59.4%	  
Operating	  Expense/Total	  Assets	   9.84%	   9.89%	   10.84%	   11.50%	   10.14%	  
Personnel	  Expense/Loan	  Portfolio	   6.40%	   6.46%	   7.20%	   8.29%	   8.74%	  
Personnel	  Expense/Total	  Assets	   4.64%	   4.65%	   5.38%	   6.02%	   6.03%	  
Ave.	  Staff	  Salary/GNI	  per	  capita	   4.79	   4.26	   4.48	   5.22	   -­‐	  
Cost	  per	  borrower	  
(Operating	  Expense/Ave.	  Num.	  Borrowers)	  
$220	   $228	   $270	   $296	   -­‐	  
Outreach	  &	  Efficiency	  
Number	  of	  Active	  Borrowers	   147,007	   126,387	   133,508	   135,587	   -­‐	  
Percent	  Female	  Borrowers	   60.81%	   60.69%	   61.16%	   61.04%	   -­‐	  
Number	  of	  Depositors	   75,874	   72,626	   76,803	   55,623	   -­‐	  
Total	  Personnel	   839	   891	   905	   962	   -­‐	  
Borrowers	  per	  Staff	  Member	  
(Total	  Borrowers/Total	  Personnel)	  
175	   142	   148	   141	   -­‐	  
Borrowers	  per	  Loan	  Officer	  
(Total	  Borrowers/Total	  Loan	  Officers)	  
488	   399	   424	   399	   -­‐	  
Average	  Loan	  Size	  
(Gross	  Loan	  Portfolio/Num.	  Active	  Borrowers)	  
$1,606	   $1,714	   $2,104	   $2,394	   	  
Loan	  Income	  Ratio	  
(Average	  Loan	  Size/GDP	  per	  Capita)	  
41.65%	   47.00%	   52.50%	   53.24%	   -­‐	  
Financial	  Structure	  
Capital/Asset	  Ratio	  
(Total	  Equity/Total	  Assets)	  
12.04%	   11.80%	   10.48%	   10.95%	   13.61%	  
Deposit	  to	  Asset	  Ratio	  
(Total	  Deposits/Total	  Assets)	  
50.75%	   50.51%	   42.15%	   41.49%	   53.42%	  
Debt	  to	  Equity	  Ratio	  
(Total	  Liabilities/Total	  Equity)	  
7.30	   7.47	   8.54	   8.13	   6.35	  
Deposits	  to	  Loan	  Ratio	  
(Deposits/Gross	  Loan	  Portfolio)	  
66.00%	   75.20%	   58.43%	   55.82%	   77.11%	  
Portfolio	  at	  Risk	  >30	  Days	  
(Outstanding	  balance	  >30	  Days	  +	  renegotiated	  
portfolio/Gross	  Loan	  Portfolio)	  
6.56%	   2.64%	   1.54%	   2.64%	   6.27%	  
Portfolio	  at	  Risk	  >90	  Days	   5.45%	   1.43%	   1.15%	   0.79%	   5.69%	  
Calculations	  and	  ratios	  by	  author.	  Data	  from	  Microfinance	  Information	  Exchange	  at	  mixmarket.org	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Table	  2:	  Financial	  Indicators	  and	  Ratios	  for	  Credi	  Fé	  (2008-­‐2012)	  	  
Indicator	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	  
Productivity	  
Yield	  on	  Gross	  Portfolio	  (real)	  
(Credit	  Program	  Income/Ave.	  Outstanding	  Portfolio	  
-­‐2.63%	   0.12%	   1.95%	   1.42%	   -­‐	  
Profit	  Margin	  
(Net	  Operating	  Income/Financial	  Revenue)	  
6.73%	   9.91%	   6.85%	   16.34%	   -­‐	  
Operational	  Self-­‐sufficiency	  
(Financial	  Revenue/[Financial	  Expense	  +Net	  
Impairment	  Loss+	  Operating	  Expense])	  
107.21%	   111.00%	   107.35%	   119.53%	   -­‐	  
Return	  on	  Assets	  
([Net	  Operating	  Income	  -­‐Taxes]/Ave.	  Total	  Assets)	  
0.52%	   0.61%	   0.41%	   0.67%	   -­‐	  
Return	  on	  Equity	  
([Net	  Operating	  Income	  -­‐Taxes]/Ave.	  Total	  Equity)	  
40.50%	   40.45%	   29.40%	   64.90%	   -­‐	  
Operating	  Expenses	  
Operating	  Expense	   11,176,918	   11,440,806	   13,601,440	   18,885,656	   -­‐	  
Operating	  Expense/Loan	  Portfolio	   5.10%	   4.62%	   5.12%	   4.96%	   -­‐	  
Operating	  Expense/Total	  Assets	   5.31%	   4.90%	   4.26%	   2.60%	   -­‐	  
Personnel	  Expense/Loan	  Portfolio	   4.12%	   3.38%	   4.18%	   2.55%	   -­‐	  
Personnel	  Expense/Total	  Assets	   4.28%	   3.59%	   4.26%	   2.60%	   -­‐	  
Ave.	  Staff	  Salary/GNI	  per	  capita	   6.02	   4.83	   5.39	   3.87	   -­‐	  
Cost	  per	  borrower	  
(Operating	  Expense/Ave.	  Num.	  Borrowers)	  
$136	   $137	   $158	   $180	   -­‐	  
Outreach	  &	  Efficiency	  
Number	  of	  Active	  Borrowers	   85,682	   81,912	   93,390	   118,477	   130,922	  
Percent	  Female	  Borrowers	   46.07%	   45.61%	   45.35%	   44.02%	   44.61%	  
Number	  of	  Depositors	   0	   0	   134,434	   163,974	   -­‐	  
Total	  Personnel	   449	   426	   513	   654	   -­‐	  
Borrowers	  per	  Staff	  Member	  
(Total	  Borrowers/Total	  Personnel)	  
191	   192	   182	   181	   -­‐	  
Borrowers	  per	  Loan	  Officer	  
(Total	  Borrowers/Total	  Loan	  Officers)	  
269	   281	   271	   260	   -­‐	  
Average	  Loan	  Size	  
(Gross	  Loan	  Portfolio/Num.	  Active	  Borrowers)	  
2,961	   2,952	   3,319	   3,828	   	  
Loan	  Income	  Ratio	  
(Average	  Loan	  Size/GDP	  per	  Capita)	  
76.78%	   80.92%	   82.81%	   85.15%	   -­‐	  
Financial	  Structure	  
Capital/Asset	  Ratio	  
(Total	  Equity/Total	  Assets)	  
1.42%	   1.59%	   1.16%	   1.08%	   -­‐	  
Deposit	  to	  Asset	  Ratio	  
(Total	  Deposits/Total	  Assets)	  
0.00%	   0.00%	   16.59%	   14.90%	   -­‐	  
Debt	  to	  Equity	  Ratio	  
(Total	  Liabilities/Total	  Equity)	  
69.45	   61.87	   85.23	   91.32	   -­‐	  
Deposits	  to	  Loan	  Ratio	  
(Deposits/Gross	  Loan	  Portfolio)	  
0.00%	   0.00%	   15.99%	   14.90%	   10.78%	  
Portfolio	  at	  Risk	  >30	  Days	  
(Outstanding	  balance	  >30	  Days	  +	  renegotiated	  
portfolio/Gross	  Loan	  Portfolio)	  
1.71%	   2.38%	   1.69%	   1.36%	   2.14%	  
Portfolio	  at	  Risk	  >90	  Days	   0.98%	   1.69%	   1.36%	   1.01%	   -­‐	  
Calculations	  and	  ratios	  by	  author.	  Data	  from	  Microfinance	  Information	  Exchange	  at	  mixmarket.org	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Chapter	  5:	  An	  Overindebtedness	  Crisis?	  
	   Based	  on	  the	  financial	  analysis	  of	  arguably	  the	  two	  biggest	  players	  in	  the	  Ecuadorian	  MFI	  market,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  a	  number	  of	  problems	  have	  been	  deepening	  over	  the	  past	  five	  years	  that	  seem	  to	  be	  linked	  to	  regulatory	  framework	  changes.	  	  These	  connections	  tie	  together	   in	   the	   supply	   side	   of	  microfinance.	   	   Essentially,	   the	   policies	   in	   place	   create	   the	  regulatory	  framework	  that	  impact	  how	  banking	  institutions	  including	  MFIs	  must	  navigate	  and	  operate.	  	  This,	  in	  turn,	  alters	  its	  products	  and	  services	  and	  most	  importantly	  affects	  its	  clients.	  	  Thus,	  we	  have	  seen	  what	  is	  changing	  on	  the	  supply	  side	  of	  things,	  but	  what	  about	  the	  demand	  side?	  How	  are	  clients	  affected	  by	  these	  changes?	  The	  next	  section	  is	  dedicated	  to	  answer	  this	  question.	  	  First,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  understand	  how	  critical	  microfinance	   is	   to	   the	  Ecuadorian	  workforce.	   	  According	  to	  a	  presentation	  collaborated	  by	  Banco	  Solidairo	  and	  the	  Pontifica	  Universidad	  Católica	  de	  Ecuador,	  over	  40%	  of	  the	  country’s	  economically	  active	  population	  is	   present	   in	   the	   microenterprise	   sector.	   Moreover,	   there	   are	   currently	   an	   estimated	  number	   of	   2	   million	   rural	   and	   urban	   microenterprises.	   Research	   indicates	   that	   the	  microenterprise	   sector	   has	   the	   potential	   of	   generating	   more	   than	   3	   million	   jobs,	   or	   the	  equivalent	   of	   65%	   of	   private	   employment.	   This	   translates	   to	   an	   estimated	   10	   –	   15%	   of	  Ecuador’s	   GDP	   (PUCE,	   2012).	   Thus,	   on	   an	   individual,	   as	   well	   as	   macro	   level,	   the	  microenterprise	   sector	   is	   critical	   to	   growth	   and	   development.	   Successful	   products	   and	  services	  provided	  by	  MFIs	  can	  therefore	  greatly	  help	  these	  small	  businesses	  to	  thrive	  and	  expand,	   coming	   closer	   to	   reaching	   the	  potential	  of	   job	   creation,	   as	  well	   as	   improving	   the	  lives	  of	  existing	  microentrepreneurs	  and	  employees.	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   Cause	   for	   concern	   amongst	   various	  MFIs	   in	   Ecuador	   over	   the	   past	   few	   years	   has	  been	  the	  increase	  of	  client	  indebtedness,	  which	  was	  also	  seen	  by	  the	  portfolio	  at	  risk	  data	  in	   the	  previous	  chapter.	   	  Similar	   trends	  have	  been	  observed	   in	  the	  MFI	  sector	  worldwide	  for	   a	   variety	   of	   reasons.	   	   One	   problem	   that	   is	   commonly	   cited	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   as	   MFIs	  become	  more	  established	  in	  a	  market,	  clients	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  borrow	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  institutions.	   	  A	  study	  of	  Bangladeshi	  borrowers	  of	   the	  three	   largest	  present	  MFIs	   in	  2007	  revealed	  “that	  borrowers	  continued	  to	  borrow	  from	  numerous	  sources,	  and	  they	  borrowed	  from	  one	  source	  to	  pay	  off	  another,	  a	  cycle	  that	  deepened	  during	  adverse	  economic	  times.”	  (Karim,	   2012).	   According	   to	   the	   2012	   Microfinance	   Banana	   Skins	   report,	   a	   survey	   of	  microfinance	  risk	  conducted	  by	  the	  Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Financial	  Innovation	  (CSFI),	  the	  single	   largest	   threat	   to	   the	   industry	   is	   overindebtedness.	   	   Moreover,	   “the	   problem	   was	  blamed	   squarely	  on	   the	   sharp	  growth	   in	   competition	   from	  new	  entrants	   in	   recent	   years,	  and	   the	   deterioration	   in	   lending	   standards	   that	   this	   has	   brought.	   The	   lack	   of	   centralized	  credit	  information	  was	  identified	  as	  a	  contributory	  cause.”	  (Karim,	  2012).	  	   Just	   in	  May	  of	  2012	  the	  Ecuadorian	  President	  Rafael	  Correa,	  gave	  a	  public	  address	  (Enlace	  Sabatino)	   to	   the	  nation	  explaining	  among	  others,	   the	  great	  danger	  Ecuador	   faces	  with	  its	  problem	  of	  overindebtedness.	  	  He	  explained	  that	  more	  than	  40,000	  households,	  or	  41%	  of	  Ecuadorian	  families	  are	  over-­‐indebted.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  demographic	  segments	  most	  prone	   to	   indebtedness	   are	   those	   that	   earn	   less	   than	   $500	   a	   month,	   and	   $500-­‐$1000	   a	  month.	   	  These	  two	  combined	  low-­‐income	  segments	  have	  increased	  indebtedness	  by	  more	  than	   35%	   between	   2006	   and	   2011.	   	   By	   2011,	   44%	   of	   the	   population	   earning	   less	   than	  $1000,	   that	   is	   to	   say	  more	   than	   4	   out	   of	   every	   10	   people,	  was	   already	   considered	   over-­‐indebted.	  	  In	  total,	  the	  indebtedness	  of	  the	  overall	  population	  increased	  26%	  from	  2006	  to	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2011	  (El	  Comercio,	  4	  June	  2012).	  	  Given	  these	  statistics	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  see	  where	  exactly	  the	  indebtedness	  lies	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  it	  impacts	  individuals.	  
	  
Defining	  Overindebtedness	  	  	   Prior	   to	   this	   analysis,	   however,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   examine	   the	   term	  overindebtedness	  more	  closely.	   	  Depending	  on	   the	  context	  and	  country,	   this	   term	  can	  be	  used	  in	  different	  ways	  and	  mean	  different	  things.	  	  In	  its	  most	  basic	  sense,	  an	  over-­‐indebted	  individual	  carries	   too	  much	  debt.	   	  But	  what	  does	   it	  mean	  to	  have	  too	  much	  debt?	  Does	   it	  mean	   it	   is	   financially	   impossible	   for	  a	  person	   to	   repay	   that	  debt?	  What	   if	   it	   could	  still	  be	  financially	  possible,	  but	  shouldn’t	  be	  humanly	  possible,	  since	  it	  might	  mean	  not	  eating	  well	  for	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time,	  or	  giving	  up	  a	  different	  essential	  aspect	  of	  ones	  life?	  A	  CGAP	  report	  from	  2011	  explains,	  “Coming	  up	  with	  a	  precise	  definition	  of	  overindebtedness—e.g.,	  for	   research	   or	   regulatory	   purposes—is	   a	   surprisingly	   complex	   challenge.”	   (Schicks	   &	  Rosenberg,	  2011).	  The	  CGAP	  report	  goes	  on	  to	  state	  “We	  look	  at	  six	  different	  approaches	  that	  are	  used	  to	   define,	   or	   proxy	   for,	   overindebtedness.	   All	   have	   limitations.”	   These	   six	   approaches	  include	   negative	   impact,	   default	   and	   arrears,	   debt	   ratios,	   multiple	   borrowing,	   borrower	  struggle	   and	   sacrifice,	   and	   composite	   indicators.	   	   Essentially,	   there	   is	   no	   one	   single	  standard	  definition,	  even	  within	  CGAP.	  Another	  study,	  from	  the	  Center	  for	  Microfinance	  at	  the	  University	   of	   Zurich,	   used	   an	   operational	   definition	  which	  describes	   indebtedness	   as	  “the	  ratio	  of	  a	  household’s	  monthly	  repayments	  divided	  by	  its	  monthly	  net	  income,	  i.e.	  total	  monthly	  gross	  income	  minus	  total	  monthly	  expenses.”	  	  Thus,	  “a	  ratio	  of	  100%	  would	  mean	  that	   the	   total	   monthly	   income	   is	   used	   for	   installments	   on	   household	   debt.”	   	   If	   the	   ratio	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exceeds	   this,	   either	   because	   repayments	   increase	   while	   net	   income	   doesn’t,	   or	   income	  decreases	   disproportionately	   to	   repayments,	   or	   a	   combination,	   indebtedness	   turns	   into	  overindebtedness	  (Kappel,	  Krauss	  &	  Lontzek,	  2010).	  	  In	   the	   Ecuadorian	   case,	   the	   term	   “sobreendeudamiento”	   is	   used	   by	   a	   variety	   of	  sources,	  including	  the	  President	  himself.	  	  The	  precise	  meaning	  and	  definition	  of	  this	  term	  in	  varying	   contexts	   is	   also	   not	   uniform,	   but	   can	   be	   taken	   to	   mean	   that	   clients	   are	   facing	  realities	  in	  which	  their	  debts	  exceed	  their	  means	  to	  repay.	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  my	  analysis,	  I	  also	  include	  various	  measures	  to	  analyze	  the	  prevalence	  of	  overindebtedness	  in	  Ecuador,	  including	  arrears,	  past-­‐due	  loans,	  multi-­‐institutional	  lending	  and	  debt.	  	  	  	  
Growth	  of	  the	  Financial	  System	  	  	   In	   the	   analysis	   it	   is	   important	   to	   first	   examine	   overall	   market	   trends.	   	   Most	  obviously,	   it	   can	   be	   seen	   that	   the	   financial	   system	   and	   all	   its	   forms	   of	   credit	   (consumer,	  housing	   and	   microenterprise)	   have	   increased	   over	   the	   past	   five	   years.	   From	   the	   table	  below,	   it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  both	  the	  financial	  system	  and	  the	  microfinance	  sector	  within	   it	  have	  grown	  significantly	  in	  value	  as	  well	  as	  pure	  size	  (number	  of	  clients).	  	  Table	  3:	  Growth	  of	  the	  Ecuadorian	  Financial	  System	  and	  Microfinance	  Sector	  	  
Date	  









Value	  of	  Credits	  
USD	  
%	  Microcredit	  of	  
Total	  Financial	  
System	  
Dec-­‐07	   2,288,155	   $	  	  	  23,798,779,295	   774,636	   $	  	  	  5,047,910,993	   33.9%	  
Dec-­‐08	   2,259,024	   $	  	  	  22,592,764,471	   700,195	   $	  	  	  5,082,289,513	   31.0%	  
Dec-­‐09	   2,562,302	   $	  	  	  23,587,309,244	   1,025,828	   $	  	  	  5,248,105,742	   40.0%	  
Dec-­‐10	   3,120,430	   $	  	  	  29,993,656,257	   1,451,719	   $	  	  	  7,089,131,997	   46.5%	  
Dec-­‐11	   3,456,944	   $	  	  	  35,038,743,507	   1,640,921	   $	  	  	  9,633,141,161	   47.5%	  
Apr-­‐12	   3,541,130	   $	  	  	  38,382,143,631	   1,692,536	   $	  	  	  9,908,464,549	   47.8%	  	  
	  	  	  	  Table	  and	  all	  calculations	  by	  author.	  Data	  from	  Equifax	  Ecuador	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%	  Olla	  de	  
Oro	  Clients	  
Dec-­‐07	   33.9%	   67.3%	   14.0%	   5.4%	   2.5%	  
Dec-­‐08	   31.0%	   66.4%	   12.3%	   5.3%	   2.5%	  
Dec-­‐09	   40.0%	   60.6%	   10.5%	   4.5%	   2.1%	  
Dec-­‐10	   46.5%	   56.2%	   8.9%	   3.9%	   1.7%	  
Dec-­‐11	   47.5%	   56.2%	   8.7%	   4.0%	   1.4%	  
Apr-­‐12	   47.8%	   56.8%	   8.3%	   3.9%	   1.3%	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Table	  and	  all	  calculations	  by	  author.	  Data	  from	  Equifax	  Ecuador	  This	   breakdown	   demonstrates	   quite	   clearly	   how	   rapidly	   the	   percentage	   of	   microcredit	  clients	  has	  been	   increasing	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	  other	   segments.	   	  Commercial,	  mortgage	  and	  “Olla	  de	  Oro”	  credit	  clients	  decreased	  as	  an	  overall	  percentage	  of	  creditors	  significantly	  since	  2007.	  Consumer	  credit	  decreased	  quite	  rapidly	  from	  2007	  to	  2010,	  but	  since	  then	  has	  stabilized,	  and	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2012	  the	  percentage	  actually	  began	  to	  rise	  again.	  	  This	  correlates	  to	  an	  additional	  nearly	  70,000	  clients	  since	  December	  2011.	  	  By	  comparison,	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  percentage	  of	  microcredit	  clients	  has	  slowed	  since	  2010,	  and	  from	  2011	  to	  2012	  there	  was	  only	  an	   increase	  of	   just	  over	  51,000	  clients.	   	  Overall,	   in	  April	  2012	  there	  were	  1,692,536	  microcredit	  clients,	  compared	  to	  2,012,686	  consumer	  credit	  clients.	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   An	  important	  aspect	  to	  discuss	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  consumer	  loans	  is	  the	  fact	   that	   Ecuador	  has	   recently	   undergone	   some	   restructuring	   related	   to	   consumer	   credit	  and	  credit	  card	  use.	  	  While	  the	  central	  bank	  has	  limited	  the	  effective	  microfinance	  interest	  rate	  to	  between	  22.93%	  and	  26.93%,	  the	  interest	  for	  consumer	  credit	  lies	  at	  only	  15.20%	  (PUCE,	   2012).	   This	   creates	   a	   clear	   incentive	   for	   microentrepreneurs	   and	   potential	  microcredit	   clients	   to	   prefer	   a	   consumer	   loan	   instead,	   as	   costs	   are	   simply	   much	   lower.	  	  Combined	  with	   an	   increase	   in	   credit	   card	   circulation	   and	   access,	   low	   interest	   rates	   have	  been	   cited	   as	   a	   critical	   cause	   of	   overindebtedness.	   	   This	   combination	   of	   issues	   will	   be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  
Development	  of	  the	  Loan	  Portfolio	  	   It	   is	   critical	   to	   find	   where	   the	   problem	   of	   indebtedness	   lies,	   by	   examining	   the	  portion	  of	  the	  total	  loan	  portfolio	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  that	  has	  not	  been	  repaid.	  	  In	  Graph	  1	  below	  the	  total	  unpaid	  or	  past-­‐due	  loans	  are	  plotted	  together	  with	  the	  total	  loan	  portfolio.	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Graph	  1:	  Growth	  of	  Total	  Loan	  Portfolio	  vs	  Past-­‐Due	  Loans	  (in	  thousands	  of	  USD)	  	  
	  	  
Graph	  and	  all	  calculations	  by	  author.	  Data	  from	  the	  Superintendence	  of	  Banks	  (Súper	  de	  
bancos	  y	  seguros)	  Ecuador	  	  	  The	   loan	   portfolio	   has	   increased	   quite	   steadily	   since	   2002,	   resulting	   in	   a	   change	   from	  roughly	  2.5	  billion	  to	  13	  billion	  USD.	  	  However,	  by	  comparison	  the	  past-­‐due	  loans	  have	  not	  grown	   in	   the	  same	  pattern.	   	  Rather,	  after	  an	   initial	  decrease	  until	  2007,	   there	  has	  been	  a	  recent	   resurgence	   in	   the	  past	   five	  years.	   	  Thus,	   it	   is	   critical	   to	  examine	   the	  proportion	  of	  past-­‐due	   loans	   compared	   to	   the	   overall	   loan	   portfolio.	   	   This	   is	   shown	   in	  Graph	  2,	   and	   is	  displayed	  as	  a	  percentage.	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Graph	  2:	  Percentage	  of	  Past-­‐Due	  Loans	  of	  Respective	  Total	  Loan	  Portfolio	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2002-­‐2012)	  	  
	  	  
Graph	  and	  all	  calculations	  by	  author.	  Data	  from	  the	  Superintendence	  of	  Banks	  (Súper	  de	  
bancos	  y	  seguros)	  Ecuador	  
	  The	  past-­‐due	   loans	  overall	  percentage	  of	   the	   total	   loan	  portfolio	   (as	  depicted	  by	   the	  blue	  line)	  has	  decreased	  significantly	  from	  just	  over	  14%	  in	  2002	  to	  just	  over	  3%	  in	  2012.	  The	  portion	  of	  past-­‐due	  loans	  of	  the	  consumer	  loan	  portfolio	  has	  mirrored	  the	  overall	  system,	  as	   has	   the	  mortgage	   portfolio.	   	   The	   portion	   of	   the	   loan	   portfolio	   comprised	   of	   past-­‐due	  microenterprise	  loans,	  however,	  has	  fluctuated	  throughout	  the	  10	  year	  time	  frame	  and	  has	  been	   increasing	   again	   for	   the	   past	   two	   years.	   	   Currently,	   the	   past-­‐due	   loans	   for	  microenterprise	  credits	  comprise	  5.5%	  of	   that	  portfolio.	   	  This	   is	   significantly	  higher	   than	  the	  average	  for	  the	  financial	  system.	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  microfinance	  sector	  is	  suffering	  from	   greater	   repayment	   issues	   than	   other	   sectors.	   Moreover,	   the	   upward	   trend	   for	  microenterprise	  credits,	  an	   increasing	  value	  of	  USD,	   is	  not	  paid	  on	  time	  and	  supports	   the	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concern	   the	  most	   vulnerable,	   low-­‐income	   population	   segment	  who	  would	   take	   out	   such	  loans	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  issues	  of	  repayment,	  default	  and	  indebtedness.	  	  
Clients	  in	  Arrears	  	   The	  increase	  in	  USD	  value	  is	  a	  critical	  finding,	  but	  does	  not	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  show	  that	  there	   is	   a	   larger	   number	   of	   individuals	   or	   percentage	   of	   the	   financial	   sector	   that	   is	   in	  arrears	  and	  over-­‐indebted.	   	  Graph	  3	  shows	  both	  of	  these	  values,	  with	  the	  total	  number	  of	  clients	  in	  arrears	  on	  the	  right	  Y	  axis	  and	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  clients	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  in	  arrears	  on	  the	  left	  Y	  axis.	  	  	  Graph	  3:	  Clients	  in	  Arrears	  (2007	  –	  2012)	  
	  
Graph	  and	  all	  calculations	  by	  author.	  Data	  from	  Equifax	  Ecuador	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This	  graph	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  prior	  assumptions	  are	  true.	  The	  total	  number	  of	  clients	  in	  arrears	  has	  increased,	  but	  since	  the	  entire	  number	  of	  borrowers	  within	  the	  financial	  system	  also	   increased,	   the	  percentage	  of	  clients	   in	  arrears	  becomes	  very	   telling.	  That	  proportion	  has	  fluctuated	  over	  the	  past	  five	  years	  and,	  since	  2011,	  the	  value	  has	  actually	  increased.	  In	  April	   2012,	   414,809	  people	  within	   the	  Ecuadorian	   financial	   system	  were	   in	   arrears	  with	  their	  payments,	  or	  11.7%	  of	  the	  total	  population	  in	  the	  financial	  system.	  	  This	  is	  a	  very	  high	  value	  and	  has	  serious	  implications	  for	  the	  health	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  and	  the	  economy,	  as	  well	   as	   for	   the	   clients	  who	   suffer	   from	   financial	   difficulties	   and	   an	   array	   of	   problems	  related	  to	  the	  actual	  process	  of	  the	  loan	  repayment.	  	   In	  order	  to	  get	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  the	  values	  discussed	  above,	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  percentage	  of	   clients	   in	  different	   stages	  of	   arrears	  would	  be	  appropriate.	   In	  Graph	  4,	   the	  percentage	  of	  borrowers	  is	  shown	  per	  year,	  and	  is	  divided	  into	  segments	  by	  their	  days	  in	  arrears.	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Graph	  4:	  Percentage	  of	  Clients	  in	  Arrears,	  by	  Day	  (2007-­‐2012)	  
Graph	  and	  all	  calculations	  by	  author.	  Data	  from	  Equifax	  Ecuador	  	  The	  majority	  of	  clients	  in	  arrears	  have	  not	  paid	  for	  more	  than	  90	  days.	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  1-­‐30day	  segment	  is	  not	  as	  serious	  since	  there	  is	  still	  a	  fairly	  reasonable	  chance	  that	  repayment	  will	  occur.	   	  However,	  beyond	  that,	  and	  certainly	  beyond	  the	  90	  day	  mark,	   it	   is	  increasingly	  less	  likely	  that	  loan	  repayment	  is	  possible	  and	  will	  occur.	  Thus,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  these	  clients	  are	  suffering	  from	  overindebtedness.	   	  Particularly	  telling	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  two	  largest	  segments	  are	  270-­‐360	  and	  <1080	  days.	   	  In	  terms	  of	  actual	  percentages	  of	  overall	  borrowers,	  3.9%	  or	  139,268	  people	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  in	  arrears	  for	  between	  270	  and	  360	  days,	  and	  3.6%	  or	  113,393	  are	  considered	  in	  arrears	  for	  more	  than	  1,080.	  	  These	  are	   significant	   values,	   and	   result	   in	   several	   hundred	   thousand	   clients	   being	   unlikely	   to	  continue	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  formal	  financial	  system	  after	  being	  in	  arrears	  for	  such	  extended	  periods	  of	  time.	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Competition	  and	  Multi-­Institution	  Borrowing	  	   As	   briefly	   discussed	   before,	   one	   of	   the	   causes	   cited	   for	   the	   increasing	   number	   of	  clients	   in	   arrears,	   and	   facing	   overindebtedness	   is	   the	   larger	   competition	   of	   financial	  institutions,	   particularly	   MFIs,	   which	   allow	   clients	   to	   receive	   loans	   from	   various	  institutions	  at	  the	  same	  time.	   	  This	  makes	  repayment	  far	  more	  difficult	  since	  often	  clients	  are	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  debt	  they	  have	  outstanding	  and	  it	  becomes	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  the	  funds	  in	  order	  to	  repay	  various	  loans,	  rather	  than	  just	  one.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  problem	  of	   borrowing	   from	  one	   institution	   to	   repay	   the	   loan	  of	   another	  has	   become	  more	  prevalent	  and	  creates	  a	  vicious	  debt	  cycle	  that	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  break.	  	  To	  gauge	  the	   prevalence	   of	   this	   in	   the	   Ecuadorian	   market,	   Graph	   5	   below	   depicts	   the	   growth	   of	  borrowers	   in	   the	   financial	   system,	   categorized	   by	   how	   many	   different	   institutions	   they	  received	  loans	  from	  at	  one	  time.	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Graph	  5:	  Clients	  by	  Number	  of	  Financial	  Institution	  (2007-­‐2012)	  
	  
Graph	  and	  all	  calculations	  by	  author.	  Data	  from	  Equifax	  Ecuador	  	  	  Table	  5:	  Clients	  by	  Number	  of	  Financial	  Institutions	  (2007-­‐2012)	  	   	  	  	  	  	  
Table	  and	  all	  calculations	  by	  author.	  Data	  from	  Equifax	  Ecuador	  	   There	   has	   been	   a	   significant	   increase	   in	   number	   of	   clients	   taking	   loans	   from	  financial	   institutions	   across	   the	   board.	   There	  were	   roughly	   53%	  more	   clients	   in	   January	  2012	   than	   there	   were	   in	   December	   2007.	   There	   have	   always	   been	   a	   fairly	   similar	  
Date	   1	  Institution	   2-­‐3	  Institutions	   4-­‐5	  Institutions	   >5	  Institutions	   Total	  
Dec-­‐07	   1,414,869	   721,413	   128,208	   23,665	   2,288,155	  
Dec-­‐08	   1,463,297	   668,123	   109,660	   17,944	   2,259,024	  
Dec-­‐09	   1,644,501	   774,744	   123,507	   19,550	   2,562,302	  
Dec-­‐10	   2,022,392	   929,647	   145,686	   22,705	   3,120,430	  
Dec-­‐11	   2,173,586	   1,067,679	   184,745	   30,934	   3,456,944	  
Jan-­‐12	   2,189,664	   1,084,047	   189,153	   31,946	   3,494,810	  
%	  increase	   54.8%	   50.3%	   47.5%	   35.0%	   52.7%	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percentage	   of	   clients	   over	   the	   years	  within	   the	   groupings	   by	   institution.	   	   By	   percentage,	  there	  aren’t	  a	  larger	  proportion	  of	  clients	  taking	  out	  3-­‐4	  loans	  in	  2012	  than	  there	  were	  in	  2007.	   	  Nevertheless,	   the	  sheer	  number	  of	   clients	   is	  growing,	  placing	  a	  greater	  burden	  on	  the	   financial	   system	   as	   more	   lenders	   are	   struggling	   with	   their	   repayments	   than	   before.	  	  Moreover,	   the	   values	   are	   still	   high,	   with	   31%	   of	   clients	   receiving	   loans	   from	   2-­‐3	  institutions,	  more	   than	   5%	  of	   clients	   have	   loans	   from	  4-­‐5	   institutions	   and	   1%	  has	   loans	  from	  more	  than	  5	  at	  a	  time.	  	  In	  total,	  37%	  of	  borrowers,	  equaling	  1,305,146	  clients,	  borrow	  from	  more	  than	  one	  institution	  at	  a	  time.	  	  One	  would	  think	  that	  over	  time	  this	  value	  would	  drop,	   as	   clients	   learn	  more	   about	   wise	   financial	   behavior	   and	  what	  might	   hurt	   them	   as	  borrowers.	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	   at	   all	   in	   Ecuador.	   Rather,	   the	   percentage	   of	  borrowers	   engaging	   in	   this	   kind	   of	   behavior	   has	   remained	   virtually	   the	   same,	   but	   the	  number	  of	  clients	  has	  increased	  by	  nearly	  50%	  since	  2007.	  These	   developments	   have	   serious	   implications	   for	   the	   financial	   wellbeing	   of	   the	  institutions	   providing	   loans,	   and	   the	   clients	   who	   are	   at	   a	   higher	   credit	   risk	   the	   more	  institutions	  from	  which	  they	  borrow.	  	  A	  survey	  conducted	  by	  Banco	  Solidario	  with	  a	  sample	  population	  of	  100	  of	  their	  clients	  (55	  women,	  45	  men)	  showed	  that	  clients	  borrowing	  from	  three	  or	  more	  financial	  institutions	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  feel	  uncomfortable	  with	  their	  level	  of	  debt	  than	  clients	  borrowing	  only	  from	  Banco	  Solidairo.3	  The	  same	  survey	  also	  indicated	  that	  58%	  of	  clients	  borrowing	  from	  more	  than	  three	  financial	  institutions	  stated	  they	  have	  had	  to	  make	  some	  form	  of	  sacrifice	  in	  order	  to	  repay	  their	  loans	  on	  time.	  	  This	  is	  16%	  more	  than	   the	   clients	   of	   Banco	   Solidario	   only.	   	   Below	   is	   a	   graph	   showing	   the	  most	   commonly	  cited	   sacrifices	   both	   client	   groups	   have	   made	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   timely	   repayment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Survey:	  Tabulación	  sobreendeudamiento,	  2012.	  Banco	  Solidario.	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Particularly	  telling	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  16%	  and	  17%	  of	  clients	  (for	  the	  two	  groups	  respectively)	  have	  incurred	  another	  debt	  in	  order	  to	  repay	  a	  loan.	  This	  is	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  43%	  and	  34%	  respectively	  that	  have	  asked	  for	  help	  from	  friends	  and	  relatives.	  	  The	  circumstances	  of	  such	  help	  are	  unknown,	  as	  it	  is	  not	  inconceivable	  that	  repayment	  to	  friends	  and	  relatives	  would	  be	   expected,	   effectively	   meaning	   another	   informal	   loan	   was	   withdrawn	   by	   clients	   who	  already	  struggle	  to	  repay.	  	  These	  are	  not	  the	  best	  financial	  behaviors/practices	  and	  indicate	  clear	  struggles	  on	  the	  part	  of	  clients.	  	  	  One	   explanation	   for	   this	   trend	   of	   multi-­‐institution	   borrowing	   is	   the	   increase	   in	  competition	  between	   financial	   institutions.	   	   Simply	   put,	   clients	   have	  more	   institutions	   to	  choose	   from,	   and	   as	   these	   compete	   for	   clients,	   they	   may	   become	   strict	   about	   what	  requirements	  they	  impose	  on	  the	  borrower	  to	  qualify.	  A	  further	  prevalent	  problem	  in	  Latin	  America	  that	  both	  the	  2011	  and	  2012	  Banana	  Skins	  study	  find,	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  effective	  credit	  bureaus	  to	  give	  valid	  ratings	  of	  client	  credit	  history,	  making	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  institutions	  to	  gauge	  how	  reliable	  a	  client	  will	  be.	  Claudia	  Valladares,	  the	  vice-­‐president	  of	  community	  banking	  at	  Banesco	  in	  Venezuela	  was	   interviewed	  for	  the	  2011	  Banana	  Skins	  survey,	  and	  said:	   “with	   the	   rise	   of	   microfinance	   in	   many	   regions	   and	   countries,	   many	   MFIs	   tend	   to	  compete	  for	  the	  same	  customers	  and	  that	  carries	  the	  risk	  of	  overindebtedness	  if	  there	  is	  no	  effective	  credit	  bureau.”	  (Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Financial	  Innovation,	  2011).	  	  In	  the	  2012	  survey,	  a	  bank	  auditor	  from	  Colombia	  explained	  that	  overindebtedness	  “has	  materialised	  in	  the	  last	  four	  years	  and	  continues	  to	  grow	  due	  to	  increasing	  competition	  from	  new	  players	  and	  the	  policy	  of	  aggressive	  expansion	  of	  current	  competitors”	  Thus,	  the	  2012	  study	  finds	  that	  in	  Latin	  America	  in	  particular,	  the	  four	  biggest	  risks	  as	  indicated	  by	  MFIs	  throughout	  the	  region,	  are	  (1)	  overindebtedness,	  (2)	  competition,	  (3)	  corporate	  governmance,	  and	  (4)	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political	  interference	  (Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Financial	  Innovation,	  2012).	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  has	  certainly	  been	  the	  case	  in	  Ecuador.	  	  
Threat	  to	  Credit	  Bureaus	  	   The	  problem	  of	  credit	  bureau	  effectiveness	  as	  highlighted	  by	  Valladares’	  statement	  in	  the	  Banana	  Skins	  report,	  holds	  true	  in	  Ecuador.	  The	  country’s	  credit	  bureaus	  and	  rating	  agencies	  have	  been	  limited	  for	  many	  years.	  While	  10	  years	  ago	  there	  were	  six	  independent	  bureaus,	   today	   only	   one	   remains.	   Even	   this	   last	   credit	   bureau,	   Equifax,	   faced	   regulatory	  restraints	  to	  provide	  only	  credit	  history	  of	  six	  years	  to	  financial	  institutions,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  institutions	  not	  to	  invade	  the	  client’s	  privacy	  (El	  Comercio,	  13	  June	  2012).	  To	   make	   matters	   worse,	   since	   May	   of	   2012,	   the	   government	   is	   pushing	   for	   the	  complete	   elimination	   of	   all	   private	   bureaus,	   as	   to	   enable	   the	   exclusive	   management	   of	  customer	   information	   by	   the	   Registry	   of	   Credit	   Data,	   which	   in	   turn	   functions	   under	   the	  National	  Directorate	  of	  Public	  Data	  Records.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  credit	  history	  would	  be	  further	  reduced	  to	  a	  maximum	  of	  four	  years	  per	  client.	  	  The	  law	  is	  still	  in	  the	  works	  and	  discussions	  have	  gone	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  government	  agencies,	  Equifax	  and	  financial	  institutions.	  	  There	   is	   great	   fear	   that	   with	   the	   removal	   of	   independent	   private	   credit	   bureaus,	   lots	   of	  know-­‐how	  and	  information	  will	  be	  lost.	  	  Carlos	  Díaz,	  representative	  of	  Equifax,	  explained	  in	  an	   interview	   with	   the	   Ecuadorian	   newspaper,	   El	   Comercio,	   “we	   [Equifax]	   have	   made	  substantial	   investments	   and	   we	   know	   how	   to	   do	   things.	   To	   remove	   the	   bureau	   is	   to	  regress.”	  (El	  Comercio,	  18	  Oct.	  2012)	  Economic	  analysts	  in	  Ecuador	  have	  also	  reiterated	  the	  importance	  of	  financial	  modeling,	  risk	  analysis	  and	  warning	  systems	  bureaus	  like	  Equifax	  have	  specialized	  in.	  	  These	  are	  critical	  to	  financial	  institutions	  in	  order	  to	  gauge	  the	  credit	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risk	  of	  their	  clients	  better	  and	  to	  anticipate	  portfolio	  default.	  	  If	  overindebtedness	  is	  already	  a	  problem,	  the	  further	  elimination	  of	  checks	  and	  balances	  on	  client’s	  financial	  performance	  and	  capacity	  will	  simply	  exacerbate	  the	  problem.	  	  	  	  
The	  Rise	  of	  Credit	  Cards	  	  	   Another	  change	  that	  is	  important	  to	  highlight	  is	  the	  rapid	  increase	  in	  access	  to	  and	  circulation	   of	   credit	   cards	   in	   Ecuador.	   This	   has	   significantly	   affected	   low-­‐income	  populations,	   as	   they	   are	   often	   the	   target	   of	   credit	   card	   companies	   that	   have	   expanded	  within	   the	   Ecuadorian	  market	   and	   are	   trying	   to	   further	   increase	   their	   client	   base.	   	   The	  growth	  of	  credit	  card	  access	  to	  low-­‐income	  populations	  has	  further	  been	  facilitated	  by	  the	  structural	   changes	   allowing	   for	   consumer	   loans	   to	   be	   charged	   at	   a	   lower	   interest	   than	  microenterprise	  loans.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  critical	  to	  microcredit	  clients	  since,	  compared	  to	  a	  microcredit	  loan,	  taking	  out	  a	  consumer	  loan	  means	  saving	  roughly	  5%	  interest	  annually.	  	  	  	  	   According	   to	   the	   Ecuadorian	   newspaper,	  EL	   Telégrafo,	   there	   are	   currently	   nearly	  24.5	  million	   credit	   cards	   (24,488,205)	   in	   circulation.	   	   This	   accounts	   for	   42%	  of	   the	   total	  money	   in	  circulation	   in	  Ecuador	  overall	   (El	  Telégrafo,	  23	  Feb.	  2012).	  El	  Comercio,	   further	  cites	  a	  study	  by	  the	  Association	  of	  Private	  Bancs	  of	  Ecuador	  (ABPE).	  It	  reveals	  that	  by	  the	  end	   of	   2011,	   there	   were	   an	   estimated	   2.2	   million	   cardholders,	   which	   is	   a	   significant	  increase	   from	   1.7	   million	   just	   in	   2008.	   Furthermore,	   by	   the	   end	   of	   2011,	   69.6%	   of	   the	  cardholders	  had	  multiple	  credit	  cards.	   	  This	  percentage	  has	  been	  growing	  very	  rapidly,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  just	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  2011	  only	  61%	  of	  the	  population	  held	  more	  than	  one	  card.	  	  More	  critically,	  33.5%	  of	  cardholders	  had	  at	  least	  three	  credit	  cards	  at	  the	   end	   of	   2011	   (El	   Comercio,	   14	   June	   2012).	   Similar	   to	   	   multi-­‐institutional	   borrowing,	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having	   multiple	   credit	   cards	   can	   also	   lead	   to	   serious	   problems	   linked	   to	   payment	  overextensions.	  	  	  This	  is	  tied	  in	  with	  the	  growing	  trend	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  cardholders	  choosing	  not	  to	  pay	   in	  deferred	  payments	   for	   their	  purchases,	  but	  rather	  pay	  only	   the	  minimum	  monthly	  fees	   without	   making	   actual	   payments	   for	   their	   purchases.	   According	   to	   the	   cited	   El	  
Telégrafo	   article,	   this	   is	   common	   practice	   amongst	   62%	   of	   cardholders.	   84%	   even	   come	  close	  to	  maxing	  out	   their	  cards	  each	  month.	  The	  result	   is	   that	  cardholders	  do	  not	  end	  up	  paying	   for	   their	   purchases	   but	   continue	   to	   get	   by	   with	   the	   minimum	   monthly	   fees.	  However,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  they	  not	  only	  owe	  the	  value	  of	  their	  original	  purchase,	  but	  also	  the	  additional	  interest	  on	  it	  and	  accumulated	  fees.	  	  	   While	  information	  indicating	  cardholder	  income	  is	  unavailable,	  breakdowns	  of	  how	  many	   cards	   per	   specific	   type	   are	   in	   circulation	   are	   available.	   	   This	   is	   important,	   because	  certain	   cards	  are	   targeted	   towards	  different	  population	  and	   income	  segments.	   	  One	   such	  example	   is	   a	   credit	   card	   called	   Cuotafácil	   offered	   by	   Ecuadorian	   bank	   Unibanco,	   whose	  target	   population	   segment	   is	   low-­‐income	   individuals.	   	   In	   2011,	   there	  were	  more	   than	   3	  million	  (3,271,708)	  cards	  of	  this	  type	  in	  circulation.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  emphasize	  that	  there	  have	  been	  very	  problematic	  practices	  involved	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  these	  cards.	  	  	  One	   tactic	   commonly	   used	   to	   increase	   client	   base	   is	   for	   banks	   associated	   with	   a	  credit	  card	  company	  or	  type	  to	  call	  their	  current	  clients	  and	  suggest	  they	  sign	  up	  for	  a	  card.	  	  They	  emphasize	  that	  it	  would	  be	  beneficial	  for	  them	  and	  improve	  their	  credit	  score	  if	  they	  were	  to	  take	  one.	  They	  also	  entice	  with	  deals	  such	  as	  allowing	  clients	  to	  sign	  up	  for	  a	  new	  card	  for	  free.	  Particularly	  for	  the	  low	  income	  population	  segments,	  such	  tactics	  can	  be	  very	  risky.	  	  Signing	  up	  for	  a	  card	  with	  no	  information	  other	  than	  what	  is	  given	  over	  a	  brief	  phone	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call	  and	  pressure	  from	  a	  bank	  can	  lead	  to	  misuse	  of	  the	  card.	  	  According	  to	  a	  bank	  official	  interviewed	   by	   El	   Telégrafo,	   he	   receives	   three	   to	   four	   calls	   a	   day	   with	   complaints	   by	  cardholders	  who	   feel	  wronged	   by	   the	   opaque	   terms	   and	   conditions	   of	   their	   card.	   	  Many	  clients	  do	  not	  realize	  what	  exactly	  they	  are	  getting	  themselves	  into,	  as	  they	  are	  unaware	  of	  the	  various	   fees	  and	   interest	  rates	   involved,	  particularly	  since	   the	  majority	  of	  clients	  that	  make	  payments	  in	  smaller	  installments	  rather	  than	  in	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  when	  the	  credit	  card	  bill	  comes.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  purchases	  becoming	  as	  much	  as	  four	  times	  more	  expensive	  than	  they	  originally	  would	  have	  been.	  Of	   the	   purchases	   most	   frequently	   made	   with	   a	   card,	   supermarket	   and	   pharmacy	  purchases	   (15.9%),	   car	   parts	   (8.75%),	   professional	   services	   (6.15%)	   and	   phone	   and	  communication	  (5.8%)	  rank	  as	  the	  top	  four	  (El	  Comercio,	  14	  June	  2012).	  While	  the	  use	  of	  these	  purchases	   is	   not	   specified,	  meaning	  whether	   it	   is	   used	   for	  private,	   personal	   use	  or	  businesses,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   microenterprises	   are	   in	   sectors	   that	  would	  make	  use	  of	   such	  purchases.	   	  More	   specifically,	   in	  2004,	  55%	  of	  microenterprises	  were	  in	  the	  commerce	  sector,	  19%	  in	  the	  production	  sector	  and	  26%	  in	  the	  services	  sector	  (USAID,	   2005).	   As	   Tables	   6,	   7	   and	   8	   below	   show,	   within	   each	   of	   these	   categories,	   most	  common	  businesses	  spend	  on	  groceries,	  car	  parts	  and	  telephone/communications.	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  microentrepreneurs	  would	  be	  likely	  candidates	  to	  make	  such	  purchases	  on	  credit.	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Table	  6:	  Breakdown	  of	  Principle	  Microenterprise	  Activities	  in	  the	  Services	  Sector	  
Service	  Sector	  Microenterprises	   Percentage	  
	  	  	  Bars,	  restaurants	  and	  cafes	   34.5%	  
	  	  	  Transportation	  (buses,	  taxis	  and	  trucks)	   22.8%	  
	  	  	  Automotive	  and	  tire	  repair	  shops	   11.2%	  
	  	  	  Beauty	  parlors	  and	  barbershops	   7.4%	  
Percentage	  of	  Total	  Services	  Sector	  
Microenterprises	  
76.1%	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Table	  by	  author.	  Data	  from	  USAID	  Ecuador	  	  Table	  7:	  Breakdown	  of	  Principle	  Microenterprise	  Activities	  in	  the	  Production	  Sector	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Table	  by	  author.	  Data	  from	  USAID	  Ecuador	  	  Table	  8:	  Breakdown	  of	  Principle	  Microenterprise	  Activities	  in	  the	  Commerce	  Sector	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Table	  by	  author.	  Data	  from	  USAID	  Ecuador	  	  
Commerce	  Sector	  Microenterprises	   Percentage	  
	  	  	  Sales	  of	  food,	  beverages,	  and	  other	  items	   50.5%	  
	  	  	  Sales	  of	  clothing	  and	  shoes	   12.5%	  
	  	  	  Sales	  of	  products	  for	  personal	  use	  and	  cleaning	   6.1%	  
	  	  	  Sales	  of	  other	  small	  items	  (knick-­‐knacks)	   5.1%	  
	  	  	  Other	  articles	  of	  commerce	   13.9%	  
Percentage	  of	  Total	  Commerce	  Sector	  
Microenterprises	  
88.1%	  
Production	  Sector	  Microenterprises	   Percentage	  
	  	  	  Clothing	  (tailors	  and	  dressmakers)	   25.6%	  
	  	  	  Wood	  furniture,	  windows	  and	  doors	   15.7%	  
	  	  	  Nonalcoholic	  beverages	  and	  juices	   15%	  
	  	  	  Metal	  products	  (furniture,	  gates,	  fences)	   9.6%	  
	  	  	  Bread	  and	  pastry	   7.5%	  
Percentage	  of	  Total	  Production	  Sector	  
Microenterprises	  
73.4%	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There	   is	  no	  data	  to	  demonstrate	  whether	  or	  not	  microfinance	  clients	  prefer	  to	  use	  credit	  cards	  for	  these	  kinds	  of	  business	  purchases	  rather	  than	  withdrawing	  a	  microcredit	  loan	   but,	   given	   the	   available	   information,	   it	   is	   not	   inconceivable	   that	   this	   may	   begin	   to	  occur.	  	  What	  exists	  is	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  credit	  cards	  are	  becoming	  ever	  more	  accessible,	  to	   all	   income	   levels.	   Consumer	   credit	   interest	   rates	   lie	   approximately	   5%	   below	  microcredit	   loans,	   there	  are	   fewer	  checks	  and	  balances	  with	  regards	  to	  receiving	  a	  credit	  card	  than	  other	  forms	  of	  loans	  like	  a	  microloan,	  presenting	  an	  instance	  that	  makes	  it	  all	  the	  more	  appealing	  to	  simply	  use	  a	  credit	  card	  make	  the	  very	  purchases	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  are	   already	  using	   cards	   for,	   rather	   than	   going	   through	   the	  more	   cumbersome	  process	   of	  withdrawing	  a	  microloan.	   	   It	   saves	   the	   time	  and	  effort	  of	  making	   trips	   to	   the	   loan	  office,	  saves	  the	  burden	  of	  making	  as	  many	  frequent	  payments	  to	  the	  bank,	  and	  the	  guilt	  of	  telling	  the	  loan	  officer	  if	  a	  payment	  cannot	  be	  made.	   	   It	  would	  be	  a	  rational	  decision,	  albeit	  a	  far	  more	  dangerous	  one	  for	  many	  clients.	  The	  danger	  of	  this	  trend	  emerging	  is	  a	  great	  one	  and	  it	  can	  cause	  a	  lot	  of	  problems	  to	  the	  most	  financially	  at	  risk	  segment	  of	  society	  which	  can	  least	  afford	  to	  become	  entangled	  in	  credit	  card	  debts,	  more	  risk	  exposure	  and	  a	  potentially	  lower	  credit	  score,	  without	  the	  checks	  and	  balances	  and	  support	  an	  MFI	  can	  provide.	  	  	  
Summary	  and	  Conclusions	  	  	   Upon	   examining	   the	   evidence	   discussed	   in	   this	   chapter,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   why	  President	   Correa	   expressed	   concerns	   in	   his	   public	   address	   in	   May	   of	   2012.	   	   Perhaps	   it	  cannot	   be	   argued	   that	   it	   an	   overindebtedness	   crisis	   yet	   but,	   given	   the	   data	   and	   current	  trends,	  there	  is	  certainly	  a	  crisis	  in	  the	  making	  if	  such	  patterns	  continue.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  there	  is	   a	   serious	   increase	   in	   individuals	   joining	   the	   financial	   system,	   in	  particular	   low	   income	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population	   who	   has	   joined	   an	   MFI.	   	   The	   population	   segment	   receiving	   microenterprise	  loans	  has	  increased	  more	  rapidly	  than	  any	  other	  type	  of	  loan.	  	  Moreover,	  past-­‐due	  loans	  of	  microenterprise	   credits	   are	   rising,	   and	   have	   the	   highest	   percentage	   of	   all	   past-­‐due	   loan	  types.	   	   This	   is	   also	   reflected	   in	   the	   number	   of	   clients	   of	   the	   financial	   system	   in	   arrears	  which	  has	  been	  consistently	  rising.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  percentage	  of	  total	  clients	  of	  the	  system	  in	  arrears	  has	  increased	  since	  2011.	   	  More	  critically,	  of	  the	  population	  in	  arrears	  on	  their	  payments,	   the	   largest	  segment	   is	  between	  270-­‐360	  days	   in	  arrears,	  and	  more	   than	  1,800	  days	   in	   arrears.	   	   These	   are	   large	   time	   frames	   indicating	   that	   repayment	   is	   likely	   not	  possible	  for	  these	  individuals.	  	  Other	  bad	  borrowing	  practices	  are	  indicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  37%,	  or	  more	  than	  1.3	  million	  individuals	  borrow	  from	  more	  than	  one	  financial	  institution	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  In	  a	  survey	   of	   a	   sample	   population	   of	   microfinance	   clients,	   58%	   borrowing	   from	  more	   than	  three	   institutions	   said	   they	   had	   to	   make	   a	   sacrifice	   in	   order	   to	   make	   their	   payments,	  compared	   to	   only	   16%	   of	   clients	   borrowing	   from	   only	   one	   institution	   who	   claimed	   the	  same.	   	   In	  addition,	   there	   is	   the	  threat	  of	   the	  possible	  removal	   from	  the	   last	  private	  credit	  bureau,	  which	  could	  be	  detrimental	  for	  financial	  institutions	  to	  accurately	  gauge	  the	  risk	  of	  their	   portfolios,	   further	   exacerbating	   the	   problems	   the	   system	   faces.	   	   Lastly,	   increased	  access	  to	  and	  circulation	  of	  credit	  cards	  without	  increase	  knowledge	  of	  their	  use	  has	  led	  to	  bad	  practices,	   such	  as	  maxing	  out	  cards	  and	  paying	  only	  minimum	  monthly	   fees,	   causing	  many	  clients	  to	  be	  surprised	  and	  overwhelmed	  by	  their	  final	  bills	  after	  a	  year’s	  time.	  Since	  the	   boom	   of	   credit	   cards	   is	   still	   beginning,	   this	   trend	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   continue	   and	  worsen	  over	  the	  next	  few	  years.	  	  	  
	   69	  
Thus,	   it	   can	  be	   seen	   that	   there	   is	   cause	   for	   strong	   concern	  and	   caution.	   	  Evidence	  shows	   that	   overindebtedness	   is	   already	   a	   problem,	   and	   it	  may	   become	   a	   crisis	   if	   trends	  continue	  and	  regulatory	  changes	  limit	  institutions	  further.	  	  This	  is	  a	  view	  shared	  by	  experts	  in	   the	   field,	   and	   in	   particular,	   MFI	   practitioners,	   as	   demonstrated	   by	   the	   Banana	   Skins	  survey	   results,	   confirming	   that	   overindebtedness	   is	   the	   single	   greatest	   risk	   to	   the	   MFI	  industry.	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Chapter	  6:	  The	  Importance	  of	  Financial	  Education	  
	  	   As	   the	   current	   situation	   in	  Ecuador	  has	  been	   laid	   out,	   it	   can	  be	   seen	   that	   there	   is	  plenty	  of	  room	  for	  improvement	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  sphere	  in	  which	  microentrepreneurs	  work.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  greatest	  problems	  influencing	  indebtedness	  in	  microfinance	  clients	  are	   structural	   ones.	   The	   regulatory	   framework	   needs	   revision,	   and	   the	   persistent	  governmental	   intervention	   has	   limited	  MFIs	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   its	   clients.	   	  While	   these	  problems	  must	  certainly	  be	  addressed,	  they	  are	  a	  much	  greater	  feat	  to	  tackle,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  power	   of	   the	   recently	   reelected	   neo-­‐populist	   president,	   Rafael	   Correa.	   Changes	   by	   the	  powers	   of	   the	   Superintendence	   of	   Banks,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   Central	   Bank	   are	   necessary,	   but	  simply	  much	  harder	  to	  achieve	  and	  ultimately	  involve	  a	  slow,	  long	  process.	  	  	  However,	  what	  can	  be	  implemented	  relatively	  quickly	  and	  easily	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  is	  a	   more	   transparent,	   system-­‐wide,	   simple,	   free	   and	   easily	   available	   financial	   education	  program.	  Such	  a	  program	  can	  highlight	  the	  underlying	  implications	  of	  an	  interest	  rate	  cap,	  inform	  clients	  of	  wise	  use	  of	  credit	  cards,	  provide	  information	  on	  what	  type	  of	  credit	  to	  use	  and	   when,	   the	   risks	   of	   borrowing	   from	   multiple	   institutions	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   how	   to	  recognize	  signs	  of	  overindebtedness,	  how	  to	  build	  up	  and	  improve	  credit	  score,	  as	  well	  as	  recommendations	  on	  use	  of	  savings	  accounts.	  	  Essentially,	  it	  can	  help	  mitigate	  the	  harmful	  effects	   the	   changing	   regulatory	   environment	   can	   have	   on	   clients.	   It	   cannot	   solve	   the	  problems	  that	  exist,	  but	  it	  can	  help	  individuals	  operating	  within	  it	  to	  become	  more	  aware	  of	  how	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  it	  can	  provide	  them	  with	  the	  tools	  to	  make	  good	  financial	  decisions.	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Defining	  Financial	  Education	  	   Financial	   education	  has	   been	  defined	   in	   slightly	   different	   terms	  depending	   on	   the	  context,	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  define	  it	  as	  a	  program	  to	  enhance	  the	  set	  of	  skills	  people	  have	  in	   order	   for	   them	   to	   be	   able	   to	   make	   better	   financial	   decisions.	   	   A	   quite	   suitable	   and	  encompassing	  definition	  has	  been	  provided	  in	  a	  report	  collaborated	  by	  Genesis	  Analytics,	  Microfinance	  Opportunities	  and	  the	  MasterCard	  Foundation,	  titled	  “Taking	  Stock:	  Financial	  Education	  Initiatives	  for	  the	  Poor.”	  The	  report	  defines	  financial	  education	  as	  “the	  process	  of	  introducing	  people	  to	  the	  knowledge,	  skills,	  and	  attitudes	  required	  for	  responsible	  earning,	  spending,	   saving,	   borrowing,	   and	   investing.	   By	   broadening	   people’s	   understanding	   of	  financial	  options	  and	  principles,	   financial	  education	  builds	  skills	   to	  use	   financial	  products	  and	   services,	   and	   promotes	   attitudes	   and	   behaviors	   that	   support	   more	   effective	   use	   of	  economic	   resources.”	   (MasterCard	   Foundation,	   2011).	   Linked	   to	   this	   is	   the	   concept	   of	  financial	   literacy,	   which	   is	   the	   ultimate	   goal	   of	   such	   financial	   education.	   	   This	   has	   been	  defined	  by	  Gale,	  Harris	  and	  Levine	  (2012)	  as	  “the	  ability	  to	  make	  informed	  judgments	  and	  effective	  decisions	  regarding	  the	  use	  and	  management	  of	  money	  and	  wealth,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ability	   and	  discipline	   to	   implement	   intended	  or	  desired	   saving	  behavior.”	   (Gale,	  Harris	  &	  Levine,	  2012).	  	  Throughout	  the	  world	  different	  approaches	  to	  financial	  education	  have	  been	  taken.	  	  In	  some	  instances	  they	  have	  been	  built	  into	  school	  education	  curricula.	  In	  other	  instances	  they	  have	  been	  private	  entities	  set	  up	  in	  order	  to	  help	  individuals	  who	  struggle	  financially.	  In	  the	  United	  States	  so-­‐called	  credit	  counseling	  programs	  were	  pioneered	  in	  the	  1950s	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  debt	  restructuring	  and	  guidance	  to	  individuals	  who	  had	  difficulty	  making	  their	  payments.	  This	  has	  been	  largely	  a	  program	  in	  place	  for	  individuals	  who	  have	  already	  
	   72	  
gotten	   into	   financial	   trouble,	   and	   are	   in	   need	  of	   help	   to	   get	   out.	   	   It	   is	   not	   a	   preventative	  program	  in	  that	  sense.	  	  This	  model	  has	  been	  exported	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  countries,	  and	  exists	  in	  a	   similar	   form	   throughout	  much	  of	   the	  EU,	   for	   example.	   	  Other	  programs,	  particularly	   in	  developing	  countries,	  have	  been	  implemented	  more	  recently	  by	  external	  organizations	  and	  companies	   such	   as	   the	   World	   Bank,	   OECD,	   the	   Citi	   Foundation,	   Visa	   and	   MasterCard	  Worldwide	   (Zia,	   2011).	  One	   of	   the	   largest	   initiatives	   has	   come	   from	   the	  Citi	   Foundation,	  which	  began	  in	  2004,	  and	  is	  a	  10-­‐year,	  $200	  million	  global	  program	  on	  financial	  education.	  So	  far	  it	  has	  helped	  to	  fund	  programs	  in	  65	  countries	  (Citi	  Foundation,	  2013).	  These	  groups	  have	   largely	  begun	   investing	   in	  more	   financial	  education	  programs	   in	  developing	  regions	  where	  they	  were	  not	  established	  before.	   	  While	  financial	  illiteracy	  is	  a	  serious	  problem	  in	  developed	  countries	  too,	   there	  have	  been	  more	  attempts	  to	  try	  and	  solve	  this	   than	   in	  the	  developing	   world.	   Thus,	   a	   serious	   gap	   of	   financial	   education	   persists	   in	   developing	  countries.	  	  	  
The	  Financial	  Capabilities	  Gap	  	   In	  a	  comprehensive	  study	  by	  the	  Citi	  Foundation,	  this	  lack	  of	  financial	  training	  and	  education,	  compared	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  financial	  products	  and	  services	  available,	  is	  defined	  as	   the	   financial	   capabilities	   gap.	   	   The	   study	   highlights,	   “Between	   500	   million	   and	   800	  million	  of	  the	  world’s	  poor	  now	  have	  access	  to	  finance	  –	  yet	  our	  research	  suggests	  that	  only	  110	  million	   to	   130	  million	   of	   that	   number	   have	   received	   any	   sort	   of	   financial	   capability	  training.	   In	   other	  words,	   only	   25%	  of	   these	  many	  millions	   have	   been	   taught	   how	   to	   use	  their	  newfound	  access	  to	  the	  world	  of	  formal	  finance	  wisely	  and	  to	  their	  advantage	  […]	  This	  is	  the	  financial	  capability	  gap	  –	  the	  chasm	  that	  exists	  between	  those	  who	  have	  been	  given	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the	   skills	   and	   knowledge	   to	   responsibly	   engage	   with	   a	   formal	   financial	   system	   that	   is	  utterly	  new	  to	  them	  and	  those	  who	  have	  not.”	  (Deb	  &	  Kubzansky,	  2012).	  	  The	  study	  argues	  that	  this	  gap,	  or	  the	  75%	  of	  the	  world’s	  poor	  who	  have	  not	  received	  financial	  capabilities,	  is	  predicted	  to	  increase.	  	  In	  particular,	  with	  the	  rise	  in	  other	  financial	  services	  that	  go	  beyond	  microfinance	   (mobile	   banking	   and	   remittances	   are	   cited),	   financial	   access	   will	   increase	  rapidly,	   without	   an	   increase	   in	   capabilities	   to	   go	   along	   with	   it.	   The	   consequences	   are	  serious	   not	   only	   for	   the	   clients	   of	   these	   products	   and	   services,	   but	   also	   for	   the	   financial	  services	  industry	  and	  financial	  institutions	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Overall,	   there	  has	  not	  been	  a	   large	  body	  of	  research	  done	  on	  financial	   literacy	  and	  education	   in	   the	   context	   of	   developing	   nations,	   which	   is	   a	   major	   criticism	   the	   Citi	  Foundation	   study	  points	   to.	   The	   focus	   of	   the	   literature	   has	   been	  primarily	   on	   the	  Global	  North.	   	   In	   this	   context,	   there	   is	   substantial	   evidence	   that	   financial	   illiteracy	   is	   prevalent	  across	  countries.	  Thus,	  the	  problem	  of	  lacking	  financial	  capabilities	  is	  prevalent	  throughout	  the	  world.	  	  The	  literature	  highlights	  the	  critical	  fact	  that	  financial	  literacy	  is	  more	  prevalent	  in	   some	  demographics	   than	  others.	   	   In	  a	   study	  by	  Lusardi	  and	  Mitchell	   (2011),	   they	   find	  that	   “financial	   illiteracy	   is	   widespread	   when	   financial	   markets	   are	   well	   developed	   as	   in	  Germany,	   the	   Netherlands,	   Sweden,	   Japan,	   Italy,	   New	   Zealand,	   and	   the	   United	   States.”	   A	  further	  study	  by	  Lusardi,	  Mitchell	  and	  Curto	  (2010)	  finds	  that	  financial	  literacy	  in	  youth	  is	  particularly	   tied	  to	  socio-­‐demographic	  characteristics.	   	  Based	  on	  the	  results	   from	  the	  U.S.	  National	   Longitudinal	   Study	   of	   Youth,	   authors	   found	   that	   women	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   be	  financially	   literate	  than	  men.	   In	  addition,	  whites	  were	  more	   likely	  to	  answer	  the	  financial	  literacy	  questions	  correctly	   than	  Hispanics	  and	  blacks.	   	  Another	   interesting	   finding	   is	   the	  fact	   that	   financial	   literacy	   was	   strongly	   associated	   with	   the	   education	   level	   of	   the	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respondent’s	  mother.	   	   In	  particular,	   likelihood	  of	  being	  financially	   literate	   increased	  most	  significantly	   if	   the	  mother	   graduated	   from	   college.	   Furthermore,	   increased	   family	  wealth	  also	   affected	   respondent’s	   level	   of	   financial	   literacy	   positively.	   Lastly,	   findings	   show	   that	  respondents	  surrounded	  by	  peer	  groups	  who	  plan	  to	  attend	  college	  also	  tended	  to	  be	  more	  financially	  literate.	  These	   findings	  demonstrate	   a	  number	  of	   critical	   points.	   First,	   that	   the	  problem	  of	  financial	   illiteracy	   and	   lacking	   of	   suitable	   financial	   education	   programs	   is	   a	   global	  phenomenon,	  not	  tied	  only	  to	  the	  global	  North	  or	  South.	  	  However,	  the	  body	  of	  research	  has	  been	   far	   more	   limited	   in	   the	   South,	   as	   have	   been	   the	   attempts	   to	   implement	   education	  programs.	  	  Furthermore,	  family	  background,	  wealth,	  peer	  groups	  and	  status	  as	  a	  minority	  group	   in	   a	   population	   seem	   to	   be	   associated	   with	   level	   of	   financial	   literacy.	   	  While	   this	  study	  was	  conducted	  in	  the	  US	  context,	  these	  findings	  point	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  more	  privileged	  groups	  in	  society	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  financially	   literate.	   	   In	  the	  context	  of	  microfinance	  clients,	  these	  are	  often	  women,	  and	  the	  less-­‐privileged	  group	  of	  society.	  	  It	  can	  therefore	  be	  concluded	   that	   although	   such	   financial	   illiteracy	   is	   not	   a	   phenomenon	   of	   the	   developing	  world,	  it	  is	  these	  countries	  and	  its	  poorest	  populations	  that	  are	  least	  likely	  to	  be	  financially	  literate,	  and	  to	  have	  access	  to	  the	  resources	  or	  capabilities	  to	  change	  this.	  	  	  With	   regards	   to	  microfinance	   clients,	   they	  would	  primarily	  be	   able	   to	   access	   such	  tools	  if	  they	  were	  provided	  by	  the	  MFIs.	  	  However,	  due	  to	  high	  competition,	  the	  trend	  has	  been	   for	   a	   reduction	   in	  mandatory	   client	   education	  or	   training	  programs,	   rather	   than	  an	  increase.	  	  With	  more	  saturated	  MFI	  markets,	  clients	  have	  the	  choice	  of	  where	  to	  withdraw	  a	  loan.	   	   Given	   the	   time	   commitment	   involved	   in	   attending	   classes	   or	   being	   part	   of	   a	  workshop,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   added	   transportation	   costs	   to	   and	   from	   the	   location,	   clients	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preferred	  to	  apply	  for	  credits	  from	  MFI	  with	  the	  least	  complicated	  processes.	  	  In	  order	  for	  MIFs	  to	  compete	   for	  clients,	   these	  programs	  became	   less	  and	   less	  available	   to	   the	  overall	  determent	  of	  the	  clients	  and	  the	  industry.	  	  	  
Financial	  Education	  in	  Ecuador	  	   In	   Ecuador,	   financial	   education	   has	   grown	   in	   importance	   in	   the	   MFI	   industry.	  	  However,	   the	   changes	   that	   have	   taken	   place	   to	   include	   more	   comprehensive	   financial	  capabilities	   training	   have	   been	   very	   recent	   and	   not	  mandatory	   as	   part	   of	   the	   borrowing	  process.	  	  For	  example,	  among	  the	  most	  important	  MFIs	  in	  the	  country	  (including	  Credi	  Fé,	  Banco	   Solidario,	   Finca,	   and	   Fundación	   Espoir),	   two	   in	   particular	   developed	   very	  comprehensive	   free	   financial	   education	   programs	   for	   their	   clients.	   	   These	   two,	   Banco	  Solidario	  and	  Fundación	  Espoir,	  have	  taken	  different	  approaches,	  but	  don’t	  make	  education	  or	   training	  programs	   for	   clients	  a	  mandatory	  part	  of	  withdrawing	  a	   loan.	   	  A	   study	  of	   the	  Superintendence	  of	  Banks	  of	  Ecuador	  showed	  that	  at	  least	  60%	  of	  financial	  institutions	  did	  not	   have	   any	  kind	  of	   sustainable	   education	  programs	   for	   their	   clients	   (El	  Diario,	   17	  Feb.	  2012).	  	  Fundación	  Espoir	  has	  made	  it	  part	  of	  its	  mission	  to	  “contribute	  to	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  and	  also	  to	  the	  health	  of	  poor	  female	  microentrepreneurs	  in	  Ecuador,	  through	   providing	   working	   capital	   credit	   and	   education,	   to	   enhance	   their	   capacity	   to	  generate	   income	   for	   their	   personal	   welfare	   and	   that	   of	   their	   family.”	   This	   is	   a	   very	  important	  first	  step	  to	  increasing	  the	  presence	  and	  significance	  of	  financial	  education	  in	  the	  MFI	   industry.	   	   Through	   this	   approach,	   Fundación	   Espoir	   gives	   women	   in	   particular	   the	  opportunity	   to	   become	   more	   informed	   about	   issues	   pertinent	   to	   their	   health,	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empowerment	   and	   economic	   wellbeing.	   	   As	   the	   program	   website	   advertises,	   “The	  education	   component	   includes	   preventive	   health	   issues	   and	   business	   management	   to	  manage	  risks,	  natural	  disasters	  and	  gender	  equity,	  institutional	  credit	  policies	  focusing	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  direct	  program	  participants	  and	  their	  families,	  and	  also	  strives	  for	  a	  positive	  impact	   on	   the	   lives	   of	   the	   community.”	   (Espoir.org.ec).	   This	   program	   certainly	   takes	   the	  right	  approach,	  but	  could	  do	  more	  to	  provide	  similar	  programs	  to	  other	  groups,	  including	  perhaps	   youth	   programs,	   and	   also	   programs	   for	   men,	   the	   minority	   of	   clients,	   but	   still	  comprise	   about	   17%	   of	   Espoir’s	   total	   client	   base.	   	   Moreover,	   while	   this	   outreach	   is	  important,	  other	  banks	  and	  institutions	  must	  follow	  suit	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  more	  significant	  impact.	   	   In	   2012,	   Espoir	   had	   71,582	   active	   borrowers	   (MIX	   Market,	   2013).	   Moreover,	  clients	   must	   make	   the	   effort	   to	   attend	   such	   programs	   and	   have	   to	   see	   the	   benefits	  independently	  in	  order	  for	  the	  programs	  to	  truly	  reach	  their	  potential.	  	  	  Banco	  Solidario’s	  approach	  to	  financial	  education	  has	  been	  different	  from	  Fundación	  Espoir’s,	   since	   its	   mission	   was	   not	   to	   provide	   financial	   education	   from	   the	   beginning.	  Together	   with	   Unibanco,	   they	   have	   developed	   a	   separate	   program	   that	   focuses	   only	   on	  providing	   financial	   education	   to	   clients	   through	   a	   variety	   of	  media.	   	   The	  program,	   called	  Cuida	  tu	  futuro	  (which	  loosely	  translates	  to	  “take	  care	  of	  /	  safeguard	  your	  future”)	  has	  its	  independent	  website	   (cuidatufuturo.com),	  which	   offers	   simply	  written	   articles	   providing	  helpful	  advice	  on	  wise	  spending	  behaviors	  or	  how	  to	  recognize	  signs	  of	   indebtedness,	   for	  example.	   	   It	  also	  offers	  educational	  podcasts,	  videos,	   tips	  and	  cartoon	  strips.	   	   In	  addition,	  Cuida	  tu	  futuro	  has	  weekly	  radio	  broadcasts,	  a	  Facebook	  page	  with	  daily	  updates,	  tips	  and	  links	  to	  more	  information,	  as	  well	  as	  informative	  brochures	  and	  printed	  publications.	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This	  approach	   is	  very	  different	   from	  Fundación	  Espoir,	   since	   this	   type	  of	   financial	  education	  is	  a	  more	  independent	  one	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  client.	  	  It	  allows	  for	  clients	  to	  learn	  about	   specific	   topics	   he	   or	   she	  may	   be	   interested	   in	   during	   their	   own	   time,	   rather	   than	  providing	  an	  educational	   session	  or	   course	   for	   clients	   to	  attend.	   	  This	  has	   its	   advantages	  and	  disadvantages.	  	  For	  one,	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  dependence	  on	  the	  internet	  for	  Cuida	  tu	  futuro’s	  outreach.	  	  If	  clients	  do	  not	  have	  frequent	  access	  to	  a	  computer	  and	  internet,	  many	  of	   these	   tips	  will	   largely	   go	  unseen	  or	  heard.	   	   Furthermore,	   it	   assumes	   a	   certain	   level	   of	  technological	  education	  in	  order	  to	  best	  make	  use	  of	  the	  website	  and	  social	  media	  so	  as	  to	  find	   the	   information	  most	  pertinent	   to	  each	   individual’s	  needs.	   	  Being	   less	   elaborate	  and	  personal	  than	  a	  classroom	  setting,	  it	  can	  also	  only	  teach	  so	  much.	  Without	  having	  the	  ability	  to	  individualize	  a	  curriculum	  or	  to	  provide	  answers	  to	  specific	  questions,	  clients	  only	  gain	  a	  slightly	  more	  comprehensive	  understanding	  from	  the	  Cuida	  tu	  futuro	  tips	  and	  articles.	  	  	  However,	   the	  great	  advantage	  of	   this	  approach	   is	   that	  clients	  don’t	   lose	   time	   from	  work	  or	  taking	  care	  of	  the	  household	  by	  attending	  a	  class.	  	  It	  also	  allows	  for	  the	  uptake	  of	  small	  pieces	  of	  information	  throughout	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  time,	  as	  the	  client	  wishes,	  which	  may	  mean	  more	  retention	  overall.	  	  It	  further	  means	  no	  costs	  in	  terms	  of	  transportation	  to	  and	   from	   the	   class/workshop.	   	   It	   also	   reduces	   costs	   for	   the	   institution	   providing	   the	  services,	   since	  no	  additional	  staff	   is	  hired	   to	  run	   the	   lessons.	   	  Given	   the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  each,	  a	  more	  effective	  approach	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  balanced	  combination	  of	  both	  services.	  	  	  This	   is	   a	   mentality	   shared	   by	   the	   Ecuadorian	   government,	   which,	   in	   the	   wake	   of	  President	   Correa’s	   statement	   about	   the	   overindebtedness	   problem	  back	   in	  May	   of	   2012,	  has	   taken	   serious	   measures	   to	   begin	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   law	   making	   financial	   education	  programs	  mandatory	  for	  all	  financial	  institutions	  operating	  in	  the	  country.	  	  According	  to	  an	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El	  Comercio	  article,	  the	  Superintendancy	  of	  Banks	  of	  Ecuador	  has	  been	  working	  to	  finalize	  the	  details	  of	  the	  law	  which	  aims	  to	  regulate	  the	  financial	  education	  programs	  in	  place	  by	  all	   financial	   institutions	   (Sarmiento,	  2012).	   Some	   requirements	  will	   be	   to	  provide	   clients	  with	   an	   understanding	   of	   advantages,	   disadvantages,	   risks	   and	   the	   proper	   use	   of	   bank	  products	  and	  services.	  	  Moreover,	  all	  programs	  must	  be	  completely	  free	  for	  the	  clients.	  	  	  Programs	   will	   provide	   information	   to	   clients	   via	   a	   range	   of	   different	   channels,	  including	   written	   media	   publications,	   television,	   radio,	   internet,	   virtual	   classrooms	   and	  personal	  counseling.	  	  The	  article	  also	  explains	  that	  clients	  can	  expect	  to	  be	  required	  to	  take	  part	   in	   different	   training	   programs	   targeted	   for	   different	   socio-­‐demographics.	   	   The	  divisions	  listed	  are	  gender,	  age,	  marital	  status,	  education,	  occupation	  and	  geographic	  area	  of	  residence.	   	  The	  article	  also	  emphasized	   that	   the	   focus	  of	   the	   training	  may	  be	  based	  on	  level	   of	   client	   income	   and	   consumption.	   	   The	   nature	   of	   the	   programs	  will	   vary	   for	   each	  institution,	   and	   thus	   there	  will	   be	   no	   single	  mandated	   curriculum	  or	  method,	   but	   rather	  certain	  requirements	  each	  financial	   institution	  must	  comply	  with.	   	  As	  such,	  each	  program	  must	   include	   the	   development	   of	   six	   cited	   topics:	   structure	   and	   function	   of	   the	   financial	  system,	   banking	   services	   (savings	   and	   checking	   accounts,	   checks,	   deposits),	   savings	   and	  family	   budgeting,	   credit	   management,	   rights	   and	   obligations	   of	   the	   use	   of	   credit	   cards,	  general	  rights	  and	  obligations.	  	  Lastly,	  the	  article	  highlighted	  the	  growing	  importance	  of	  the	  internet	  as	  a	  medium	  for	  transmitting	  information,	  and	  therefore	  it	  will	  become	  mandatory	  for	   institutions	   to	  have	  a	   link	   to	   their	   financial	  education	  website	  or	  section	  prominently	  displayed	  on	   their	  homepage.	   	  A	  glossary	  of	   financial	   terms,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  online	   interest	  rate	  and	  cost	  calculator	  is	  also	  in	  the	  plan.	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This	  outline	  of	  requirements	  sounds	  very	  promising,	  but	  has	  not	  been	  formalized	  as	  of	   yet.	   It	   has	   yet	   to	   be	   seen	   how	   this	   law	   will	   develop,	   and	   how	   comprehensive	   the	  individual	  programs	  will	  ultimately	  be.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  this	  concept	  is	  in	  the	  discourse	  and	  on	  the	  horizon	  of	  policymakers	   in	  any	  case.	   	  Some	  criticisms	  and	  further	  suggestions	  for	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  and	  structured	  financial	  education	  model	  will	  be	  provided	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  However,	  before	  going	  on	  to	  discuss	  this,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  outline	  the	  actual	  benefits	  of	  such	  programs.	  	  	  
The	  Case	  for	  Financial	  Education	  	   Studies	  discussed	  thus	  far	  have	  shown	  that	  financial	  illiteracy	  is	  a	  reality	  worldwide.	  It	   is	   also	   true	   that	  developing	  countries	  are	  particularly	  at	   risk	  and	  have	   few	  established	  programs	  to	  help	  combat	  this	  issue	  –	  or	  bridge	  the	  financial	  capabilities	  gap	  as	  it	  were.	  	  The	  actual	  impacts	  of	  such	  programs,	  however,	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  discussed.	  	  As	  stated	  before,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  large	  body	  of	  literature	  and	  evidence	  to	  show	  impacts	  of	  financial	  education	  in	   the	   contexts	   of	   developing	   countries,	   even	   less	   so	   for	   Latin	   America,	   or	   Ecuador	   in	  particular.	   	  However,	   there	   is	   some	  work	  on	   the	   impact	  of	   financial	  education,	  as	  well	  as	  credit	  counseling	  programs	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  some	  other	  research	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  countries	  which	  can	  help	  to	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  impacts	  more	  generally.	  	  	  In	   a	   study	   by	   Collins	   (2010),	   a	   randomized	   control	   trial	   is	   used	   to	   examine	   the	  impacts	   of	   a	   financial	   education	   program	   in	   the	   U.S.	   “Very	   low-­‐income	   families	   in	   a	  subsidized	  housing	  program	  were	  randomly	  assigned	   to	  a	  mandatory	   financial	  education	  program	   and	   tracked	   for	   12	  months.”	   	   144	   clients	   participated	   in	   the	   survey,	   randomly	  divided	  so	  73	  clients	  were	  assigned	  to	  the	  treatment	  group,	  while	  71	  clients	  were	  assigned	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to	  the	  control	  group.	  Mean	  baseline	  income	  for	  the	  sample	  was	  $19,939,	  average	  balance	  on	  participant	   savings	   accounts	  was	   $286,	   and	   average	   outstanding	  debt	  was	   $7,957.	   	   After	  having	   completed	   the	   program,	   results	   show	   improvements	   in	   self-­‐reported	   financial	  knowledge,	  as	  well	  as	  improved	  self-­‐reported	  behavior,	  moderate	  improvements	  in	  credit	  score,	  and	  an	  average	  increase	  in	  savings	  of	  $377	  (Collins,	  2010).	  	  The	   study	   also	   provides	   evidence	   of	   better	   budgeting	   practices	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  program.	   	   While	   there	   are	   some	   disadvantages	   linked	   to	   reliability	   of	   self-­‐reporting,	  implications	  of	  the	  study	  are	  that	  mandatory	  financial	  education	  can	  have	  positive	  effects	  on	  financial	  behaviors	  on	  program	  recipients.	  As	  the	  author	  concludes,	   “Despite	  expected	  economic	  and	  social	  pressures	  faced	  by	  study	  participants,	  as	  well	  as	  predicted	  impatience	  and	   self-­‐control	   failures,	   this	   study	   documents	   an	   increase	   in	   savings	   levels	   without	  corresponding	  increases	  in	  debt	  or	  poor	  credit	  management.”	  (Collins,	  2010)	  As	   stated	   before,	   credit	   counseling	   is	   one	   form	   of	   financial	   education,	   which	  attempts	   to	   help	   individuals	   who	   are	   already	   indebted,	   rather	   than	   a	   preventative	  	  	  	  program	   for	   individuals	   at	   risk.	   According	   to	   two	   prominent	   studies	   on	   the	  	  subject	   (Xiao	  &	  Wu,	  2006),	   the	   factors	   affecting	   the	   credit	   problems	   can	  be	   classified	   as:	  social	  (external	  influence	  or	  society)	  and	  personal	  (internal	  decisions	  and	  behaviors).	  Thus,	  credit	   counseling	   agencies	   should	   offer	   two	  basic	   types	   of	   services.	   1)	   Technical	   service:	  education	  on	   financial	   terms	  and	  procedures	   to	   reduce	  debts,	   and	  2)	  Changing	  behavior:	  identify	  root	  problems	  and	  how	  to	  solve	  them.	  Furthermore,	   there	  are	  two	  main	  types	  of	  customers	  for	  credit	  counseling	  and	  thus,	  there	  are	  also	  two	  distinct	  programs:	  1)	  people	  whose	  financial	  situation	  is	  not	  yet	  dire,	  meaning	  they	  can	  help	  themselves	  out	  of	  financial	  problems,	  but	  they	  need	  proper	  guidance	  and	  information	  on	  how	  to	  manage	  their	  money	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and	   expenses	   through	   a	   preventative	   education	   program,	   (financial	   consulting)	   and,	   2)	  people	  who	  are	  already	   in	  debt,	  who	  need	  a	  service	  to	  help	  them	  improve	  their	  situation	  with	  a	  rehabilitation	  program	  (debt	  management).	  	   In	   a	   study	   by	   Elliehausen,	   Lundquist	   and	   Staten	   (2003),	   it	   was	   shown	   that	  individuals	   who	   participated	   in	   a	   credit	   counseling	   program	   in	   the	   U.S.	   improved	   their	  financial	   behavior	   much	   more	   than	   people	   of	   the	   same	   economic	   level,	   who	   did	   not	  participate	  one.	  The	  study	  was	  based	  on	  econometric	  regressions,	  comparing	  credit	  rating	  (empirica	  score)	  of	  clients	  who	  had	  already	  participated	   in	  a	  program	  to	  people	  who	  did	  not	  received	  any	  counseling.	  The	  program	  began	  in	  1997	  and	  lasted	  3	  years.	  The	  credit	  rating	  factors	  included:	  current	  level	  of	  indebtedness,	  length	  of	  credit	  and	  number	   of	   credits,	   and	   credit	   history.	   	   All	   these	   variables	  were	   reflected	   in	   the	   empirica	  score	  of	  the	  clients,	  which	  were	  then	  distributed	  into	  percentiles,	  according	  to	  the	  rating.	  In	  other	   words,	   people	   with	   better	   empirica	   score	   were	   located	   in	   the	   upper	   percentiles	  (90th)	   and	   people	   with	   a	   lower	   empirica	   score,	   were	   located	   in	   the	   lower	   percentiles	  (10th).	  The	  study	  demonstrated	   that	  credit	  counseling	  has	  a	  greater	  effect	  on	   individuals	  with	  a	  lower	  empirica	  score	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  program,	  than	  those	  with	  a	  higher	  one.	  Some	  more	   specific	   findings	  were	   that	   on	   average,	   program	   clients	   reduced	   their	  debt	   by	   $6,752	   in	   a	   period	   of	   three	   years,	   while	   the	   control	   group	   with	   no	   counseling	  increased	  the	  average	  debt	  by	  $8,844.	  	  Also,	  people	  with	  a	  low	  empirica	  score	  reduced	  their	  debt	  by	  more	  than	  $10,000.	  Credit	  counseling	  clients	  reduced	  the	  number	  of	  credit	  cards	  in	  every	   empirica	   score	   percentile.	   On	   average,	   there	   was	   a	   decrease	   of	   1.19	   credit	   cards	  (52%)	  for	  counseled	  individuals,	  while	  the	  control	  group	  only	  reduced	  the	  number	  of	  cards	  by	  an	  average	  of	  0.13	  (10.5%)	  over	  the	  three	  years.	   	  Another	  observation	  from	  the	  study	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was	  that	  clients	  reduced	  the	  number	  and	  frequency	  of	  late	  payments	  much	  more	  than	  the	  control	  group.	  In	  addition,	  all	  counseled	  clients	  reduced	  the	  number	  of	  accounts	  during	  the	  three	  years.	  Program	  clients	  with	  lower	  initial	  empirica	  scores	  even	  reduced	  the	  number	  of	  accounts	  by	  more	  than	  4.	  	  Overall,	   the	   study	   shows	   that	   the	   program	   significantly	   improved	   the	   lives	   and	  behavior	  of	  these	  clients.	  This	  in	  turn	  is	  also	  very	  beneficial	  to	  the	  financial	  institutions	  and	  credit	   card	   companies	   that	   receive	   more	   reliable	   and	   timely	   payments	   from	   these	  individuals.	  Examples	  of	  overall	  benefits	   include,	   improved	  credit	  management	  practices,	  better	  use	  of	  credit	  and	  payment	  behavior,	  decrease	  in	  amount	  of	  client’s	  debts,	  improved	  client	  credit	  score,	  increased	  health	  and	  family	  welfare	  and	  reduced	  financial	  stress.	  	  	  
Summary	  and	  Conclusions	  	   Based	  on	  the	  findings	  from	  these	  various	  financial	  education	  programs	  in	  the	  United	  States,	   there	   is	   significant	   evidence	   that	   they	   can	   be	   very	   effective	   in	   improving	   the	  financial	   behavior	   of	   clients.	   	   It	   is	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   financial	   education,	   if	  contextualized	  and	  refined	  for	  the	  varying	  regional	  target	  groups,	  can	  be	  equally	  successful	  in	  other	  regions,	  such	  as	  Ecuador.	   	  Given	  these	   findings,	   it	  becomes	  clear	   that	   finding	  the	  best	  practices	  and	  creating	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  effective	  financial	  education	  program	  for	  different	  socioeconomic	  groups	  in	  Ecuador	  should	  be	  a	  priority.	  	  Some	  important	  MFIs	  are	  already	   on	   the	   right	   path	   to	   this,	   as	   is	   the	   proposed	   law	   to	   make	   financial	   education	  mandatory	  for	  financial	  institutions.	  	  However,	  some	  light	  should	  be	  cast	  on	  what	  practices	  and	   program	   specifics	   should	   be	   kept	   in	   mind	   when	   shaping	   the	   various	   programs	  available	  to	  clients.	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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Chapter	  7:	  The	  Financial	  Education	  Model	  
	  
	  	   Based	  on	   the	   findings	  discussed	   in	   this	  paper,	   it	   has	  become	  clear	   that	   a	   financial	  education	   program	   is	   necessary	   in	   the	   Ecuadorian	   context	   to	   help	   address	   the	   issues	  leading	  to	  overindebtedness,	   in	  particular	  for	   individuals	  at	  risk	   like	  microfinance	  clients.	  	  This	  chapter	  will	   serve	  as	  a	  policy	   recommendation	  and	  as	  a	  guideline	   for	  policy	  makers	  implementing	  free,	  mandatory	  financial	  education	  programs.	  	  	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   this	   recommendation	   serves	   to	   address	   some	   of	   the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  current	  microfinance	  model	  that	  exists	  in	  Ecuador.	  	  Specifically	  it	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  the	  regulatory	  framework	  has	  caused,	  with	  focus	  in	   particular	   on	   addressing	   the	   rising	   issues	   of	   overindebtedness	   amongst	   low-­‐income	  populations.	  	  This	  is	  not	  in	  any	  way	  meant	  to	  solve	  the	  underlying	  problems	  of	  poverty,	  and	  social,	  racial	  and	  gender	  biases	  that	  are	  tied	  to	  it.	  	  These	  are	  of	  course	  other	  critical	  issues	  and	   must	   be	   addressed	   separately	   and	   carefully,	   but	   this	   is	   not	   within	   the	   scope	   and	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  and	  recommendation.	  	  This	  chapter	  is	  merely	  a	  suggestion	  for	  a	  way	  to	  more	  easily	  implement	  an	  education	  program	  that	  can	  offer	  an	  additional	  set	  of	  skills	  to	  microfinance	   clients,	   so	   they	   receive	  more	  equal	  opportunities	   to	   compete	   in	   the	  market	  and	  make	  the	  best	  possible	  use	  of	  their	  financial	  tools	  and	  resources.	  	  	  	  
Methods	  of	  Implementation	  	   As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  financial	  education	  exists	  in	  some	  Ecuadorian	  MFIs	   already,	   but	   is	  not	   a	  mandatory	   aspect	   of	   the	  borrowing	  process.	   	   Even	   though	   the	  government	   is	   attempting	   to	   implement	   a	   law	   making	   it	   mandatory	   for	   financial	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institutions	   to	   offer	   such	   programs,	   it	   is	   not	  mandatory	   for	   clients	   to	   take	   part	   in	   them.	  However,	  this	  is	  a	  critical	  aspect	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  enforced	  by	  MFIs	  in	  order	  to	  truly	  provide	  the	  comprehensive	  coverage	  that	  is	  needed.	  	  	   This	  brings	  up	  many	  questions,	  of	  course,	  and	  implementation	  must	  be	  more	  closely	  examined.	   	  One	  possible	  method	  would	  be	   to	  create	  a	  comprehensive	  exam,	   testing	  basic	  financial	   terminology	   and	   knowledge,	   including	   topics	   on	   interest	   rates,	   credit	   cards,	  household	   spending,	   the	   loan	   process,	   financial	   risks,	   credit	   score,	   and	   recognizing	  overindebtedness,	   to	   name	   a	   few.	   	   Passing	   the	   exam	   by	   correctly	   answering	   a	   certain	  percentage	  of	  it	  would	  allow	  the	  client	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  loan.	  	  Essentially,	  a	  good	  score	  on	  this	  test	   on	   basic	   critical	   financial	   knowledge	   would	   be	   one	   of	   the	   requirements	   to	   qualify	  individuals	   for	   an	   institution’s	   products	   and	   services,	   and	   serve	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   good	  financial	  behavior	  in	  the	  future.	   	  If	  clients	  cannot	  pass	  this	  test,	  they	  will	  be	  given	  various	  mediums	   to	   complete	   free	   financial	   education	  programs	   to	   help	   them	  pass	   it.	   	   This	  way,	  financial	  education	  will	  be	  mandatory	  in	  certain	  circumstances	  where	  clients	  arguably	  need	  it,	  but	  not	  if	  clients	  clearly	  have	  a	  solid	  grasp	  on	  this	  knowledge.	  It	  may	  be	  a	  test	  that	  must	  be	  retaken	  each	  year	  to	  ensure	  that	  clients	  remain	  up	  to	  date	  on	  their	  financial	  knowledge.	  	  The	   questions	   will	   be	   reviewed	   and	   updated	   if	   necessary	   each	   year	   by	   the	   financial	  institution,	  so	  as	  to	  guarantee	  that	  the	  most	  current	  and	  critical	  information	  is	  tested.	  	  	   One	   of	   the	   criticisms	   of	   mandatory	   financial	   education	   has	   been	   that	   it	   prevents	  individuals	  from	  spending	  the	  time	  they	  are	  in	  classes	  actually	  working	  or	  tending	  to	  things	  at	  home,	  which	  adds	  another	  burden	  on	  them.	  	  In	  addition,	  it	  means	  spending	  money	  out	  of	  pocket	  to	  attend	  the	  classes,	  which	  can	  be	  particularly	  significant	  for	  individuals	  who	  live	  in	  rural	   areas.	   	   For	   these	   issues	   there	   can	  be	   a	  number	  of	   solutions.	   Firstly,	  while	  personal	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classes	   should	   be	   offered,	   other	  mediums	   should	   also	   be	   available.	   	   This	   can	   include	   an	  online	  course,	  a	  computer	  course	  on	  CD,	  a	  course/counseling	  over	  the	  phone,	  a	  radio	  class,	  and	  a	  manual/syllabus	   to	   learn	  and	   study	   from	  home.	   	  These	   free	  products	   and	   services	  provided	   by	   the	   institution	   allow	   clients	   to	   study	   and	   learn	   in	   their	   own	   time,	   without	  travelling	  far	  and	  spending	  money.	  	  Those	  that	  wish	  to	  take	  classes	  in	  person	  or	  who	  do	  not	  have	   access	   to	   computers,	   internet,	   phones	   or	   radio	   on	   a	   regular	   basis,	   they	   can	   attend	  classes	   in	   groups.	   	   These	   can	   be	   offered	   at	   the	   regional	   branches	   where	   clients	   receive	  MFI’s	  products	  and	  services	  to	  combine	  the	  trips.	  Courses	  can	  be	  offered	  in	  evenings	  after	  working	   hours,	   or	   on	   weekends.	   	   Regional	   customer	   surveys	   can	   determine	   the	   most	  suitable	  hours	  for	  clients.	  	  	  	  
Establishing	  Target	  Clients	  	  	   The	   target	   audience	   is	   also	   critical	   for	   this	   service.	   Even	   within	   the	   group	   of	  microfinance	  clients	  there	  is	  an	  incredibly	  diverse	  population.	  	  All	  of	  these	  individuals	  have	  different	   needs.	   	   Thus,	   aside	   from	   having	   the	   purpose	   of	   allowing	   clients	   to	   pass	   their	  financial	   knowledge	   test,	   courses	   can	   target	   different	   socio-­‐demographic	   groups	   and	  address	  their	  needs	  more	  individually.	  	  This	  means	  considering	  that	  needs	  for	  women	  are	  different	  from	  men,	  that	  needs	  of	  rural	  clients	  are	  different	  from	  urban	  ones,	  that	  needs	  of	  microentrepreneurs	  working	   in	   agriculture	   are	   different	   from	   ones	   in	  manufacturing,	   or	  sales,	   etc.	   	   In	   this	   sense,	   individualized	   course	   materials	   offered	   through	   the	   range	   of	  mediums	  mentioned	  can	  be	  helpful	  to	  better	  address	  the	  needs	  of	  different	  clients.	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Funding	  Options	  	  	   These	  propositions	  might	  raise	  the	  concern	  of	  how	  these	  programs	  will	  be	  funded.	  Seeing	   as	   all	   services	   will	   be	   provided	   for	   free	   to	   clients,	   this	   is	   a	   legitimate	   concern.	  Remaining	   in	   line	  with	   the	  current	   changes	   to	  Ecuador’s	   financial	   education	  policies	   that	  are	  already	  in	  the	  works,	  the	  MFIs	  themselves	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  costs	  of	  these	  programs.	  Finding	  efficient	  and	  user-­‐friendly	  ways	  to	  convey	  the	  materials	  is	  in	  their	  self-­‐interest.	   	   Moreover,	   based	   on	   the	   numbers	   showing	   default	   rates,	   days	   in	   arrears	   and	  credit-­‐card	   debts	   in	   Ecuador,	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   that	   institutions	   will	   themselves	   benefit	  greatly	   from	   their	   client’s	   improved	   financial	   behavior.	   	   Fewer	   defaults,	   more	   timely	  payments,	   and	  more	   clients	   returning	   to	   the	   bank	  with	   higher	   credit	   scores	   and	   overall	  wealth	  are	  all	  financial	  goals	  for	  a	  bank,	  and	  will	  ultimately	  save	  MFIs	  money.	  	  	  The	   Citi	   Foundation	   cites	   ‘induction	   training’,	   or	   mandatory	   financial	   education	  training	  for	  new	  clients,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  least	  expensive	  methods	  to	  bridging	  the	  capabilities	  gap.	   According	   to	   the	   study,	   induction	   training	   costs	   range	   from	   $0.07	   to	   $0.54	   per	  customer.	  Using	  a	  case	  study	  of	  KASH,	  a	  Pakistani	  MFI,	  KWFT	  from	  Kenya	  and	  Mann	  Deshi	  Mahila	  Bank	  in	  India,	  the	  cost	  of	  training	  all	  new	  customers	  is	  between	  0.2%	  and	  1.3%	  of	  annual	  profits,	  assuming	  an	  average	  customer	  acquisition	  growth	  rate	  of	  24%	  (pegged	  to	  industry	   growth	   figures).	   Providing	   training	   to	   existing	   clients	   can	   be	   most	   costly,	  depending	   on	   the	   method	   –	   classroom	   setting	   classes	   are	   more	   expensive	   than	   online	  courses.	  	  (Deb	  &	  Kubzansky,	  2012)	  The	  example	  goes	  to	  show	  that	  the	  amount	  spent	  on	  providing	  the	  program	  will	  be	  recuperated	  over	  time	  with	  better	  client	  performances.	  	  Moreover,	  as	  time	  passes,	  the	  hope	  is	  that	  sustainable,	  comprehensive	  education	  programs	  will	  allow	  for	  long-­‐term	  changes	  in	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behavior	   and	   attitudes.	   Investing	   in	   the	   education	   of	   current	   clients	   will	   lead	   to	   better	  overall	  behavior	  in	  next	  generations	  as	  well,	  as	  parents	  will	  pass	  along	  their	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  to	  their	  children.	  	  Thus,	  on	  the	  bank’s	  part,	  it	  is	  a	  long-­‐term	  investment	  in	  their	  clients	  and	  the	  financial	  stability	  of	  the	  bank	  and	  financial	  system	  itself,	  and	  can	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  wise	  investment	  strategy.	  	  
Financial	  Education	  Departments	  and	  Impact	  Assessments	  	  	   In	  order	  for	  these	  tailored	  financial	  education	  programs	  to	  operate	  most	  effectively,	  MFIs	   must	   create	   separate	   departments	   within	   the	   institution	   of	   trained	   personnel	  exclusively	  focused	  only	  on	  the	  development	  and	  implementation	  of	  effective	  and	  intuitive	  programs.	  	  This	  department	  should	  also	  include	  regular	  impact	  assessments	  to	  examine	  the	  true	  effects	  of	   the	  programs	  on	  clients	  and	  their	   financial	  behavior.	   	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  random	   control	   trials	   can	   be	   an	   effective	   way	   to	   truly	   measure	   the	   impacts	   of	   an	  intervention,	   program	   or	   service.	   This	   involves	   active	   monitoring	   of	   clients,	   conducting	  surveys	  and	  extensive	  market	  research.	  	  A	  department	  focused	  on	  this	  work	  would	  be	  most	  capable	  to	  determine	  best	  practices	  and	  methodologies,	  and	  also	  show	  innovation	  to	  help	  improve	   the	   financial	   education	   programs	   regularly.	   	   Since	   client	   needs,	   political	  frameworks,	  the	  macro	  economy,	  financial	  supplies	  and	  demands	  are	  constantly	  changing,	  the	  adaptation	  of	  financial	  education	  programs	  to	  such	  changes	  is	  critical	  to	  the	  success	  of	  these	  services.	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The	  Importance	  of	  Behavioral	  Economics	  	  	   While	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  recommendation	  is	  on	  the	  financial	  education	  program,	  it	  is	  critical	   to	   emphasize	   the	   importance	   of	   developing	   consumer-­‐friendly	   financial	   products	  and	  services.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  research	  and	  findings	  from	  the	  field	  of	  behavioral	  economics	  has	  shown	   that	   it	   is	   critical	   to	   improve	   the	   products	   and	   services	   offered	   so	   that	   they	  complement	  financial	  education.	  In	  many	  ways,	  better	  designed	  products	  and	  services	  can	  lead	   to	   better	   financial	   behavior	   and	   involve	   education	   as	   they	   promote	   good	   practices.	  	  These	   findings	   are	  particularly	   critical	   in	   the	  microfinance	   industry	  with	   regards	   to	   low-­‐income	  populations.	  	  	  Research	   from	   behavioral	   economics	   on	   consumer	   behavior	   shows	   that	   people	  discount	  the	  value	  of	  future	  consumption	  for	  present	  day	  benefits.	  	  Most	  simplistically,	  this	  means	  that	  people	  generally	  want	  things	  now	  rather	  than	  to	  saving	  to	  have	  other	  things	  in	  the	   future.	  This	   is	   considered	  an	   inconsistent	   time	  preference,	  meaning	   the	   further	  away	  something	  is,	  the	  lower	  we	  value	  it.	  	  This	  directly	  contradicts	  the	  necessity	  to	  save	  money.	  	  This	  behavioral	  pattern,	  also	  sometimes	  referred	   to	  as	  hyperbolic	  discounting,	   is	   cited	  as	  one	  reason	  for	  why	  people	  as	  a	  whole	  are	  bad	  at	  saving	  money	  (Wilkinson,	  2008).	  	  In	   addition,	   people	   are	   bad	   at	   following	   through,	   particularly	  when	   plans	   require	  continuous	  action.	  Thus,	  people	  prefer	  to	  adhere	  to	  default	  settings	  which	  reduce	  the	  active	  input	  required.	  This	  has	  been	  widely	  discussed	  by	  economists	  and	  policy	  makers	  alike,	  and	  is	   central	   to	   the	   influential	   book	  Nudge.	   The	   power	   of	   default	   options	   or	   ‘nudges’	   thus	  becomes	  critical	  in	  shaping	  the	  kind	  of	  actions	  people	  take	  (Thaler	  &	  Sunstein,	  2008).	  Furthermore,	  people	  as	  a	  whole	  are	  bad	  at	  predicting	  probabilities,	  even	  when	  they	  are	  related	  to	  our	  personal	  lives	  (Pompian,	  2012).	  Therefore,	  we	  are	  not	  good	  at	  foreseeing	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future	  risks	  such	  as	  the	  possibility	  of	  losing	  a	  job,	  larger	  health	  care	  expenses,	  accidents	  etc.	  Given	   these	   findings,	   among	   many	   others,	   that	   pertain	   directly	   to	   people’s	   financial	  behavior	   and	   consumption	   patterns,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   the	   design	   of	   products	   and	  services	  can	  go	  a	  long	  way	  to	  compensate	  in	  part	  for	  our	  human	  shortcomings.	  	  	  Research	  has	  shown	  that	  many	  people	  often	  fail	  to	  think	  about	  the	  future	  and	  don’t	  take	   into	   consideration	   what	   future	   expenditures	   they	   might	   have.	   	   A	   study	   by	   Karlan,	  McConnell,	   Mullainathan	   and	   Zinman	   (2012)	   found	   that	   simple	   reminders	   to	   savings	  accountholders	   (in	   Peru,	   Bolivia	   and	   the	   Philippines)	   to	   save	   more,	   increased	   deposits.	  	  Even	   more	   importantly,	   the	   study	   showed	   that	   if	   the	   reminders	   were	   not	   generic,	   but	  focused	   on	   a	   specific	   kind	   of	   future	   expenditure	   worth	   saving	   for,	   such	   as	   school	   fees,	  savings	  increased	  even	  more.	  	  Failing	  to	  consider	  future	  expenditures	  explains	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  why	  people	  have	  difficulties	  saving	  and	  then	  later	  resort	  to	  high-­‐cost	  borrowing.	  	  Including	   savings	   reminders,	   rather	   than	   just	   the	   course	  on	   savings	  practices,	  may	  affect	  even	  greater	  positive	  change	  in	  clients.	  Furthermore,	  research	  also	  indicates	  that	  people	  are	  most	  effective	  at	  saving	  when	  there	   is	  a	  one-­‐time	  change	  which	   is	   in	  some	  way	  continuous.	   	  Actively	  depositing	  money	  into	  a	  savings	  account	   is	  a	  process	  which	  many	  people	  would	  have	  a	  hard	  time	  following	  through,	  even	  with	  reminders.	  	  Thus,	  a	  better	  method	  would	  be	  to	  create	  a	  savings	  account	  where	  money	  would	  automatically	  be	  deposited	  from	  a	  paycheck	  every	  month.	  	  	  The	   idea	  of	  default	  settings	   is	  also	  very	   important,	  as	  a	  study	  by	  the	  New	  America	  Foundation’s	   “AutoSave”	  pilot	  program	  has	   shown.	   	  The	  Foundation	   implemented	  a	  pilot	  program	   of	   an	   automatic	   savings	   account	   in	   the	   U.S..	   On	   the	   enrollment	   form	   for	   this	  account,	   51%	   of	   participants	   chose	   the	   recommended	   amount	   of	   savings	   per	   month	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(MDCR.org).	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  are	  opting	  to	  trust	  the	  program	  and	  select	  the	  default	  choice.	  	  This	  has	  huge	  implications	  as	  a	  wisely	  selected	  default	  can	  greatly	  affect	  the	  way	  in	  which	  people	  save.	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  AutoSave	  account	  is	  not	  linked	  to	  a	  transaction	  account,	  which	  makes	   it	  more	  difficult	   for	   individuals	   to	  access	   their	   savings.	  	  This	  is	  a	  further	  self-­‐control	  device	  that	  keeps	  people	  from	  spending	  the	  money.	  A	   study	   by	  Morse	   and	   Bertrand	   (2009)	   shows	   that	   very	   high	   “payday	   loans”	   are	  taken	  out	  by	   individuals	  who	  often	  do	  not	  realize	   the	   financial	   implications	  because	   they	  cannot	   do	   the	   complex	   math	   in	   their	   heads.	   	   Thus,	   when	   provided	   with	   the	   precise	  calculations	  and	  total	  dollar	  cost	  of	  the	  loan	  fees,	  individuals	  were	  10%	  less	  likely	  to	  take	  these	  loans.	  	  Thus,	  very	  clear	  presentation	  of	  total	  costs	  and	  calculations	  will	  also	  go	  a	  long	  way	  to	  alter	  the	  behavior	  of	  individuals	  and	  borrowers.	  In	  a	  study	  by	  Dean	  Karlan,	  Melanie	  Morton	  and	   Jonathan	  Zinman	  (2011),	   titled	  “A	  personal	   touch:	   Text	  messaging	   for	   loan	   repayment”,	   they	  made	   important	   observations	  about	   the	   relationship	   between	   borrowers	   and	   loan	   officers,	   based	   on	   research	   in	   the	  Philippines.	   Repayment	   did	   not	   improve	   by	   simply	   sending	   a	   generic	   text	   message	  reminder,	  but	  it	  did	  improve	  when	  the	  message	  was	  personalized	  and	  sent	  by	  the	  client’s	  loan	  officer	  with	  whom	  he/she	  had	  previously	  been	  working.	   	  This	  did	  not	  hold	   true	   for	  new	  clients,	  only	  for	  those	  that	  had	  been	  able	  to	  establish	  some	  kind	  of	  connection	  with	  the	  loan	  officers.	  This	  hints	  to	  the	  fact	   that	  borrowers	  may	  feel	  a	  sense	  of	  obligation	  towards	  their	  loan	  officer,	  which	  increases	  their	  repayment	  efforts.	  Overall,	  these	  examples	  and	  findings	  from	  behavioral	  economics	  go	  to	  show	  that	  the	  structure	   of	   all	   financial	   services	   offered	   affects	   a	   client’s	   behavior.	   Thus,	   financial	  education	  as	  an	  outside	   class	  or	   ‘intervention’	   is	   critical	  but	  not	   the	  only	  way	   to	  address	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these	   issues.	   Financial	   education	   does	   not	   simply	   mean	   that	   education	   is	   limited	   to	   a	  classroom.	   There	   can	   be	   many	   other	   ways	   to	   convey	   these	   messages,	   and	   one	   way	   of	  affecting	  positive	  behavioral	  changes	  is	  through	  the	  wise	  development	  of	  the	  products	  and	  services	  offered.	  	  	  	  
Summary	  and	  Conclusions	  	  	   Mandatory	   financial	   education	   is	   a	   critical	   strategy	   which	   provides	   microfinance	  clients	  with	  a	  better	  set	  of	   tools	   to	  use	  the	  services	  MFIs	  offer	   to	   them	  most	  wisely.	   	   It	   is	  beneficial	  to	  the	  clients,	  their	  children	  and	  families,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  MFI	  itself	  and	  the	  total	  financial	  system.	  	  It	  is	  critical	  to	  provide	  education	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  mediums,	  so	  as	  to	  make	  it	  easiest	  for	  clients	  to	  obtain	  the	  necessary	  information.	  	  Using	  financial	  knowledge	  tests	  may	  be	  one	  effective	  way	  to	  gauge	  what	  knowledge	  is	  lacking,	  and	  which	  clients	  most	  need	  help	   to	   learn	   it.	   	  This	   can	  help	   tailor	   the	  materials	   covered	  by	   the	  program	  as	  well.	  Making	  more	   individualized	   lessons	   for	  certain	  client	  groups	  can	  also	  help	   them	  gain	   the	  most	  out	  from	  their	  education,	  as	  different	  populations	  have	  different	  needs.	  Using	  surveys	  and	   impact	   assessments	   will	   be	   essential	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   most	   effective	  strategies,	   and	   will	   require	   regular	   revisions	   of	   the	   needs	   of	   clients	   and	   the	  syllabus/materials	   taught	   and	   emphasized.	   	   Lastly,	   focusing	   on	   a	  more	   general	   sense	   of	  education,	  including	  lessons,	  but	  also	  other	  sources	  and	  types	  of	  materials,	  like	  online	  tips	  and	   articles,	   but	   also	  more	   refined	   and	   user-­‐friendly	   products	   and	   services,	   can	   help	   to	  most	  effectively	  promote	  positive	  behavior	  changes.	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Final	  Conclusions	  
	  	   Ecuador’s	  microfinance	  market	  is	  one	  of	  the	  region’s	  most	  mature	  and	  saturated.	  	  It	  has	  developed	  very	  positively	  as	  a	  whole,	  reflecting	  global	  trends	  of	  the	  upgrading	  process.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  most	  important	  MFIs	  are	  formal	  financial	  institutions,	  which	  has	  allowed	  them	  to	  be	   financially	   self	   sufficient	   and	  have	   a	  wide	  outreach	   to	  many	   clients	   throughout	   the	  country.	   	   Outreach	   has	   been	   one	   of	   the	   most	   successful	   aspects	   of	   the	   MFI	   market	   in	  Ecuador,	  as	  many	  of	  the	  potential	  clients	  are	  in	  fact	  being	  targeted	  and	  reached	  by	  the	  MFIs.	  	  A	  number	  of	  different	  models	  exist,	  including	  upgraded	  and	  downscaled	  banks,	  NGOs	  and	  cooperatives.	  	  There	  is	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  products	  and	  services	  for	  clients	  to	  choose	  from,	  and	  competition	  has	  largely	  led	  to	  increased	  efficiency,	  beneficial	  to	  clients.	  	   However,	   recent	   regulatory	   changes	  are	  holding	   the	   sector	  back	   from	  reaching	   its	  full	   potential	   and	   serving	   its	   clients	   best.	   	   The	   populist	   agenda	   of	   President	   Correa	   has	  caused	  some	  changes	  to	  take	  place	  that	  are	  detrimental	  to	  the	  health	  and	  success	  of	  MFIs,	  which	   ultimately	   harm	   the	   consumer	  most.	   	   Implementing	   interest	   rate	   caps	   has	   caused	  institutions	  to	  attempt	  to	  recuperate	  the	  sums	  they	  miss	  out	  on	  through	  other	  means,	  and	  has	  also	  meant	  sacrificing	  some	  efficiency.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  has	  led	  to	  some	  MFIs	  moving	  out	  of	  the	   market	   entirely,	   as	   they	   can	   no	   longer	   remain	   profitable.	   	   Other	   MFIs	   have	   had	   to	  compromise	   their	  mission	   statements	   to	   a	   certain	   degree,	   as	   they	   simply	   provide	   higher	  average	   loans,	   which	   often	   means	   excluding	   the	   very	   poor,	   and	   women.	   	   The	   industry	  interventions	   by	   the	   President	   have	   harmed	   institutions	   and	   clients	   alike,	   rather	   than	  having	  benefitted	  them.	  	   Upon	   closer	   examination	   of	   the	   overindebtedness	   crisis	   that	   President	   Correa	  announced	   in	   2012,	   which	   ultimately	   sparked	   many	   of	   the	   changes	   in	   the	   regulatory	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environment	   that	   are	   taking	  place,	   it	   can	  be	   seen	   that	   there	   is	   indeed	   cause	   for	   concern.	  	  While	   it	  may	  not	  be	  a	  crisis	  at	  this	  point	   in	  time,	   if	   trends	  continue,	   it	  may	  easily	  become	  one.	  	  There	  is	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  clients	  who	  are	  in	  arrears.	  	  Past-­‐due	  loans	  are	  highest	  in	  the	  microfinance	   loan	   portfolio,	   and	   the	   portion	   of	   the	   population	   in	   arrears	   has	   been	  increasing.	  	  Moreover,	  due	  in	  part	  to	  high	  competition	  amongst	  MFIs,	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	   the	   population	   borrows	   from	  multiple	   institutions	   at	   once,	   putting	   them	   into	   greater	  financial	  risk.	  	  The	  recent	  increase	  in	  credit	  card	  circulation	  has	  also	  brought	  with	  it	  a	  range	  of	  new	  problems.	   	  With	   little	  history	  of	  credit	  card	  use,	  many	  new	  clients	  are	  unaware	  of	  the	  exact	  interest	  rates,	  terms	  and	  fees	  connected	  to	  their	  cards	  upon	  signing	  up.	  	  Lured	  to	  sign	   up	   by	   adamant	   credit	   card	   companies,	   and	   sometimes	   even	   banks,	   clients	   are	   later	  surprised	   to	   find	   themselves	   with	   a	   significant	   sum	   of	   debts,	   unaware	   of	   how	   they	   got	  there.	   Combined	   with	   the	   threat	   of	   the	   last	   remaining	   independent	   credit	   bureau	   being	  forced	  to	  close	  down,	  so	  as	  to	  make	  credit	  rating	  a	  public	  entity,	  there	  is	  a	  serious	  risk	  of	  overindebtedness,	  which	  will	   increase	   to	  much	   higher	   and	   drastic	   levels	   in	   the	   future,	   if	  trends	  continue.	  	  	  	   While	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  regulatory	  changes	  to	  reverse	  some	  of	  these	  interventions	  are	  necessary,	   such	   change	   is	  more	   difficult	   to	   achieve.	   	   However,	   financial	   education	   is	   one	  way	  to	  at	  least	  inform	  clients	  of	  wiser	  financial	  use	  and	  behavior,	  and	  mitigate	  the	  effects	  some	  of	  these	  interventions	  are	  having.	   	   	  This	  is	  a	  far	  easier	  change	  to	  achieve,	  and	  many	  MFIs	   have	   already	   begun	   developing	   and/or	   providing	   different	   forms	   of	   financial	  education	  to	  their	  clients.	  	  What	  is	  needed	  is	  to	  continue	  along	  this	  path,	  and	  develop	  them	  further,	  so	  all	  MFIs	  can	  provide	  such	  services	  to	  their	  clients.	  	  As	  studies	  show,	  mandatory	  financial	   education	   programs	   have	   achieved	   significant	   success	   in	   improving	   client’s	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financial	   behavior.	   In	   Ecuador,	   system-­‐wide	   financial	   education	   is	   critical	   in	   order	   to	  provide	   resources	   to	   financially	   at-­‐risk	   clients,	   thereby	   enabling	   them	   to	   make	   better	  financial	   decisions.	   Moreover,	   having	   it	   be	   mandatory	  means	   financial	   institutions	   don’t	  have	  to	  fear	  losing	  their	  client	  base	  due	  to	  competition.	  	  	  	   These	  recent	  changes	  in	  Ecuadorian	  microfinance	  have	  largely	  mirrored	  many	  of	  the	  problems	   the	   industry	   faces	  globally.	   	  Various	  MFI	  administrators	   through	  Latin	  America	  have	  cited	  overindebtedness	  and	  political	  intervention	  as	  top	  problems	  facing	  the	  industry.	  The	   issues	   Ecuador	   is	   grappling	   with	   are	   not	   unique,	   and	   are	   reflected	   in	   other	   Latin	  American	  MFI	  markets,	  and	  in	  many	  instances	  throughout	  the	  world.	  	  The	  exact	  causes	  and	  issues	   faced	   in	   these	   various	   contexts	   are	   of	   course	   slightly	   different,	   but	   the	   fact	   that	  financial	  products	  and	  services	  have	  grown	  at	  a	  rate	  far	  faster	  than	  financial	  education	  and	  guidance	  on	  how	   to	  use	   these	   capabilities	   remains	   true	  worldwide.	   	  Thus,	   it	   is	   critical	   to	  begin	   addressing	   this	   gap,	   by	   examining	   MFI	   markets	   locally,	   conducting	   surveys	   and	  performing	  extensive	  market	   research,	   in	  order	   to	  best	   address	   the	  needs	  of	   clients,	   and	  provide	  them	  with	  the	  most	  effective	  and	  comprehensive	  tools	  so	  they	  can	  best	  make	  use	  of	  the	  financial	  services	  now	  available	  to	  more	  people	  than	  ever	  before.	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